Sorrow v. Harris Cnty. Sheriff

• Decision Date: 02 March 2021
• Docket Number: NO. 14-18-00901-CV,14-18-00901-CV
• Citation: 622 S.W.3d 496
• Parties: Loyd Landon SORROW, Sr., Appellant v. HARRIS COUNTY SHERIFF, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

622 S.W.3d 496

Loyd Landon SORROW, Sr., Appellant

v.HARRIS COUNTY SHERIFF, Appellee

NO. 14-18-00901-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinion filed March 2, 2021

Rehearing Denied March 25, 2021

Rehearing En Banc Denied April 27, 2021

Charles A. Spain, Justice

Loyd Landon Sorrow, Sr. appeals from the trial court's grant of appellee Harris County Sheriff's second amended motion for summary judgment, which dismissed with prejudice Sorrow's claims that he suffered injuries from medical care he received in pre-trial detention while in the Sheriff's custody. On its face the Sheriff's motion was interlocutory, but the trial court added finality language that made the otherwise interlocutory judgment final as to several unserved defendants. See Bella Palma, LLC v. Young , 601 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2020) (per curiae); In re Elizondo , 544 S.W.3d 824, 828 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) ; Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 192–93 (Tex. 2001). Sorrow brings nine issues, which along the way require us to determine how the final judgment affected the unserved defendants and how to address the preservation of an appellate complaint based on error that occurred in judgment formation of what should have been an interlocutory summary judgment. Following this court's precedent, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part as to the dismissal with prejudice of Sorrow's claims against the Sheriff and reverse the judgment of the trial court in part as to Sorrow's claims against the unserved defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

Sorrow filed suit on May 15, 2017, naming the Harris County Sheriff,¹ the "University of Texas Health Science Center of Houston,"² and "Dr. Seal,"³ as defendants and alleged a variety of tort, statutory, and constitutional violations stemming from Sorrow's medical treatment while in the custody of the Sheriff during his pre-trial detention.⁴ Sorrow later named "Harris County" as a defendant. In his petition, Sorrow asserts that between 2001 and 2002—at least fifteen years earlier—he was prescribed a "mixture of highly powerful anti-depressants, narcotics, and narcotic[-]like pills and[/]or medications" by doctors when he was in jail that caused him to have "many adverse reactions, side effects, and adverse side effects, ... such as audio-visual hallucinations, anxiety attacks, agitation, memory lapses and loss." He claims the Sheriff neglected him and failed to intervene, prevent, or exercise the degree of safe care that professional guardians owe mentally ill pre-trial detainees within the boundaries provided by Texas law and the U.S. and Texas Constitutions. Sorrow concludes these actions also resulted in the denial of due process because the medications he was prescribed dulled his reasoning and resulted in a "medicated mental restraint" for his court hearings.

The Sheriff filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Sheriff filed an amended second motion for summary judgment, arguing statute of limitations and lack of capacity to be sued as a non sui juris entity, which the trial court granted.⁵

II. ANALYSIS

Sorrow raises nine issues on appeal. We review the claims of an incarcerated litigant proceeding pro se with liberality and patience. Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520–21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) ; see Minix v. Gonzales , 162 S.W.3d 635, 637 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (discussing applicability of Haines rule in Texas and outside Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) context). Sorrow repeatedly cites Haines for the proposition that being a layman "unschooled in law" excuses him from being held to the same stringent standards as lawyers. While we must construe his petition liberally in the light most favorable to him, Sorrow misreads the holding in Haines. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9 ; see also Minix , 162 S.W.3d at 637. In Haines , the Supreme Court of the United States stated "the allegations of the pro se complaint ... we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." 404 U.S. at 520–21, 92 S.Ct. 594. This holding requires pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant to be construed liberally, but does not otherwise excuse pro se litigants from complying with other substantive and procedural rules. Id. Pro se litigants must comply with all applicable rules of procedure and substantive law. Burbage v. Burbage , 447 S.W.3d 249, 258 (Tex. 2014) (explaining that courts may not stray from procedural rules simply because litigant represented self); see also Harrison v. Reiner , 607 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. filed).

A. Trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment

In issue three, Sorrow challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's rendition of summary judgment. Though Sorrow challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, he effectively argues that summary judgment was improper because there were outstanding questions of material fact. We liberally construe his briefing to challenge the trial court's rendition of summary judgment. Tex. R. App. P. 38.9. Sorrow believes the trial court should have held that the discovery rule applied and tolled limitations. In issue eight, Sorrow asserts that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment because he believes the Sheriff's alleged fraudulent concealment of medical records tolled limitations.

1. Standard of review

We review a trial court's rendition of summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Id. When, as here, a trial court's order granting a motion for summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, we must affirm the summary judgment if any of the grounds advanced are meritorious. Carr v. Brasher , 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989). We must affirm if an appellant fails to challenge all grounds on which the motion for summary judgment may have been granted. Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier , 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970).

Courts properly render traditional summary judgment if the motion and evidence show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ; Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co. , 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). A defendant moving for summary judgment must conclusively disprove at least one element of the plaintiff's claim or prove every element of an affirmative defense. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade & Co. , 926 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).

Once the movant facially establishes its right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-movant to present a material fact issue that precludes summary judgment. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589 S.W.2d 671, 678–79 (Tex. 1979). Evidence raises a genuine issue of fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions considering all the summary-judgment evidence. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes , 236 S.W.3d 754, 755–57 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).

2. Discovery rule

In general, constitutional claims that arise in Texas under the state and federal constitutions, including title 42, United States Code, section 1983 claims are governed by the two-year tort statute of limitations. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) ; see Wallace v. Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 387–88, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (holding statute of limitations for section 1983 claim is governed by personal-injury-tort statute of limitations of state in which cause of action arose); Jackson v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. , 994 S.W.2d 396, 402 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (Texas Constitution claim). Common-law claims of tort and negligence must also be brought within two years.⁶ Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (party must bring suit for personal injury not later than two years after day cause of action accrues); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp. , 988 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. 1999) (negligence claims).

The statute of limitations begins to run when a claim accrues. Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc. , 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990). A cause of action accrues when facts come into existence that permit a plaintiff to recover. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones , 520 S.W.3d 572, 593 (Tex. 2017). Generally, in the context of a tort, this is when a wrongful act causes an injury. See Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand , 491 S.W.3d 699, 721 (Tex. 2016) ("As a general proposition, a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes a legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later...."); Murray , 800 S.W.2d at 828. The Sheriff produced summary-judgment evidence that Sorrow was last incarcerated in a Harris County jail on December 11, 2002, and Sorrow admits that the tortious conduct made the basis of his claim occurred in 2001–02. Given that Sorrow filed the underlying lawsuit in 2017, the statute of limitations bars any personal injury or tort claims arising out of his 2001–02 incarceration unless a tolling provision applies.

Statutes of limitations are intended to compel plaintiffs to assert their claims "within a reasonable period while the evidence is fresh in the minds of the parties and witnesses." Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. , 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996). It is in society's best interest to grant repose by requiring that disputes be settled or barred within a reasonable time. See id. The discovery-rule exception operates to defer accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knows or, by exercising reasonable diligence, should know of the facts giving rise to the claim. Id. The supreme court has described the discovery rule as "a very limited exception to statutes of limitations," and has condoned...