Sommermeyer v. Price
Decision Date | 03 December 1979 |
Docket Number | Nos. C-1679,C-1703,s. C-1679 |
Citation | 603 P.2d 135,198 Colo. 548 |
Parties | Mayo SOMMERMEYER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Christine E. Price, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Teresa Lynn PRICE, Alan Dale Price, and Jeff Wade Price, minors, by their next friend, Thomas W. Metcalf, Respondents. Teresa Lynn PRICE, Alan Dale Price, and Jeff Wade Price, minors, by their next friend, Thomas W. Metcalf, Petitioners, v. Mayo SOMMERMEYER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Christine E. Price, Deceased, Respondent. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Montgomery, Little, Young, Campbell & McGrew, P. C., H. Wayne Leiser, Donald G. Musselman, J. Bayard Young, Denver, for petitioner in No. C-1679 and for respondent in No. C-1703.
Samuel L. Anderson, Fort Collins, for respondents in No. C-1679 and for petitioners in No. C-1703.
Certiorari was granted to review the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Price v. Sommermeyer, 41 Colo.App. 147, 584 P.2d 1220 (1978). We affirm.
This is a wrongful death action brought by plaintiffs against a special administrator of their mother's estate to recover damages for the death of plaintiffs' father who was killed in an automobile accident, which occurred in Colorado on August 4, 1973. 1 Both the mother and the father were domiciliaries of Nebraska at the time of the accident. The mother was driving the father's automobile in which the father was riding as a passenger when the accident occurred. The only Colorado asset in the mother's estate was an automobile liability insurance policy.
A jury trial was held and a verdict was returned for the plaintiffs in the amount of $270,000, which was reduced by the court to $15,000 upon a stipulation by the parties that the amount of recovery would be limited to the coverage provided by the applicable insurance policy.
On appeal to the court of appeals, that court reversed the district court for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Price v. Sommermeyer, 39 Colo.App. 365, 567 P.2d 819 (1977). On certiorari, this court reversed the court of appeals in Price v. Sommermeyer, 195 Colo. 285, 577 P.2d 752 (1978), holding that there was subject matter jurisdiction. The cause was remanded to the court of appeals for determination of the other issues raised on appeal.
On reconsideration, the court of appeals then affirmed the trial court, holding that: (1) the minority disability provisions of C.R.S.1963, 87-2-3 (now section 13-81-103, C.R.S.1973) saved plaintiffs' cause of action despite their failure to obtain an administrator for their mother's estate within one year of her death as required by C.R.S.1963, 153-7-2 and 3; 2 (2) the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury that a driver's negligence may be imputed to the owner-passenger in a suit by the owner-passenger against the driver; and (3) because the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, section 42-7-413(1)(c), C.R.S.1973, was not applicable, the damage award should be reduced from $15,000 to $10,000. We then granted certiorari and now affirm the court of appeals.
Defendant contends that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by their failure to procure the appointment of an administrator for their mother's estate within one year of her death as required by the then applicable statutes, C.R.S.1963, 153-7-2 and 3. C.R.S.1963, 153-7-2 provided:
C.R.S.1963, 153-7-3 provided:
The court of appeals held that the plaintiffs, as minors, were not bound by the one-year limitation established by C.R.S.1963, 153-7-2 and 3 because of the operation of the disability provisions of C.R.S.1963, 87-2-3. 3
Defendant argues that this holding was error, and he characterizes the foregoing statutes as nonclaim statutes, which cannot be tolled by a statutorily recognized disability, citing Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hospital, 166 Colo. 1, 441 P.2d 153 (1968). We do not agree, and hold, for the reasons hereinafter stated, that plaintiffs' cause of action is not barred by the aforementioned statutes.
We do not regard Randall as controlling the disposition here. In Randall an estate had been properly opened and the Colorado State Hospital filed a late claim. This court held, overruling its previous decision in State v. Estate of Griffith, 130 Colo. 312, 275 P.2d 945 (1954), that the state of Colorado or its subdivisions, as a claimant, is subject to the same limitation for filing a claim as any other creditor who makes a claim against the estate of a decedent.
In the instant case, no estate was opened against which a claim could be filed. We interpret the language of this court in Randall that a nonclaim statute operates to deprive a court of jurisdiction as limited only to late filed claims in a then pending estate. In other words, once an estate was opened and a notice to creditors had been given, the court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate untimely filed claims.
At issue in the present case is whether the one-year period in which creditors must apply for administration of a decedent's estate is tolled for a claimant who is under disability as provided by C.R.S.1963, 87-2-3. We answer in the affirmative. The statute does not indicate otherwise. The applicability of the statute is stated as follows:
"Statute begins to run when. (1)(a) Whenever in Any of the statutes of the state of Colorado Heretofore or hereafter enacted, a limitation is fixed upon the time within which a right of action, right of redemption, or any other right, may be asserted either affirmatively or by way of defense, or an action, suit or proceeding based thereon, may be brought, commenced, maintained or prosecuted, and the true owner of said right is a person under disability at the time such right accrues, then:
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