Soriano v. Elia

• Decision Date: 30 November 2017
• Docket Number: 524746
• Citation: 66 N.Y.S.3d 331,155 A.D.3d 1496
• Parties: In the Matter of Charles R. SORIANO, Appellant, v. MaryEllen ELIA, as Commissioner of Education, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

155 A.D.3d 1496
66 N.Y.S.3d 331

In the Matter of Charles R. SORIANO, Appellant,
v.
MaryEllen ELIA, as Commissioner of Education, et al., Respondents.

524746

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: October 10, 2017
Decided and Entered: November 30, 2017

66 N.Y.S.3d 332

Hamburger, Maxson, Yaffe & McNally, LLP, Melville (Richard Hamburger of counsel), for appellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Brian D. Ginsberg of counsel),

66 N.Y.S.3d 333

for Commissioner of Education, respondent.

Frazer & Feldman, LLP, Garden City (Nicole A. Donatich of counsel), for Board of Education of East Hampton Union Free School District, respondent.

Before: Peters, P.J., Garry, Mulvey, Aarons and Pritzker, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Peters, P.J.

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Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Platkin, J.), entered August 30, 2016 in Albany County, which

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dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination by respondent Commissioner of Education dismissing petitioner's challenge to the reduction by respondent Board of Education of East Hampton Union Free School District of his salary and benefits following a transfer of position.

Petitioner is a tenured administrator employed by the East Hampton Union Free School District. In June 2003, he was appointed by respondent Board of Education of East Hampton Union Free School District to the position of Assistant Superintendent. Petitioner's employment contract for that position, which was modified on three occasions, expired on June 30, 2012. Pursuant to the final version of that contract, petitioner earned an annual salary of approximately $205,000. At a June 19, 2012 meeting, the Board approved a reorganization plan for administrative staff within the school district that resulted in petitioner being reassigned and appointed to Middle School Principal, a position within his tenure area, effective July 1, 2012. The Board fixed petitioner's annual salary for the new position at $180,000. While petitioner did not contest the reassignment, he objected to any reduction in his salary or benefits as a consequence of the transfer. Reasoning that its actions were both lawful and reasonable, the Board declined to reinstate petitioner's previous salary and benefits.

Petitioner appealed the Board's determination to respondent Commissioner of Education (see Education Law § 310 ), alleging that his compensation could not be unilaterally reduced by the Board except as "discipline" pursuant to the procedures set forth in Education Law § 3020–a. The Commissioner dismissed the appeal, finding that petitioner failed to demonstrate that the salary reduction constituted discipline under Education Law § 3020 or that the Board's actions in that regard were otherwise arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking to annul the Commissioner's determination, which Supreme Court dismissed. Petitioner appeals.

Education Law § 3020(1) provides that "[n]o person enjoying the benefits of tenure shall be disciplined or removed during a term of employment except for just cause and in accordance with the procedures set forth in [ Education Law § 3020–a ]." Petitioner argues that, as a matter of law, the reduction in his salary resulting from his reassignment to Middle School Principal constitutes "discipline[ ]" under the statute, which could not be imposed absent compliance with Education Law § 3020–a. Because—as the Commissioner recognizes—the issue

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presented is one of pure statutory reading and analysis, we "need not accord any deference to the [Commissioner's] determination, and [are] free to ascertain the proper interpretation from the statutory language and legislative intent" (Matter of Belmonte v. Snashall, 2 N.Y.3d 560, 566, 780 N.Y.S.2d 541, 813 N.E.2d 621 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see

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Matter of Madison–Oneida Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. Mills, 4 N.Y.3d 51, 59, 790 N.Y.S.2d 619, 823 N.E.2d 1265 [2004] ; Matter of DeVera v. Elia, 152 A.D.3d 13, 19, 56 N.Y.S.3d 609 [2017] ).

"The main goal in statutory construction is to discern the will of the Legislature and, as the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" ( Matter of Lawrence Teachers' Assn., NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL–CIO v. New York State Pub. Relations Bod., 152 A.D.3d 171, 173, 57 N.Y.S.3d 551 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv. denied 30 N.Y.3d 904, 2017 WL 4782647 [Oct. 24, 2017] ; see Matter of Shannon, 25 N.Y.3d 345, 351, 12 N.Y.S.3d 600, 34 N.E.3d 351 [2015] ; Ronkese v. Tilcon N.Y., Inc., 153 A.D.3d 259, 262, 59 N.Y.S.3d 605 [2017] ). In undertaking this endeavor, "[c]ourts may not reject a literal construction of a statute unless it is evident that a literal construction does not correctly reflect the legislative intent" ( Myers v. Schneiderman, 30 N.Y.3d 1, 12, 62 N.Y.S.3d 838, 85 N.E.3d 57 [2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]; see A.J. Temple Marble & Tile v. Union Carbide Marble Care, 87 N.Y.2d 574, 580–581, 640 N.Y.S.2d 849, 663 N.E.2d 890 [1996] ).

"Discipline" is not defined in the Education Law, and therefore we must "construe [this] word[ ] of ordinary import with [its] usual and commonly understood meaning" ( Yaniveth R. v. LTD Realty Co., 27 N.Y.3d 186, 192, 32 N.Y.S.3d 10, 51 N.E.3d 521 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 232 at 392–393). The term "discipline" is uniformly defined, both in the legal and ordinary sense, as "punishment" (see Black's Law Dictionary [10th ed. 2014], discipline [defining discipline as "(p)unishment intended to correct or instruct"]; Merriam–Webster Online Dictionary, discipline, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ discipline [defining discipline as "punishment"]; Merriam–Webster Collegiate Dictionary 196 [11th ed 2004] [same]; Oxford Living Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com [defining discipline as to "[p]unish or rebuke formally for an offen(s)e"]; Cambridge Dictionary, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/ discipline [defining discipline as "to punish"] ). Applying this commonly understood meaning of the word, we conclude that the term "discipline[ ]" in Education Law § 3020 refers not merely to action

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that has an adverse impact, but adverse action that is motivated by a punitive intent.

Case law applying and interpreting Education Law § 3020 supports our reading of the statute. "The purpose of [ Education Law § 3020 ] is to protect [tenured educators] from arbitrary imposition of formal discipline. It was not intended to interfere with the day-to-day operation of the educational system" ( Holt v. Board of Educ. of Webutuck Cent. School Dist., 52 N.Y.2d 625, 632, 439 N.Y.S.2d 839, 422 N.E.2d 499 [1981] ; see Matter of Kilduff v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 24 N.Y.3d 505, 509, 2 N.Y.S.3d 3, 25 N.E.3d 916 [2014] ). In Holt v. Board of Educ. of Webutuck Cent. School Dist. (sup...