Soil Preparation, Inc. v. Town of Plymouth
| Decision Date | 28 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. BCD-CV-16-32 |
| Parties | SOIL PREPARATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF PLYMOUTH, Defendant. |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
Plaintiff Soil Preparation, Inc. ("SPI") has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on Counts I, III, and V of its complaint. For the following reasons, SPI's motion is denied. Pursuant to Maine Rule Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is entered for Defendant Town of Plymouth (the "Town") on Counts I, III, and V of SPI's complaint.
SPI has operated a facility in Plymouth, Maine since 1995. (Pl. Supp'g S.M.F. ¶ 7; Def. Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 7.) SPI receives and processes septage, sludge, and other materials from several municipalities and quasi-municipal entities throughout Maine. (Id. ¶ 8.) SPI also receives and processes septage from licensed haulers. (Id. ¶ 9.)
SPI is subject to the authority of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") and its rules. (Id. ¶11.) There is no dispute that SPI is licensed by DEP to operate as a "Solid Waste Facility," as well as a "Solid Waste Processing Facility" and a "Waste Facility," as those terms are defined in the Maine Hazardous Waste, Septage and Solid Waste Management Act (the "Solid Waste Act"), 38 M.R.S. § 1301 et seq., and DEP's Solid Waste Management Rules (the "Solid Waste Rules"), 06-096 C.M.R. ch. 400 et seq.1 (Id. ¶ 10.)
On March 19, 2016, the Town of Plymouth (the "Town") adopted "An Ordinance Regulating Solid Waste Facilities" (the "Solid Waste Ordinance" or "Ordinance"). (Id. ¶ 13.) The Ordinance's stated purpose is to protect the health and safety of the Town's residence, maintain the environment, conserve natural resources, and prevent pollution by regulating the processing, storage, and land applications of municipal and industrial wastewater treatment plant sludge and other residuals, septage, and solid waste. Plymouth, Me., Solid Waste Ordinance §§ 2.1-2.2 (March 19, 2016).
Pursuant to § 7.1 of the Solid Waste Ordinance:
The following activities shall be regulated by the Town of Plymouth and shall require a permit approval by the Planning Board: establishment or operation of solid waste facilities, including land spreading of sludge and residuals, storage of sludge and residuals, land spreading and storage of septage, and composting operations.
Id. § 7.1. Section 8.1, entitled "New Permits," further provides:
Id. § 8.1 (emphasis supplied).
On or about May 9, 2016, the Town sent a letter to SPI informing it of the new Solid Waste Ordinance and instructing SPI to submit an application to the Planning Board for a new permit no later than June 20, 2016. (Pl. Supp'g S.M.F. ¶ 19; Def. Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 19; Pl. Ex. C.) SPI submitted an application for a new permit on June 17, 2016. (Id. ¶ 20; Pl. Ex D.) In its cover letter to the application, SPI reserved all rights, claims, and defenses as to the applicability and validity of the Ordinance. (Id.)
SPI filed a complaint against the Town on July 28, 2016. SPI's complaint contains seven counts for declaratory judgment challenging the validity and applicability of the Ordinance and two civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶¶ 38-104.) The Town answered on August 26, 2016. This matter was subsequently transferred to the Business and Consumer Court.
SPI filed a motion for summary judgment on Counts I, III, and V of its complaint on January 9, 2017. SPI request that the court enter summary judgment declaring the following: (1) that the authority the Town intends to exercise pursuant to the Solid Waste Ordinance exceeds the powers allowed by the Legislature pursuant to 38 M.R.S. § 1310-U of the Solid Waste Act (Count I); (2) that § 1310-U specifies the areas in which municipalities can impose standards, that the Ordinance exceeds those areas, and that Ordinance is therefore invalid (Count III); and (3) that, pursuant to the terms of § 1.2 of the Ordinance, the Town's Solid Waste Ordinance does not apply to SPI's pre-existing facility (Count V). (Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 2.) The Town filed its opposition on February 10, 2017.2 SPI filed its reply on February 24, 2017.
