Sorenson v. Superior Court in and for Maricopa County

• Decision Date: 16 March 1927
• Docket Number: Civil 2600
• Citation: 31 Ariz. 421,254 P. 230
• Parties: S. C. SORENSON, Relator, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA, and JOSEPH S. JENCKES, Judge of Division No. 2 of the Said Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondents
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

254 P. 230

31 Ariz. 421

S. C. SORENSON, Relator, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA, and JOSEPH S. JENCKES, Judge of Division No. 2 of the Said Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondents

Civil No. 2600

Supreme Court of Arizona

March 16, 1927

Original proceedings for Writ of Prohibition. Alternative writ quashed.

Messrs Dougherty & Dougherty, for Relator.

Mr. E S. Clark and Mr. W. J. Van Spanckeren, for Respondents.

OPINION

LOCKWOOD, J.

S. C. Sorenson, hereinafter called relator, made application in this court for an original writ of prohibition directed against the superior court of Maricopa county and the judge of division No. 2 thereof, prohibiting them from proceeding with the hearing of action No. 25,853, pending in said superior court, on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to consider it. The particular action referred to was brought by R. B. Findley, hereinafter called contestant, for the purpose of contesting a school election. The complaint alleges, among other things, that on the thirty-first day of October, 1926, an election was held in the Mesa union high school district in Maricopa county for the purpose of choosing a member of the board of education of said district. At such election relator and one L. J. Barden were candidates. The returns were duly canvassed by the proper authorities, and relator was declared elected, whereupon contestant brought a contest, praying that Barden be declared the legally chosen member of the board. Relator demurred to the jurisdiction of the court, and after the matter had been duly argued and submitted, the demurrer was overruled, and the case noticed for further proceedings, whereupon an application was made to this court for a writ of prohibition as above set forth.

The first question before us is whether or not a writ of prohibition lies under these circumstances. We do not think it necessary or advisable to discuss this issue, as the application will be determined upon its merits. Assuming, therefore, for the purposes of this case, without deciding, that a writ of prohibition is the proper remedy, if as, contended by relator, the superior court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a contest of this nature, we pass to the consideration of whether or not such jurisdiction does as a matter of fact exist.

Election contests, of course, are unknown to common law, and can be instituted only when there is express statutory authorization therefor. McCall v. City of Tombstone, 21 Ariz. 161, 185 P. 942.

We must therefore look to our statutes to see if contestant is given any right therein to maintain his action. Such authority exists, if at all, by virtue of paragraph 3065, Revised Statutes of Arizona of 1913, Civil Code, which reads, so far as material to the determination of this question, as follows:

"Any elector of a county, city, or any political subdivision of either, may contest the right of any person declared elected to an office to be exercised therein for any of the following reasons. . . ."

It is apparent that the issue turns upon whether or not a union high school district is, within the language of the paragraph just quoted, a "political subdivision" of a county. If it is, a contest lies, of which the superior court has jurisdiction. If it is not, no contest is allowed, and that court has no right to consider it.

Is a union high school district a "subdivision" of a county? Chapter 7, title 11, Revised Statutes of Arizona of 1913, Civil Code, deals with the organization of school districts. From the various paragraphs of the chapter it appears that every school district is designated as "school district No. of county (using the name of the county in which such district is located)"; that in forming it applications must be made to a particular county school superintendent; that it must be carved out of one county; that reports of its boundaries must be made by the superintendent to the board of supervisors of that particular county, and that whenever two districts are consolidated the application must be made to one superintendent. The funds for the support of a district, except in so far as they come from the state itself, are raised by the action of the authorities of the county. Nowhere in the statutes is there any suggestion that a school district may be formed or operated, except as a part of some one county, or a division of consolidation of districts already existing in such county.

The provisions in regard to union high school districts are found in chapter 13 of the same title, and on examining them it is equally apparent the same principles apply to a union high school district as to a single district. It must be, necessarily, an organization formed from school districts of the same county, and the funds for its maintenance are levied by the board of supervisors of the county. It is therefore equally with the individual district a "subdivision" of a county. This, we think, cannot be successfully denied.

Is it, however, a "political" subdivision? "Political" has been defined by Webster as "relating to the management of affairs of state; of or pertaining to or incidental to the exercise of functions vested in those charged with the conduct of government."

In discussing a somewhat analogous question, the Supreme Court of Indiana, in Freel v....