Snyder v. Curran Tp.

• Decision Date: 26 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 78212,78212
• Citation: 657 N.E.2d 988,212 Ill.Dec. 643,167 Ill.2d 466
• Parties: , 212 Ill.Dec. 643 Norma L. SNYDER et al., Appellants, v. CURRAN TOWNSHIP, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 988

657 N.E.2d 988

167 Ill.2d 466, 212 Ill.Dec. 643

Norma L. SNYDER et al., Appellants, v. CURRAN TOWNSHIP, Appellee.

No. 78212.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 26, 1995.

Barber, Segatto, Hoffee & Hines, of Springfield (Barry O. Hines and R. Kurt Wilke, of counsel), for appellants.

Judge & James, Ltd., of Park Ridge (Jay S. Judge, Kristine A. Karlin, Michael J. Toussaint and Gregory R. James, of counsel), for appellee.

Justice HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a trial in the circuit court of Sangamon County, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Norma L. Snyder for personal injuries she sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant, Curran Township, filed a post-trial motion for a judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. The appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion, finding that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiffs as a matter of law. (267 Ill.App.3d 174, 204 Ill.Dec. 44, 641 N.E.2d 3.) We granted plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal (145 Ill.2d R. 315) to address whether the doctrine of discretionary immunity provides absolute immunity to municipalities for the negligent placement of traffic warning devices. We conclude that it does not and, accordingly, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

In the afternoon of March of 1987, Norma L. Snyder was driving east on Route 7 South At trial, plaintiffs' expert testified that, although the State manual required defendant to place the warning sign on the right side of the road and 425 feet in advance of the curve, the defendant placed the sign on the left side of the roadway, approximately 67 to 120 feet before the curve. (This range is set forth due to the parties' disagreement over the true distance: plaintiffs contend that the sign was placed 67 feet before the curve, while defendant contends that the sign was placed 120 feet before the curve.) The Curran Township highway commissioner testified that he posted the right reverse turn sign because the curve was dangerous. He also testified that he did not consult the State manual prior to posting the warning sign; rather, he placed the sign where he thought it would be most obvious to motorists.

[212 Ill.Dec. 645] a narrow township road in rural Sangamon County. After failing to successfully negotiate a sharp right bend in the road at the top of a hill, she lost control of her van. She sustained severe injuries, including her permanent loss of sight. In their subsequent action against defendant, Curran Township, plaintiffs, Norma L. Snyder and her husband, Dean L. Snyder, alleged that its failure to place a sign warning of the curve in conformity with the State manual was the proximate cause of her accident.

After trial, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff Norma L. Snyder for $1,077,000, which was reduced to $581,580 based on the jury's finding that she was 46% contributorily negligent. The jury awarded plaintiff Dean L. Snyder nothing for his loss of consortium claim. Curran Township appealed.

The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, concluded that defendant's sign placement was protected by discretionary immunity and that, as a result, defendant owed no duty to plaintiffs as a matter of law. The appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. 267 Ill.App.3d at 176, 204 Ill.Dec. 44, 641 N.E.2d 3.

ANALYSIS

Sections 2-109 and 2-201 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Immunity Act) grant immunity to public entities for the performance of discretionary functions. These sections provide:

"A local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable." 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 1992).

"Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused." 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1992).

Defendant's chief contention is that its decision as to where to place the warning sign at issue is wholly discretionary and therefore within the ambit of these immunity provisions.

Plaintiffs counter, however, that the decision where to place a sign is not discretionary because section 11-304 of the Illinois Vehicle Code mandates compliance with the State manual in erecting warning devices. Section 11-304 of the Vehicle Code provides:

"Local traffic-control devices. Local authorities and road district highway commissioners in their respective maintenance jurisdiction shall place and maintain such traffic-control devices upon highways under their maintenance jurisdiction as are required to indicate and carry out the provisions of this Chapter, and local traffic ordinances or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic. All such traffic control devices shall conform to the State Manual and Specifications and shall be justified by traffic warrants stated in the Manual. Placement of traffic-control devices on township or road district roads also shall be subject to the written approval of the county engineer or superintendent of highways." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11-304 (West 1992).

