Sonny v. Balch Motor Co.

• Citation: 328 Ark. 321,944 S.W.2d 87
• Decision Date: 28 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-384,96-384
• Parties: Paul B. SONNY, Appellant, v. BALCH MOTOR COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 87

944 S.W.2d 87

328 Ark. 321

Paul B. SONNY, Appellant, v. BALCH MOTOR COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 96-384.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 28, 1997.

James R. Wallace, Dale E. Adams, Little Rock, for Appellant.

Miriam T. Hopkins, Little Rock, for Appellee.

THORNTON, Justice.

Balch Motor Company sued Paul B. Sonny for an unpaid bill for repairs to Mr. Sonny's car. Mr. Sonny counterclaimed for damages from Balch in connection with Balch's efforts to prosecute him for theft of services. The jury found in favor of Balch for car repairs in the amount of $871.13, and against Mr. Sonny on his counterclaims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. On appeal to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, Mr. Sonny argued that the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence about a prior incident between the parties, and contended that Balch's use of peremptory strikes to exclude two black people from the jury was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals decided that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the introduction of evidence regarding the earlier incident and affirmed by a tie vote the trial court's decision that Balch's use of peremptory strikes did not violate Mr. Sonny's constitutional rights. Sonny v. Balch Motor Co., 52 Ark.App. 233, 917 S.W.2d 173 (1996).

We granted Mr. Sonny's petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals because of the tie vote on the question of a violation of Mr. Sonny's constitutional rights. We conduct our review pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(f) as though the case had originally been appealed to this court, and we conclude that the trial court's decision should be affirmed.

Whether Introduction of Evidence of Prior Lawsuit was Error

While Mr. Sonny did not specifically seek a review of the Court of Appeals' decision relating to the introduction of evidence regarding the earlier lawsuit, we first address that issue because it was included in his original appeal. Mr. Sonny claimed that the evidence of the earlier lawsuit between the parties should have been excluded pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 403 and 404. We will not reverse a lower court's determination regarding this evidentiary balancing of probative value against prejudice absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Wallace v. State, 326 Ark. 376, 379, 931 S.W.2d 113, 115 (1996); Jarrett v. State, 310 Ark. 358, 363, 833 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1992). After reviewing the record, we find that none of the evidence relating to the circumstances surrounding the prior lawsuit was used to prove that Mr. Sonny acted in conformity with the earlier incident in the circumstances at issue in this trial. Ark. R. Evid. 404. Rather, the trial court found the evidence to be relevant and admissible due to Mr. Sonny's counterclaim alleging malicious prosecution. ¹

We hold that the trial court's decision to admit the evidence of the earlier incident does not reflect a manifest abuse of discretion and affirm on this point.

Whether the State Unconstitutionally Used its Peremptory Strikes to Exclude Blacks from the Petit Jury

For his second point of appeal, Mr. Sonny claimed that Balch used its peremptory challenges at trial to exclude blacks from the petit jury in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as construed in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution forbids a prosecutor in a criminal case to use his peremptory strikes to exclude jurors solely on the basis of race. Id. at 84, 106 S.Ct. at 1716. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991), the Supreme Court extended its decision in Batson to private litigants who use peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors, and described its concern with racial bias in our legal system as follows:

Race discrimination within the courtroom raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted there. Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system, and prevents the idea of democratic government from becoming a reality.

Id. at 628, 111 S.Ct. at 2087 (citations omitted). This extension of the principle that racial bias has no place in the courtroom is salutary, as any exclusion from jury service on the basis of race violates the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors. Discrimination in jury selection in a civil action on the basis of race harms the person excluded from service no less than exclusion from a criminal jury. Id. at 618, 111 S.Ct. at 2081-82.

The goal of fairness in jury trials is also enhanced by the venerable practice of peremptory challenges, which dates back beyond the founding of the Republic to origins in the common law. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481, 110 S.Ct. 803, 807-08, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990) (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 346-48 (1769)); see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 215-18, 85 S.Ct. 824, 833-35, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). The historical practice of allowing the litigant to strike jurors for any reason came into being for the purpose of fostering both the perception and the reality of an impartial jury. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376, 13 S.Ct. 136, 138, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70-71, 7 S.Ct. 350, 351-52, 30 L.Ed. 578 (1887). The rationale supporting this practice remains valid except where the constitutional principles articulated by Batson and its progeny are violated. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. at 619-22, 111 S.Ct. at 2082-84.

Eliminating racial discrimination in the selection of jurors and simultaneously protecting the practice of peremptory challenges addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court. The basis for this deference is articulated in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991), where the Court stated:

In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.... [T]he state of mind of a juror ... based on demeanor and credibility lies "peculiarly within a trial judge's province."

Id. at 365, 111 S.Ct. at 1869 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 854, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). It is essential that trial courts charged with this responsibility be provided with clear statements of applicable principles of law. Recently, the Court has restated the principle that "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam).

While the Supreme Court decisions from Batson to Purkett have provided an analysis of the constitutional principles to be followed, we have recognized a need for an orderly process for resolving the issues. We pointed out in Watson v. State, 308 Ark. 444, 825 S.W.2d 569 (1992), that Batson was silent on the specific procedures that the states should use in implementing the Court's decisions. We stated that "[t]he upshot of this lack of direction has been that the states have been forced to chart their own courses in formulating procedures for the time, place, and manner of the Batson process." Id. at 449, 825 S.W.2d at 571. We then proceeded in Watson to establish that it is reversible error to force the defense counsel to make his Batson objection in front of the jury, thereby assuring that the entire proceeding be treated with great sensitivity. Id. at 451, 825 S.W.2d at 573.

We adhere to the basic structure prescribed by the Supreme Court, and we have further developed specific procedures for our courts to follow when considering a Batson challenge. The first requirement of a Batson objection is to make a prima facie case of prohibited discrimination in a peremptory challenge. Bradley v. State, 320 Ark. 100, 107, 896 S.W.2d 425, 429 (1995). ² If no prima facie case is presented, no neutral explanation is required. Tucker v. State, 313 Ark. 624, 629, 855 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1993) (affirming on other grounds the trial court's finding no Batson violation). When there is no challenge to whether a prima facie case has been made, but a race-neutral explanation is offered, the issue of a prima facie case becomes moot. Cleveland v. State, 326 Ark. 46, 49, 930 S.W.2d 316, 318 (1996) (quoting Prowell v. State, 324 Ark. 335, 345, 921 S.W.2d 585, 591 (1996)). As we further pointed out in Bradley, "[i]f the trial court finds that the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to provide a racially neutral explanation." Bradley v. State, 320 Ark. at 108, 896 S.W.2d at 429 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723).

Failure to require an explanation to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination before allowing the exercise of a peremptory challenge is error requiring reversal. Ward v. State, 293 Ark. 88, 93-94, 733 S.W.2d 728, 730-31 (1987). When a racially neutral explanation is offered to rebut the prima facie case, the trial court shall then determine from all relevant circumstances the sufficiency of the explanation. Colbert v. State, 304 Ark. 250, 255, 801 S.W.2d 643, 646 (1990); see also Tucker v. State, 313 Ark. at 629, 855 S.W.2d at 950.

We have affirmed a trial court's decision that a racially neutral explanation was a sufficient basis for the peremptory strike without further inquiry, stating:

Hence, we cannot say, under these circumstances, that the circuit court's acceptance of the prosecutor's justification was clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, a further inquiry on the matter was not warranted. On this...