Snyder v. State

• Decision Date: 01 April 1983
• Docket Number: No. 6405,6405
• Citation: 661 P.2d 638
• Parties: Billy J. SNYDER, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
• Court: Alaska Court of Appeals

Page 638

661 P.2d 638

Billy J. SNYDER, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. 6405.

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

April 1, 1983.

Mary E. Greene, Asst. Public Defender, Fairbanks, and Dana Fabe, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.

William H. Hawley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Sp. Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Wilson L. Condon, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.

Before BRYNER, C.J., and COATS and SINGLETON, JJ.

OPINION

COATS, Judge.

The state indicted Billy J. Snyder on nine counts of burglary in the first-degree, violations of AS 11.46.300(a)(1). A jury convicted him on six counts. Under presumptive sentencing, Snyder was sentenced to a seven-year term on each count, with three years suspended, each term to be served concurrently. Snyder was also ordered to make restitution to the burglary victims. Snyder appeals his convictions, arguing that his motions for judgments of acquittal should have been granted and that a search warrant under which items taken during the burglaries were found at Snyder's home was unlawfully issued. We affirm the convictions.

On August 25, 1980, the North Pole home of Terry D. Hill and Margaret Gossweiler was burglarized. The house was ransacked, and a large amount of gold, jewelry and ivory was taken.

Six months later, on February 25, 1981, the homes of Joan Kinney and Preston and Judy Fowler were burglarized. The two residences are approximately two miles apart in the vicinity of Fairbanks. The front door of the Kinney residence had been broken in, and the bedroom was left in disarray. A camera, flash attachment, jewelry and a pillowcase were stolen. The front door of the Fowler residence, like that of the Kinney residence, had been forced open. Jewelry, a camera, a watch, coins and a pillowcase were taken from the Fowler residence.

On March 10, 1981, two more burglaries occurred at residences in close proximity. The McFarlane home and the Herting home were burglarized. The front door of the McFarlane residence was kicked in, and property was taken. Several items, including a box of change and two rings, were taken from the Herting home.

On March 11, 1981, the day after the McFarlane and Herting burglaries, the Youngblood home in North Pole was burglarized. The burglars gained entrance to the Youngblood residence by kicking in a garage entry door. Several items were taken from the Youngblood residence, including a pair of double-lock "Chief of Police" handcuffs.

Roughly two weeks after the Youngblood burglary, on March 26, 1981, Trooper Howard Burger submitted his affidavit in support of a warrant to search the Snyder residence. The warrant was to authorize a search of that residence for shoes that could have made the prints found at the burglary scenes, and for items stolen in the McFarlane, Youngblood and Ballam burglaries. (Snyder was indicted but not convicted on the Ballam burglary count.)

The affidavit recited strong circumstantial evidence linking Snyder to the McFarlane, Ballam, and Youngblood burglaries. Cars registered to Snyder and his friend Larry Frey were seen at the residences on the days they were burglarized. One of the cars was also driven by three individuals who, according to the testimony of another homeowner, were apparently casing his home for a possible burglary. The affidavit contained a statement from Snyder's probation officer saying that Snyder was living at his parent's home along with one Larry Frey. Other statements in the affidavit indicated that Snyder was known to frequently be in the company of both Frey and Frey's sister, Bridgette. Individuals matching the description of Snyder and the two Freys were seen in the cars placed at the burglarized homes by several eyewitnesses. Snyder, Larry and Bridgette Frey were stopped while driving together in one of the cars seen at the burglarized homes by a state trooper. Larry Frey's footprint was examined and found to be similar to footprints found at the burglarized homes. The affidavit also stated that Snyder was on probation for burglary and that Larry Frey was awaiting sentencing on a second-degree theft conviction. District Court Judge Stephen Cline issued the warrant on March 26, 1982. The warrant authorized a search of the Snyder residence, trailers and vehicles for shoes and boots matching the prints left at the McFarlane and Youngblood burglaries and for property stolen during those two burglaries as well as property taken during the Ballam burglary. The search was conducted on March 27, 1981. Some of the property sought under the warrant, as well as other stolen property not listed in the warrant, was found at the Snyder residence. Jewelry, a photograph showing Snyder wearing jewelry, the "Chief of Police" handcuffs, as well as other items of incriminating evidence were found in two footlockers. Other personal effects in the footlockers indicated that the footlockers were used by Snyder and Bridgette Frey.