Summary judgment is appropriate if, based on the parties' statements of material fact and the cited record, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); Dyer v. Dep't of Transp., 2008 ME 106, ¶ 14, 951 A.2d 821. Where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the questions before the court are purely questions of law for the court, summary judgment is an appropriate device for deciding such dispositive questions. Magno v. Town of Freeport, 486 A.2d 137, 141 (Me. 1985). Furthermore, where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, the court may enter summary judgment against the moving party without the need for a cross-motion by the non-moving party. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); 3 Harvey, Maine Civil Practice § 56.10 at 251 (3d ed. 2011).
Maine's Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, 14 M.R.S. § 5951 et seq., authorizes the courts "to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." 14 M.R.S. § 5953. The court may issue a declaratory judgment whenever "a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty." Id. § 5957. Any person whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute or municipal ordinance may seek a declaratory judgment to determine any question of interpretation or validity arising under a statute or ordinance. Id. § 5954. Thus, a declaratory judgment action isan appropriate method for challenging the validity of an ordinance as beyond the lawful authority of the municipality. Sold, Inc. v. Town of Gorham, 2005 ME 24, ¶ 14, 868 A.2d 172.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law for the court. Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Devereux Marine, Inc., 2013 ME 37, ¶ 8, 68 A.3d 1262. In order to effectuate the drafters' intent, the court first looks to the plain language of the statute. Guar. Tr. Life Ins. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins., 2013 ME 102, ¶ 17, 82 A.3d 121. In the absence of statutory definitions, the court affords statutory terms their plain, common, and ordinary meaning. Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 ME 158, ¶ 22, 107 A.3d 621. All words in a statute must be given meaning. Cent. Me. Power Co., 2013 ME 37, ¶ 8, 68 A.3d 1262. No words are to be treated as mere surplusage. Id. The court examines other indicia of the drafters' intent only when the plain language of the statute is ambiguous. Berube v. Rust Eng'g, 668 A.2d 875, 877 (Me. 1995).
The interpretation of local ordinances is also a question of law for the court. Rudolph v. Golick, 2010 ME 106, ¶ 8, 8 A.3d 684. Like statutes, the court examines ordinances for their plain meaning and construes the terms of ordinances reasonably "in light of the purposes and objectives of the ordinance and its general structure." Id. ¶ 9. The court will not construe the ordinance as to create "absurd, inconsistent, unreasonable, or illogical results." Duffy v. Town of Berwick, 2013 ME 105, ¶ 23, 82 A.3d 148. "An ordinance may not be interpreted in such a way to read a provision out of existence or to render it surplusage." Jade Realty Corp. v. Town of Eliot, 2008 ME 80, ¶ 8, 946 A.2d 408. If the meaning of an ordinance is clear on its face, the court looks no further. Rudolph, 2010 ME 106, ¶ 9, 8 A.3d 684.
As discussed above, SPI seeks a declaratory judgment that the Town's Solid Waste Ordinance exceeds the authority permitted to municipalities by the Legislature under 38 M.R.S. § 1310-U of the Solid Waste Act (Count I) and that § 1310-U specifies the areas in which municipalities can impose standards on solid waste facilities, that the Ordinance exceeds those areas, and that Ordinance is therefore invalid (Count III). (Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 2.)
SPI argues that § 1310-U expressly or by clear implication preempts municipal home rule authority to adopt ordinances regarding solid waste management. (Id. at 15, 18.) SPI further argues that, although § 1310-U preempts municipal authority, the statute permits municipalities to adopt ordinances the limited areas identified therein. (Id. at 14.) SPI argues that the Town's Solid Waste Ordinance exceeds the authority permitted to it under § 1310-U because (1) the Ordinance claims authority "coterminous" with the State's authority, (2) the Ordinance subjects existing facilities to permitting requirements by treating them like new facilities, and (3) § 8.2 and § 8.4 of the Ordinance claim de facto authority for the Town to enforce State and Federal enforcement and licensing decisions. (Id. at 19-21.)
The home rule provision of the Maine Constitution provides, Me. Const. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1. Maine's home rule statute further provides, "Any municipality, by the adoption, amendment or...
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