Sosniak v. The State

• Decision Date: 07 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. S10A0335.,S10A0335.
• Citation: 287 Ga. 279,695 S.E.2d 604
• Parties: SOSNIAKv.The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

287 Ga. 279

695 S.E.2d 604

SOSNIAKv.The STATE.

No. S10A0335.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 7, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles G. Haldi, Jr., William A. Finch, Cumming, for appellant.

Penny A. Penn, District Attorney, James A. Dunn, Asst. Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, for appellee.

MELTON, Justice.

This is an interim appellate review of a case in which the State seeks the death penalty. Marcin “Martin” Sosniak and his co-defendants, Jason McGhee and Frank Ortegon, have been indicted for four counts each of malice murder and felony murder in connection with the deaths of Kyle Jones, Mariel Hannah, William Osment, and Lynn Bartlett, as well as for related crimes. The crimes occurred on March 19, 2006, at a residence in Forsyth County. This Court granted Sosniak's application for interim review and directed the parties to address whether the trial court erred in its order denying Sosniak's motion to exclude his statements to law enforcement officers and any evidence obtained as a result and in its order addressing the admissibility of certain victim impact evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

1. Sosniak claims that the trial court erred in finding admissible statements that he made to Detectives Moore and Cox of the Forsyth County Sheriff's Office on March 20, March 23, and March 29, 2006. “The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant's statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard considering the totality of the circumstances. [Cit.]” Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 176, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008). “Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court's findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of the defendant's statement at a Jackson-Denno hearing will be upheld on appeal. [Cit.]” Grier v. State, 273 Ga. 363, 365(2), 541 S.E.2d 369 (2001). See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). However, “ ‘(w)here controlling facts are not in dispute, ... such as those facts discernible from a videotape, our review is de novo.’ [Cit.]” Vergara, 283 Ga. at 178(1), 657 S.E.2d 863.

A. Statements of March 20, 2006.

(1) Pre-Miranda statements. Sosniak claims that he was in custody and, thus, that the statements of his March 20 interview prior to his being apprised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), are inadmissible.

A person is considered to be in custody and Miranda warnings are required when a person is (1) formally arrested or (2) restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Unless a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive that he was in custody Miranda warnings are not necessary. Thus, the relative inquiry is how a reasonable person in [Sosniak]' s position would perceive his situation.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Folsom, 285 Ga. 11, 12-13(1), 673 S.E.2d 210 (2009). In other words, the inquiry properly focuses upon “the objective circumstances attending the particular interrogation at issue, and not upon the subjective views of either the person being interrogated or the interrogating officer.” Hardin v. State, 269 Ga. 1, 3(2), 494 S.E.2d 647 (1998).

The testimony at the Jackson-Denno hearing showed the following. After receiving a page at 10:45 p.m. on the date of the murders and reporting to the crime scene, Detective Moore went to the Criminal Investigations Division of the Sheriff's Office (CID), where he interviewed witnesses. At that time, he received information that Sosniak was one of three males that had been at the crime scene about a half hour prior to the crimes. As a result, sometime in the early morning hours of March 20, four to five officers from the Forsyth County Sheriff's Office went to Sosniak's residence. When Sosniak's mother opened the door to the officers, they entered and told her that they were looking for Sosniak. Sosniak's mother went upstairs and awakened Sosniak, who came downstairs and conversed with the officers. Then Sosniak went outside, where he was handcuffed, placed in a patrol car, and taken to the CID. Sosniak waited in the foyer of the CID until he was approached by Detective Moore, who testified that Sosniak was not handcuffed at the time that they met. Detective Moore's testimony also established that Sosniak was handcuffed for transport to the CID pursuant to a departmental policy for officers' safety, that the handcuffs were removed upon Sosniak's arrival at the CID, that the CID did not have a holding cell or a booking area and was not locked for those wishing to exit, and that the interview room was not locked.