Defendant acknowledges that section 11-304 mandates compliance with the State manual. ¹ However, defendant contends that the language of the Illinois Manual itself suggests that a governmental official may use his discretion in erecting these warning devices. Defendant points to the introductory section of the Illinois Manual, in which the requirements for the design, installation or use of traffic control devices are indicated by the terms "shall," "should," or "may." The Illinois Manual defines these terms as "mandatory condition," "advisory condition," or "permissive condition," respectively. (Illinois Manual § 1A-5.) With respect to the placement of the warning sign at issue here, the Illinois Manual provides, in pertinent part:

" § 2A-21 Standardization of Location

Standardization of position cannot always be attained in practice; however, the general rule is to locate signs on the right-hand side of the roadway, where the driver is looking for them. On wide expressways, or where some degree of lane-use control is desirable, or where space is not available at the roadside, overhead signs are often necessary. Signs in any other locations ordinarily should be considered only as supplementary to signs in the normal locations. Under some circumstances signs may be placed on channelizing islands or (as on sharp curves to the right) on the left-hand shoulder of the road, directly in front of approaching vehicles. A supplementary sign located on the left of the roadway is often helpful on a multi-lane road where traffic in the right-hand lane may obstruct the view to the right." (Emphasis added.) (Illinois Manual § 2A-21.)

Subsequently, in the section entitled "Placement of Warning Signs," the Illinois Manual provides:

"Warning signs shall be erected in accordance with the general requirements for sign position as described in Section 2A-21 to 29." (Emphasis added.) Illinois Manual § 2C-3.

Defendant suggests that these provisions, taken together, expressly allow for the highway commissioner's exercise of discretion in placing warning signs. The appellate court agreed, finding that nothing in the language of the Illinois Manual imposed a mandatory, ministerial duty. Thus, it ruled that defendant's decision regarding placement of the warning sign was discretionary and was immune from liability pursuant to section 2-201 of the Immunity Act. We disagree.

Initially, we question defendant's contention that the relevant sign placement language in the Illinois Manual is merely "permissive." Although the Illinois Manual concedes that uniformity in sign placement cannot always be achieved, section 2A-21 does make clear that signs in any location other than the right-hand side of the road or overhead the road should only be considered as supplementary to signs in these standard locations. Moreover, the Illinois Manual states that warning signs "shall" be placed in accordance with the general placement requirements of section 2A-21. In short, we do not perceive the same degree of latitude in the Illinois Manual which defendant perceives. Nothing in section 2A-21 contemplates locating a warning sign solely on the left-hand side of the roadway, as occurred in the instant case. ²

In addition to placing a warning sign only on the left-hand side of the roadway, plaintiffs also set forth other examples of the defendant's noncompliance with the Illinois Manual at trial. Section 2C-3 of the Illinois Manual provides a table for the placement of warning signs, which lists "suggested minimum sign placement distances." (Illinois Manual § 2C-3.) Plaintiffs' expert, relying on this table, testified that the warning sign should have been placed 425 feet in front of the curve, instead of the distance of 67 to 120 feet where the warning sign was posted. Plaintiffs also contended at trial that defendant did not, pursuant to section 11-304 of the Vehicle Code, receive written approval from the county superintendent of highways prior to the placement of the sign in question. ³ See 625 ILCS 5/11-304 (West 1992).

In light of the applicable regulations and statutes, we agree with the plaintiffs that the issue of compliance or noncompliance with the Illinois Manual was a question properly before the jury. Section 11-304, by mandating compliance with the Illinois Manual, establishes defendant's duty of reasonable care. Whether that duty was breached is a jury question, turning on an examination of the applicable provisions of the Illinois Manual and the facts of a particular case. To countenance defendant's interpretation of the statutes and regulations would...