Amphitheater Unified School Dist. No. 10 v. Harte, 14806
Decision Date | 13 February 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 14806,14806 |
Citation | 128 Ariz. 233,624 P.2d 1281 |
Parties | , 32 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 181 AMPHITHEATER UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT # 10, a body politic, Petitioner, v. Court Commissioner Lawrence K. Bret HARTE and the Superior Court of the State of Arizona In and For the County of Pima, The Civil Rights Division of the Attorney General's Office/Arizona Department of Law, real party in interest, Respondents. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Stephen D. Neely, Pima County Atty. by Lawrence Ollason, Sp. Deputy County Atty., Tucson, for petitioner.
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by Phillip A. Austin, Philip G. Urry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for respondents.
By Special Action the petitioner, Amphitheater Unified School District # 10, challenges the action of the Superior Court of Pima County in its denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss an employment discrimination suit filed against it by the Civil Rights Division of the Attorney General's office. We accepted jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 6, § 4 of the Arizona Constitution.
The essential facts are that the Civil Rights Division filed an employment discrimination action against Amphitheater Unified School District # 10 whereby it alleged that Amphitheater discriminated against Jillyn B. Smith by not hiring her to fill the position of football coach-biology teacher. The Civil Rights Division sought individual relief for Ms. Smith along with an injunction, forbidding Amphitheater from coupling academic teaching positions with part-time coaching positions in male dominated sports.
The petitioner raises two primary contentions:
1. That the Attorney General is prevented by statute from bringing an employment discrimination suit against a school district;
2. That the Attorney General may not bring suit against the petitioner because it constitutes a conflict of interest.
The petitioner contends that the Attorney General is specifically proscribed by A.R.S. § 41-1481(D) from bringing an employment discrimination action against petitioner. The statute reads:
The Attorney General has no common law powers, but only such powers as are conferred by the state constitution or by statute. Arizona State Land Department v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1960). The statute quoted above specifically restricts the Attorney General from independently bringing suit in employment discrimination cases where "the state (is) named in the charge" or "in which the state is a defendant." It is the petitioner's position that the term "state," as used in this instance, included school districts.
Arizona case law has not clearly determined the precise nature of a school district. In Sorenson v. Superior Court in and for Maricopa County, 31 Ariz. 421, 254 P. 230 (1927), this court held that a high school district is a political subdivision of the county. In Jarvis v. Hammons, 32 Ariz. 124, 256 P. 362 (1927), modified, 32 Ariz. 318, 257 P. 985 (1927), the court held that a school district is a legal entity separate and distinct from the county within whose physical boundaries it lies. In State v. Davey, 27 Ariz. 254, 232 P. 884 (1925), and in Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242, 204 P.2d 854 (1949), the court referred to school districts as political subdivisions of the state.
A majority of other jurisdictions classify school districts as political or civil subdivisions of the state. Lovell v. School District No. 13, 172 Or. 500, 143 P.2d 236 (1943); Wichita Public Schools Employees Union, Local No. 513 v. Smith, 194 Kan. 2, 397 P.2d 357 (1964); Bagby v. School District No. 1, 186 Colo. 428, 528 P.2d 1299 (1974); Watts v. Double Oak Independent School District, 377 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Civ.App.1964); Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Keefe, 215 Ga. 830, 113 S.E.2d 774 (1960); Skelly v. Westminster School District of Orange County, 103 Cal. 652, 37 P. 643 (1894); 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 24 (1952).
We are satisfied that the proper classification of school districts is that of political subdivisions of the state. As thus defined, the question at issue may be restated: Does the term "state" as used in A.R.S. § 41-1481(D) include political subdivisions?
The term "state" is not specifically defined in the statute at issue nor in any of the other statutory provisions dealing with the same subject matter. In such instances, unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning should control, the usual meaning of the word should be applied. State v. Carter, 123 Ariz. 524, 601 P.2d 287 (1979); Kilpatrick v. Superior Court in and for Maricopa County, 105 Ariz. 413, 466 P.2d 18 (1970); State ex rel. Frohmiller v. Hendrix, 59 Ariz. 184, 124 P.2d 768 (1942).
The usual meaning of the term "state" is not easily determined because it has been defined and used in various ways in statutes and court decisions. Where a word in a statute is susceptible of more than one meaning the court must adopt such interpretation as is reasonable. In seeking the reasonable interpretation the court will consider the statute as a whole to determine its intent and purpose. Employment Security Commission of Arizona v. Fish, 92 Ariz. 140, 375 P.2d 20 (1962).
The definitions applicable to the statutory article on discrimination in employment help to refine the intent of the legislature. In A.R.S. § 41-1461(2) the term "Employer" is defined as "a person who has fifteen or more employees." The same section defines the term "Person" to mean: "(O)ne or more individuals, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy or receivers." A.R.S. § 41-1461(5) (emphasis supplied). We believe the above clearly indicates that the legislature recognized political subdivisions as separate entities.
It is also helpful to refer to the federal legislation from which A.R.S. § 41-1481(D) was derived. The federal statute is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970). In pertinent part, the federal legislation provides that: "(T)he Commission (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge." The Arizona legislation provides that: "(T)he division (Civil Rights Division) may bring a civil action against the respondent, other than the state, named in the charge." It is apparent that the example of the federal legislation in specifically excluding political subdivisions was not followed in the state enactment. We conclude that this omission is another indication of the intent of the legislature to limit the meaning of the term "state."
Based on the differences between the federal and state legislation and the definitions in the state legislation, we hold that the term "state" does not include political subdivisions. The petitioner high school district is not included within the term "state" as used in A.R.S. § 41-1481(D).
Petitioner contends, however, that even if a high school district is not included within the term "state," the Attorney General may not bring an action against the petitioner because it would constitute a conflict of interest. Petitioner points out that the Attorney General has supervisory authority over the county attorneys (the legal advisors of the school districts A.R.S. § 11-532(A)(10)); that the Attorney General reviews opinions of the county attorneys on school matters and issues legal opinions himself on school matters relating to all school districts. See A.R.S. §§ 41-193(A) and 15-122.
Petitioner does not allege any facts which show an actual or real conflict of interest. In reviewing the statutes called to our attention, we find nothing in the actions of the Attorney General in this case which might be termed a conflict of interest.
From the foregoing, we find that the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss was correct and petitioner is not entitled to relief in this court. Relief denied.
In 1979, the Civil Rights Division of the Attorney General's Office brought an employment discrimination action against Amphitheater, alleging that the school district's discriminatory practices had precluded the hiring of Jillyn Smith to teach high school biology. The Attorney General sought individual relief for Jillyn Smith and an injunction forbidding Amphitheater from coupling academic teaching positions with part-time coaching positions in male dominated sports like football. Smith now has private counsel and her personal suit is not involved in this special action.
I dissent because I believe that the school district is a state agency and because I believe there is a conflict of interest which would make it inappropriate for the Attorney General to represent the teacher against the school district.
The Civil Rights Division's sole authority for the bringing of this suit is derived from A.R.S. § 41-1481(D), which reads as follows:
"If within thirty days after the division has made a determination that reasonable cause exists to believe that the charge is true the division has not accepted a conciliation agreement to which the charging party and the respondent are parties, the division may bring a civil action against the respondent, other than the state, named in the charge. * * * " (Emphasis added)
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