The two-hour interview was videotaped, and the videotape, played before the trial court, showed the following. Sosniak was not handcuffed or physically restrained in any way when he entered the interview room at 5:15 a.m. After obtaining basic information from him, Detective Moore told Sosniak that he was “not under arrest for anything” and that he just needed to talk to him “about some stuff tonight, that's all.” Sosniak indicated that he was agreeable to that. Sosniak initially denied knowing that the crimes had taken place or being at the location of the crimes shortly before they occurred, and the first hour of the interview was spent addressing Sosniak's denial of that information. Detective Moore told Sosniak that he knew that Sosniak was not being completely truthful, and he encouraged Sosniak to tell the truth. However, Detective Moore was neither hostile nor accusatory toward him. At one point during the interview, Detective Moore asked Sosniak if he would be attending his college class “tomorrow,” and Sosniak responded that he would be. Detective Moore's question would indicate to a reasonable person in Sosniak's position that he was not being “restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Folsom, 285 Ga. at 12(1), 673 S.E.2d 210. Although Sosniak once stated, “I'm exhausted, I'm tired, all I want to do is just go home,” he made no effort to get up and leave, and he immediately re-engaged Detective Moore by asking, “What is this all about, is what I would like to know?” While Detective Moore told Sosniak that he had “a lot riding on this,” he did nothing that would indicate to Sosniak that he was not free to leave, and he testified that, had Sosniak pursued leaving, the Sheriff's Office would have provided a ride for him.

There is no merit to Sosniak's contention that, because Detective Moore did not inform him that he considered him to be a suspect and did not apprise him of the nature of the crimes that he was suspected of being involved in, his statements are inadmissible. “[A] police officer's subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question whether the individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda. [Cit.]” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324(II), 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). The relevant inquiry remains how a reasonable person in Sosniak's position would have perceived his situation. See McAllister v. State, 270 Ga. 224, 228(1), 507 S.E.2d 448 (1998).

We conclude that the trial court was authorized to find that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Sosniak's position would not have believed that he was in custody prior to the time that he was read the Miranda rights. See Bell v. State, 280 Ga. 562, 563(2), 629 S.E.2d 213 (2006) (finding that a defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda where he was handcuffed pursuant to police protocol during the execution of a no-knock search warrant and was driven in a patrol car to police barracks where he was released from handcuffs, was free to move about so long as he remained in an officer's presence, and was advised that he was free to leave at any time). Compare State v. Folsom, 286 Ga. 105, 108(1), 686 S.E.2d 239 (2009) (affirming the trial court's determination that the defendant was in custody during pre- Miranda questioning where the defendant was required to come to the police station by officers who waited at his home and followed him to the station, was never told that he was free to leave, was kept either under surveillance or in a closed interrogation room for six hours, was explicitly told that evidence pointed toward him, and was repeatedly asked incriminating questions).

(2) Post-Miranda statements. Almost an hour and a half into the interview, Sosniak acknowledged that he had been at the residence where the shootings occurred on the previous evening. Shortly afterward, he admitted hearing gunshots while there. Detective Moore testified that, once Sosniak made that admission, he was no longer free to leave. Our review of the videotape shows that, at the point when Sosniak admitted hearing gunshots, Detective Moore stopped the interview and read Sosniak the Miranda rights. When Detective Moore asked Sosniak if he understood his rights and if he and Sosniak were “still good to talk,” Sosniak nodded affirmatively, effectively waiving his rights. See Spain v. State, 243 Ga. 15, 16(1), 252 S.E.2d 436 (1979) (“There is no constitutional requirement that waiver of constitutional rights be in writing.”). Upon our review of the transcript of the Jackson-Denno hearing and the videotape of the interview reviewed by the trial court, we find no error in the trial court's ruling that this statement was given knowingly, freely, and voluntarily after Sosniak had been properly advised of and had waived his Miranda rights. See Bell, 280 Ga. at 565(2)(b), 629 S.E.2d 213.

B. Statements of March 23, 2006.

On March 20, 2006, Sosniak signed a waiver of appointed counsel form and retained attorney John Stokes to represent him. On March 23, 2006, Detectives Moore and Cox met with Sosniak and Stokes for Sosniak's second interview. This interview began at 1:20 p.m., took place in the same interview room as the first interview, lasted approximately an...