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Snyder contends that the state's evidence was inadequate to convict him on any of the burglary counts. Consequently, he claims that Judge Taylor should have granted his motion for a judgment of acquittal as to each count.

In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal the test is whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences therefrom in a manner most favorable to the state, "fair-minded men in the exercise of reasonable judgment could differ on the question of whether guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt ...." Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981) (citations and footnotes omitted). Put another way, "a motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted only when fair-minded persons would have to agree that the state had failed to carry its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the motion should be denied." Gipson v. State, 609 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Alaska 1980). In this case there was no direct evidence of Snyder's guilt; the state's evidence was circumstantial, and "[n]o different standard applies when the state's evidence is circumstantial rather than direct." Stumbaugh v. State, 599 P.2d 166, 173 (Alaska 1979); see Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d at 453.

Snyder argues that the state failed to link him to items that were stolen and recovered by the police and presented by the state as evidence at trial. Snyder contends that the judgments of acquittal should have been granted for one reason only: the state failed to demonstrate that Snyder's possession of any of the items submitted by the state as evidence was "exclusive." Snyder argues that since he, Bridgette and Larry Frey had access to the footlockers in which certain prosecution evidence was found, no juror could reasonably conclude that those items were in his "exclusive" possession.

In Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025, 1035 (Alaska 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), the Alaska Supreme Court noted that:

Wigmore suggests that what is minimally required to permit an inference of theft from possession is that the possession be exclusive, unexplained, and fairly close in time to the commission of the crime. The majority of jurisdictions which follow this rule have held that the questions of whether the possession was sufficiently recent and sufficiently exclusive to justify an inference of guilt are questions of fact for the jury. Thus, according to our standard of sufficiency of the evidence, the judge should rule on the question of exclusivity as a matter of law only when the evidence that possession was not exclusive is so persuasive that fair-minded men exercising reasonable judgment could not differ with that conclusion. [Footnotes omitted; emphasis added.]

Snyder contends that a jury could not reasonably infer that the items seized from the footlockers evidenced his participation in the burglaries in which the items were taken because both Bridgette and Larry Frey also had access to the footlockers. Thus, Snyder concludes his possession of the items was not "exclusive," as the above standard requires.

Snyder's argument is without merit. Where two or more persons have access to particular items and control over the items, they may both or all be deemed to have "exclusive" possession of the items. State v. Pederson, 102 Ariz. 60, 424 P.2d 810, 818 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 867, 88 S.Ct. 138, 19 L.Ed.2d 142 (1967); Martinez v. People, 162 Colo. 195, 425 P.2d 299, 301 (Colo.1967); People v. Klausing, 41 Ill.App.3d 588, 353 N.E.2d 441, 443 (Ill.App.1976). Put another way, two or more persons can be in "exclusive and joint" possession of items seized as evidence. Here, Snyder, Bridgette and Larry Frey clearly had access to and control over the footlockers wherein the items used as evidence against Snyder were found. The three individuals were in "joint and exclusive" possession of the items contained in the footlockers. Moreover, given the additional evidence implicating Snyder, a jury could reasonably conclude that Snyder was in possession of items stolen during the course of the burglaries.

Having discussed the issue of "exclusive" possession, we now discuss whether or not there was sufficient evidence to convict Snyder of burglary such that "fair-minded men in the exercise of reasonable judgment could differ on the question of whether guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt...." Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d at 453.

COUNT I

Count I charged that Snyder burglarized the Hill home on August 25, 1980. Items taken during that burglary, including necklaces, were identified by Mrs. Hill as being similar to necklaces in a picture of Snyder recovered from the black footlocker. A jewelry box like the one taken during the burglary and taken by the police from the black footlocker was also identified by Mrs. Hill. Sherry Chiantelli testified that in late August of 1980 Snyder gave her a piece of jewelry from the Hill residence as a birthday present and that she observed...