Sostaric v. Marshall
Decision Date | 14 November 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 14–0143.,14–0143. |
Citation | 766 S.E.2d 396,234 W.Va. 449 |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | Nancy SOSTARIC and Stjepan Sostaric, Defendants Below, Petitioners v. Sally MARSHALL, Plaintiff Below, Respondent. |
Nancy Sostaric, Stjepan Sostaric, Falls Church, Virginia, pro se.
Sally Marshall, Berkeley Springs, WV, pro se.
Petitioners, Nancy Sostaric and Stjepan Sostaric (“Mr. and Mrs. Sostaric”),1 who are appearing pro se, appeal from an order entered January 16, 2014, by the Circuit Court of Morgan County. The circuit court granted summary judgment to respondent, Sally Marshall (“Ms. Marshall”), who is also appearing pro se, awarding her a deficiency judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Sostaric and attorney's fees.2
On appeal, Mr. and Mrs. Sostaric contend that summary judgment was improper because there exist genuine issues of material fact. They contend that the amount of the deficiency judgment awarded was too high and that it should have been adjusted to reflect the fair market value of their property when it was sold at the trust deed sale. They argue the property was sold for less than its fair market value at the trustee's foreclosure sale.
Upon review, we find that Mr. and Mrs. Sostaric may assert, as a defense in the lawsuit seeking a deficiency judgment, that the property was sold for less than its fair market value at the trust deed foreclosure sale. In so finding, we overrule Syllabus Point 4 of Fayette County National Bank v. Lilly, 199 W.Va. 349, 484 S.E.2d 232 (1997). We therefore reverse the circuit court's summary judgment order and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Additionally, the note included a “DEFAULT AND ACCELERATION CLAUSE,” which provided:
If Borrowers [Mr. and Mrs. Sostaric] default in the payment of this Note or in the performance of any obligation, and the default is not cured within fifteen days after Lender [Ms. Marshall] has given to Borrowers written notice of the default and time to cure, then Lender may declare the unpaid principal balance and earned interest on this Note immediately due. Borrowers and each surety, endorser, and guarantor waive all demands for payment, presentation for payment, notices of intentions to accelerate maturity, protests and notices of protest, to the extent permitted by law.
Finally, the note allowed for the recovery of attorney's fees incurred in the collection or enforcement of the note:
If this Note is given to an attorney for collection or enforcement, or if suit is brought for cancellation or enforcement, or if it is collected or enforced through probate, bankruptcy or other judicial proceeding, then Borrowers [Mr. and Mrs. Sostaric] shall pay to Lender [Ms. Marshall] all costs of collection and enforcement, including reasonable attorneys fees and court costs in addition to other amounts due.
While Mr. and Mrs. Sostaric made the required monthly interest payments for a period of time after signing the promissory note, they stopped making their monthly payments in October 2010 and subsequently defaulted on their obligation. On July 17, 2012, Ms. Marshall sent Mrs. Sostaric5 a “NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CURE DEFAULT,” which The property sought to be sold was the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Sostaric that had served as collateral for the promissory note. The notice further provided:
(Emphasis in original.)
(Emphasis in original.)
On October 17, 2012, Ms. Marshall purchased the subject property at the trustee's sale for $60,000.00. Of this amount, $58,260.757 was distributed to “Sally Marshall, the holder and owner of the note secured by said deed of trust to apply on principal and interest of said note8 and obligations set forth in said deed of trust,” while the remaining sum of $1,739.25 was applied to the costs of the sale. (Footnote added.)
Thereafter, on December 13, 2012, Ms. Marshall, by counsel, filed the instant lawsuit against Mr. and Mrs. Sostaric seeking a deficiency judgment for the unpaid balance of their promissory note. By order entered January 16, 2014, the circuit court awarded summary judgment to Ms. Marshall, ruling as follows:
The Plaintiff [Ms. Marshall] has set forth evidence, by way of a sworn affidavit, of an outstanding debt in the amount of $175,407.45, the collection of which is supported by an exhibit to the Complaint, the Secured Balloon Promissory Note. Further, the Plaintiff has set forth evidence, by way of a sworn affidavit, of attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,749.25, the collection of which is supported by an exhibit to the Complaint, the Secured Balloon Promissory Note.
The court also awarded Ms. Marshall post-judgment interest on this award. From this adverse ruling, Mr. and Mrs. Sostaric now appeal to this Court.9
Mr. and Mrs. Sostaric appeal from the circuit court's order granting summary judgment. We previously have held that “[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.” Syl. pt. 3, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). We afford a plenary review to a lower court's order awarding summary judgment: “[a] circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).
This case involves a deficiency judgment. A deficiency judgment “is an imposition of personal liability upon a mortgagor for an unpaid balance of a secured obligation after foreclosure of the mortgage has failed to yield the full amount of the underlying debt.” Lawrence R. Ahern, III, The Law of Debtors and Creditors, § 8:20 (2014).10
In this appeal, Mr. and Mrs. Sostaric contend that the circuit court's award of summary judgment to Ms. Marshall was improper because the deficiency judgment award was not adjusted to reflect the fair market value of the property securing the debt. In addressing whether a defendant may challenge the sale price of foreclosed property in a deficiency judgment lawsuit and assert that the property was sold for less than its fair market value, we will examine and consider: (1) the majority view of other jurisdictions that permit the sale price of foreclosed property to be challenged in a deficiency judgment lawsuit; and (2) West Virginia's statutory law on trust deed foreclosure sales, as well as this Court's ruling in Fayette County National Bank v. Lilly, 199 W.Va. 349, 484 S.E.2d 232 (1997).
Our Court has recognized that “a majority of jurisdictions permit the sale price of foreclosed property to be challenged in a deficiency judgment proceeding[.]” Fayette Cnty. Nat'l Bank v. Lilly, 199 W.Va. at 356, 484 S.E.2d at 239. Whether by judicial decision or by statute,11 the majority view “afford[s] the deficiency defendant the right to insist that the greater of the fair market value of the real estate or the foreclosure sale price be used in calculating the deficiency.” Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages, § 8.4 cmt. a (1997).
In one such judicial decision, the Montana Supreme Court determined that its real property foreclosure statute was silent on whether the fair market value of the property could be raised in a deficiency judgment proceeding. Because the statute was silent, the court used its inherent equitable powers to require that the fair market value of the foreclosed property be determined and form the basis of any deficiency judgment award.See Trustees of the Wash.–Idaho–Mont.–Carpenters–Emp'r Ret. Trust Fund v. Galleria P'ship, 239 Mont. 250, 265, 780 P.2d 608, 617 (1989) (...
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