Soerries v. Dancause
| Decision Date | 02 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. A00A1882.,A00A1882. |
| Parties | SOERRIES v. DANCAUSE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Grogran, Jones, Rumer & Gunby, Lee R. Grogan, Columbus, Christopher J. McFadden, Decatur, for appellant.
William J. Mason, Columbus, for appellee.
In this dram shop liability case, William A. Soerries appeals from a jury verdict that pierced the corporate veil and held him personally liable for damages. Because we find that the evidence presented supported the jury's verdict, we affirm.
The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,1 show that Soerries was the sole shareholder of Chickasaw Club, Inc., which operated a popular nightclub in Columbus for 23 years until it closed in 1999. At approximately 11:45 p.m. on July 31, 1996, 18-year-old Aubrey Lynn Pursley was intoxicated when she entered the Chickasaw Club. Although a Columbus ordinance prohibits individuals under 21 years old from entering nightclubs, it is undisputed that club employees did not check Pursley's identification to establish her age. A friend testified that Pursley already was intoxicated when she arrived at the club. Even so, friends testified that Pursley drank additional alcohol at the club and was visibly intoxicated when she left at approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 1, 1996. Security videotapes showed that she left the club with a beer in her hand. Shortly thereafter, Pursley was killed when she lost control of her car and struck a tree.
Joseph Dancause, Pursley's stepfather, sued Chickasaw Club, Inc. and Soerries individually for the cost of the car and for punitive damages. Following a trifurcated jury trial,2 the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, which pierced the corporate veil and found Soerries jointly liable with the corporation for $6,500 in compensatory damages and solely liable for $187,500 in punitive damages.3 Soerries appeals from this judgment.
Soerries argues that Dancause presented insufficient evidence to justify piercing the corporate veil. We disagree. As we have held:
The concept of piercing the corporate veil is applied in Georgia to remedy injustices which arise where a party has overextended his privilege in the use of a corporate entity in order to defeat justice, perpetrate fraud or to evade contractual or tort responsibility. Because the cardinal rule of corporate law is that a corporation possesses a legal existence separate and apart from that of its officers and shareholders, the mere operation of corporate business does not render one personally liable for corporate acts. Sole ownership of a corporation by one person or another corporation is not a factor, and neither is the fact that the sole owner uses and controls it to promote his ends. There must be evidence of abuse of the corporate form. Plaintiff must show that the defendant disregarded the separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or confusing the otherwise separate properties, records or control. In deciding this enumeration of error, we are confronted with two maxims that sometimes conflict. On the one hand, we are mindful that great caution should be exercised by the court in disregarding the corporate entity. On the other, it is axiomatic that when litigated, the issue of piercing the corporate veil is for the jury, unless there is no evidence sufficient to justify disregarding the corporate form.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) J-Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. at 459, 460(1), 462 S.E.2d 406 (1995). See also Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, 194 Ga.App. 840, 844(2)(a), 392 S.E.2d 37 (1990).
In this case, the jury heard testimony from Larry Jones, who managed the Chickasaw Club for 20 years. Jones testified that the club was open four nights a week and regularly admitted an average of 250 people who paid cover charges of $3 to $4 each. Additional patrons were also admitted, so that the club sometimes exceeded its capacity of 477 people. According to Jones, he and the other employees were paid each night in cash by Soerries out of the proceeds of the club. Although Jones testified that 1996 was a "bad year" for the corporation and that he was paid between $10,000 and $12,000, corporate payroll records reported his earnings as only $5,690. Jones admitted that Soerries sometimes paid him extra cash that was not reported to the club's bookkeeper.
It is undisputed that Soerries paid his employees, suppliers, and entertainers in cash and not from existing corporate checking accounts. One employee admitted he was paid "under the table." The employee never appeared on corporate payroll records, although Soerries admitted giving him money to help out around the club.
Corporate tax returns showed that, even though the Chickasaw Club was a busy nightclub, it regularly declared business losses. On...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Friedman's Inc.
...pierces the corporate veil. McKesson Corp., 266 Ga.App. at 166, 597 S.E.2d 447 (refusing to pierce corporate veil); Soerries 248 Ga.App. at 376, 546 S.E.2d 356 (piercing the corporate veil without making express finding on issue of insolvency). The Court thus rejects plaintiffs argument. Th......
-
Trading v. Jitc, LLC
...or fraud." Boafo, 338 S.E.2d at 479. In other words, there "'must be evidence of abuse of the corporate form.'" Soerries v. Dancause, 546 S.E.2d 356, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting J-Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design, 462 S.E.2d 406 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)). Different terms are used, su......
-
Reheis v. Baxley Creosoting & Osmose Wood Preserving Co.
...environment. 2. See generally Nat Katz & Assoc. v. Barber, 255 Ga.App. 207, 208-209(1), 564 S.E.2d 802 (2002); Soerries v. Dancause, 248 Ga.App. 374, 375, 546 S.E.2d 356 (2001). Compare Jennings v. Smith, 226 Ga.App. 765, 766(1), 487 S.E.2d 362 (1997) (corporate officer who participates in ......
-
Bryant v. Optima Int'l, Inc.
...whether the alter ego doctrine should apply and allow the entities and the shareholders to be treated as one); Soerries v. Dancause , 248 Ga.App. 374, 375, 546 S.E.2d 356 (2001) (when litigated, the question of whether the alter ego doctrine applies "is for the jury, unless there is no evid......