Sorrells v. State
| Decision Date | 22 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. PD–1802–09.,PD–1802–09. |
| Citation | 343 S.W.3d 152 |
| Parties | Eric Deshon SORRELLS, Appellant,v.The STATE of Texas. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Edmund M. “Skip” Davis, Austin, for Appellant.Laura McElroy, Asst. D.A., Jeffrey L. Van Horn, Austin, for State.WOMACK, J., delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.
A Travis County jury convicted the appellant, Eric Deshon Sorrells, of aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals 1 found that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated robbery, and reformed the judgment to reflect conviction of the lesser-included offense of assault by threat. We granted the State's petition for discretionary review on three grounds: (1) whether the Court of Appeals properly reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the law of parties; and (3) in the alternative, whether the Court of Appeals properly reformed the judgment. We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its review of the sufficiency of the evidence. We therefore need not address the State's second and third grounds. We will reverse the Court's decision and remand for consideration of the appellant's remaining claims.
The following factual background is abridged from the facts described by the Court of Appeals. In the early morning hours of January 30, 2005, Frances Reynolds waited on a curb outside an Austin nightclub for her boyfriend, Nathaniel Rice, to retrieve her car from a nearby parking lot. Reynolds testified that she leaned against a Mercedes SUV parked on the street. The appellant emerged from the club wearing a black and gray sweater and a black leather jacket. He told Reynolds to “get the f*** off the car” because she was damaging it. With gun in hand, the appellant struck Reynolds across the side of her head, and the two began scuffling. Shortly thereafter, Rice arrived. As Rice approached, the appellant turned, pulled back the slide of the gun, and said, “[D]o you have a problem with me, too?” Rice punched the appellant, and the two started fighting. A man wearing a blue “flannel-type” jacket then ran up to Rice and punched him. Rice fell to the ground and Reynolds went for help. When she returned, the altercation had ended. Rice told her that his jewelry had been stolen.
Rice testified that after retrieving Reynolds's car, he drove to the front of the club and saw three men standing near Reynolds. Rice saw Reynolds scuffling with the appellant. As Rice approached, the appellant pulled out a gun and “cocked it at [Rice].” Rice pushed the gun out of the way and swung at the appellant. The appellant struck back, hitting Rice with the gun. At that moment, a man wearing a flannel jacket punched Rice in the head. Rice was knocked to the ground and was “jumped” by multiple people. At some point the beating ceased and the assailants dispersed. Rice then became aware that he was no longer wearing his lion medallion necklace, which he valued at approximately $1,000. When the police arrived moments later, Rice told them that his jewelry had been stolen.
Kevin Fritz, a friend of Reynolds and Rice, testified that he accompanied Rice to the parking lot to retrieve Reynolds's car. As they drove to the front of the club, Fritz saw Reynolds arguing with the appellant. Fritz followed as Rice approached the appellant. Upon noticing Rice, the appellant turned and pointed a gun at Rice. Rice took a swing at the appellant, and then another man came up behind Rice and hit him in the head. A third man joined the fight; he and the second man “jumped” Rice. Fritz then saw the appellant point the gun at Rice. Fritz ran up and pushed the appellant. The men then turned their attention from Rice and began fighting with Fritz. Someone hit Fritz with a gun; after being dazed and stumbling for a few seconds, Fritz looked up and saw the three men running into the club. At some point during the altercation, Fritz noticed Rice's lion medallion necklace on the ground.
Officer Charles Riley testified that he was stationed nearby when he was dispatched to the incident. Riley arrived on the scene within twenty or thirty seconds of the dispatch and saw several people in front of the club; everyone was being loud and yelling that “someone had taken something” and “someone had a gun.” Riley learned that the gunman, a male wearing a black leather jacket, had gone inside the club. Riley ran into the alley behind the club and saw three people walking away from him down the alley. One of the three, Rachel Hardeman, turned and looked at Riley. Then she removed her hand from her jacket pocket and deposited an object into the side of a recycling receptacle. After the three were detained, Riley searched the receptacle and found a gun. Riley also noticed that the black leather jacket Hardeman was wearing was too big for her. Inside a pocket of the jacket, Riley found the lion medallion necklace. Both of the other detainees were male. One, who would become appellant's co-defendant at trial, wore a blue denim jacket. The other was the appellant, who wore a black and tan sweater but was not wearing a jacket.
Reynolds, Rice, and Fritz did not identify Hardeman, but each of them identified the appellant as the man who had been wearing the black leather jacket.2
In addition to the facts described by the Court of Appeals, we find the following three pieces of testimony to be important as well. First, Sergeant Richard Shirley testified that he also responded to the incident, but he attempted to gain entrance through the front of the club. As he looked into the club from the front, he saw the appellant wearing a black leather jacket and moving towards the back. When Shirley finally made it through the club and got to the alley behind it, he saw that three individuals had been detained. He noticed that Hardeman “did have what appeared to be the same jacket” that the appellant had been wearing as he moved toward the back of the club.
Second, Rice identified the gun recovered by Officer Riley as the weapon pointed at him by the appellant.
Third, Officer Brian Lloyd, called as a witness by the co-defendant's counsel, testified without objection that Rice told him that the man with the gun and the black leather jacket took Rice's necklace:
In Clayton v. State3 we described the standard of review appropriate for addressing the sufficiency of evidence in cases involving circumstantial evidence and the drawing of inferences by a jury:
When we review a court of appeals's application of the legal sufficiency standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia4, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard accounts for the factfinder's duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Therefore, in analyzing legal sufficiency, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Our review of all of the evidence includes evidence that was properly and improperly admitted. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination. Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally: Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.5
To prove the essential elements of aggravated robbery in this case, the State had to show that the appellant committed robbery as defined in Section 29.02 of the Penal Code, and used or exhibited a deadly weapon.6 Under Section 29.02, the robbery in this case would be proved by evidence that, in the course of committing theft as defined in Chapter 31 of the Penal Code and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, the appellant intentionally or knowingly threatened or placed another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.7 The phrase “in the course of committing theft” is defined by Section 29.01 of the Penal Code to mean “conduct that occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission of theft.” 8 A person commits theft under Chapter 31 if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of the property.9
The Court of Appeals found that the evidence was insufficient to prove either that the appellant was the perpetrator of the theft, or that the assault was committed “in the course of committing theft.”
With respect to the identity of the thief, the Court of Appeals found that “[b]ased on [the] circumstantial evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the jacket worn by Hardeman belonged to [the appellant].” 10 Nevertheless, the Court found the evidence insufficient to prove that the appellant had possession of the necklace:
At the time of [the appellant's] arrest, although the necklace was...
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