Sophie G. v. Wilson Cnty. Sch.
| Decision Date | 12 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-6209,17-6209 |
| Parties | SOPHIE G., a minor child, by and through her parent and next friend, and KELLY G., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILSON COUNTY SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellee Wilson County Schools offers a subsidized after-school childcare program called "Kid's Club." Plaintiff-Appellant Kelly G. sought to enroll her seven-year-old daughter, Plaintiff-Appellant Sophie G., in Kid's Club but was denied access because Sophie was not toilet trained. Plaintiffs brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act, and the district court dismissed the complaint because it found Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). We REVERSE.
Sophie G. attends Tuckers Crossroads Elementary School in Wilson County, Tennessee. Kelly is employed full time and requires childcare for Sophie, both during the school year and during school breaks. Sophie has autism and developmental delay, which impairs her functional communication, sensory responses, movements, mannerisms, and social adaptation. Sophie is not fully toilet trained and needs a one-on-one attendant to assist with diapering.
Sophie receives special education services from Wilson County Schools. As a student receiving special education, Sophie's educational services are delivered under an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") uniquely designed for her disability by an "IEP Team" made up of her mother, teachers, and Wilson County administrators. Sophie's IEP addresses, among other things, social skills and toilet-independence training, including "donning [and] doffing" of clothes. [IEP, R.31-1 at PID 169, 171, 176].
Wilson County offers an extended-day childcare program (sometimes referred to as "after-school") known as "Kid's Club." Kid's Club is a registered childcare provider licensed under the laws of the State of Tennessee. Kid's Club, which has existed in Wilson County for approximately 25 years, operates at Tuckers Crossroads Elementary and eleven other locations in the Wilson County School District. Kid's Club programs utilize public facilities and funds in addition to receiving enrollment fees from parents.
Kelly sought to enroll Sophie in Kid's Club, which is less expensive than nonsubsidized after-school care. In September 2016, one of Sophie's classroom aides spoke with the Kid's Club on-site coordinator on Kelly's behalf to determine whether Sophie could attend the program. Kelly was told Sophie could not attend Kid's Club because she was not toilet trained. On October 11, 2016, Kelly inquired again about enrolling Sophie in Kid's Club, but was again told that Sophie could not attend because she was not "potty trained." Kelly continued seeking to enroll Sophie in Kids Club by calling the school district's Department of Exceptional Children and was told on October 20 and October 25 that "the program's rules barred Sophie's participation." Additionally, the School Board's Superintendent, Dr. Donna Wright, witnessed one of Sophie's diaper changes and determined that Sophie "squirmed" or was otherwise difficult to change.
In November 2016, Kelly authorized a due process complaint on Sophie's behalf in the Tennessee Department of Education pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 300.500, et seq. and Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. § 520-01-09-.18, et seq., asserting that Sophie's IEP provided insufficient "speech/language service," "Occupational Therapy," and "Behavioral Therapy"; did not provide support services for specific educational goals listed in the IEP; and that the services listed did not adequately support the associated educational goals. The complaint further alleged Wilson County violated the IDEA by failing to "design and implement an appropriate IEP" for the years 2014-2017, "fully and thoroughly evaluate/assess Sophie," or design appropriate services to assist Sophie.
The "History" section of Sophie's due process complaint also outlined her rejection from Kid's Club: [Due Process Compl., R.21-2 at PID 283-84] (listing Kelly's attempts to enroll Sophie in the program). This section concluded that "Wilson County Schools does not understand S., her support needs nor her present levels of functioning." [Id. at PID 284].
For "Relief," the complaint requested that Wilson County further evaluate Sophie, develop and implement an appropriate IEP, alter the IEP to include staff supports, and provide certain therapies. The complaint did not request Kid's Club admittance.
On April 12, 2017, an administrative judge entered a "Final Order Entered By Consent" ordering the due process complaint dismissed without prejudice as a result of the parties' settlement. The parties agreed that they had "resolved that substantive part of the Petitioner's complaint for due process seeking relief for educational benefits under the IDEA." [Final ConsentOrder, R.21-3 at PID 107]. The order noted that the parties could not [Id.].
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed this suit under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act alleging that Wilson County intentionally discriminated against Sophie when it denied her access to the Kid's Club program on the basis of her lack of independent toileting ability. Plaintiffs' complaint sought relief in the form of damages, attorney's fees, and an injunction requiring Wilson County to comply with the accessibility requirements under relevant law.
Wilson County moved to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to properly exhaust their administrative remedies. The district court agreed and granted the motion. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
We review de novo the district court's dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 649 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). "A court should not dismiss a plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) unless, after construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepting all factual allegations as true, the court determines that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Id. (citing Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)).
The IDEA ensures that children with disabilities receive necessary special-education services and provides administrative remedies to achieve that goal. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 245 (2009); Covington v. Knox Cty. Sch. Sys., 205 F.3d 912, 915 (6th Cir. 2000). The IDEA offers federal funds to states in exchange for a commitment to furnish a "freeappropriate public education" (a "FAPE") to all children with certain physical or intellectual disabilities. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1)(A), 1401(3)(A)(i) (listing covered disabilities). As defined in the IDEA, a FAPE comprises "special education and related services"—both "instruction" tailored to meet a child's needs and "supportive services" sufficient to permit the child to benefit from that instruction. Id. at § 1401.
Under the IDEA, an IEP serves as the "primary vehicle" for providing each child with the promised FAPE. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). A student's IEP outlines a personalized plan to meet all of the child's educational needs, documents the student's current "levels of academic achievement," specifies "measurable annual goals" for how she can "make progress in the general education curriculum," and lists the "special education and related services" to be provided so that she can "advance appropriately toward [those] goals." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).
The IDEA establishes formal procedures for resolving disputes. A parent or guardian may file a complaint regarding any matter concerning the provision of a FAPE with the local or state educational agency. Id. at § 1415(b)(6). That pleading triggers a "[p]reliminary meeting" involving "the parents and the relevant member or members of the IEP Team who have specific knowledge of the facts identified in the complaint." Id. at § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i). If the issue is not resolved, the matter proceeds to a "due process hearing" before an impartial hearing officer. § 1415(f)(1)(A). Any decision of the officer granting substantive relief must be "based on a determination of whether the child received a [FAPE]." Id. at § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). If the hearing is initially conducted at the local level, the ruling is appealable to the state agency. Id. at § 1415(g). Finally, any party unhappy with the outcome of the administrative process may seek judicial review by filing a civil action in state or federal court. Id. at § 1415(i)(2)(A).
Section 1415(l) of the IDEA addresses the Act's relationship with other statutory remedies and contains an exhaustion requirement:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought...
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