Soto v. Sacco

• Citation: 398 P.3d 90
• Decision Date: 13 July 2017
• Docket Number: No. CV-16-0136-PR,CV-16-0136-PR
• Parties: Michael SOTO, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Anthony M. SACCO, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: Supreme Court of Arizona

398 P.3d 90

Michael SOTO, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.Anthony M. SACCO, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. CV-16-0136-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed July 13, 2017

James Michael Abernethy (argued), Law Office of James Michael Abernethy PLLC, Phoenix, Attorney for Michael Soto

Edward G. Hochuli, Lori L. Voepel (argued), Justin M. Ackerman, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli P.L.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for Anthony M. Sacco, Total Transit Inc. dba Discount Cab and Discount Enterprises, Inc.

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Daniel P. Schaack, Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. McCright, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae State of Arizona

Joseph N. Roth, Joshua D. Bendor, Osborn Maledon P.A., Phoenix; and Brad Holm, Phoenix City Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae City of Phoenix

Jeffrey C. Warren, Amanda Heitz, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Association of Defense Counsel.

JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, and JUSTICES BRUTINEL, TIMMER, BOLICK and BERCH (Retired)^* joined.

JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 This case concerns the standards a trial court applies in granting a new trial or ordering remittitur or additur under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Although a trial court should be circumspect when modifying a jury verdict, it nonetheless may do so if it states the Rule 59(a) or (i) grounds for the order and explains its ruling with sufficient particularity to avoid speculation as to its basis.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 This case arises from a motor vehicle accident, the salient facts of which are not in dispute. Michael Soto and his wife Julie (the "Sotos") were passengers in a taxi cab driven by Anthony Sacco when it collided with another vehicle. The Sotos sued Sacco, Discount Enterprises Inc., and Total Transit, Inc. doing business as Discount Cab (collectively "Defendants"). Defendants admitted Sacco's negligence and respondeat superior liability. A jury trial ensued to determine damages.

¶ 3 As a result of the accident, Michael sustained multiple fractures to his dominant arm and underwent surgery to permanently implant a plate and screws to stabilize it. The Sotos testified that Michael experienced significant pain and emotional distress since the accident, preventing him from participating in physical activities he previously enjoyed. Michael's treating physician, however, placed no limitations on his activities and told him to use his arm normally, using pain as a guide when engaging in physical activity. Michael's medical bills totaled $40,538.40, but he made no claim for future medical expenses or lost wages.

¶ 4 At trial, the Sotos urged the jury to award Michael $725,000 in damages. Defendants suggested an award between $90,000 and $120,000. After deliberating, the jury awarded $700,000 to Michael and $40,000 to Julie. Defendants then moved for a new trial, or to alter or amend the judgment, and for remittitur under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1), (5), (7) and (8), and Rule 59(i), requesting that Michael's award be reduced to not more than $350,000. The trial court found that the jury verdict in favor of Michael "was excessive and not supported by the evidence," and granted a remittitur pursuant to Rule 59(i), reducing Michael's award to $250,000.¹ The Sotos rejected the court's remittitur and appealed from the new trial order that became effective after they declined the remittitur.

¶ 5 The court of appeals affirmed. Soto v. Sacco , 239 Ariz. 516, 372 P.3d 1040 (App. 2016). It rejected the Sotos' argument that conditional grants of new trial under Rule 59(i) are subject to Rule 59(m), which requires the trial court to specify with particularity the ground(s) on which the new trial is granted. The court of appeals instead concluded that " Rule 59(i) does not require the trial court to specify the particulars in relation to which the verdict was excessive" and upheld the trial court's remittitur. Soto , 239 Ariz. at 519 ¶ 12, 372 P.3d 1040, at 1043 (quoting Hancock v. Linsenmeyer , 15 Ariz. App. 296, 299, 488 P.2d 501 (1971) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court determined that the trial court "could reasonably conclude that the award to Michael reflected ‘an exaggerated measurement of damages.’ " Id. at 520 ¶ 14, 372 P.3d 1040, at 1044 (quoting In re Estate of Hanscome , 227 Ariz. 158, 162 ¶ 13, 254 P.3d 397, 401 (App. 2011) ).

¶ 6 We granted review because the standards for ordering remittitur or additur or granting a new trial under Rule 59 present recurring issues of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review Under Rule 59

¶ 7 This case implicates the proper balance between a jury's province to determine civil damages and the trial court's authority under Rule 59 to modify a jury's award. Because a jury plays a vital role in our civil justice system, a trial court may not simply substitute its judgment for the jury's. State v. Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44, 50 ¶ 21, 392 P.3d 488, 494 (2017) ("We emphasize that the court does not usurp the role of the jury in granting a new trial because the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the jury; it only allows the parties a new trial before a different jury."); cf. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co. , 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520 (1944) ("Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable."). A trial court should be circumspect in interfering with a jury verdict by carefully and sparingly exercising its discretion to reduce or increase a jury's damage award. See Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44 ¶ 11, 50 ¶ 19, 392 P.3d 488, at 492 ("Arizona courts use essentially the same standard in civil and criminal cases," and "[a] trial court considering a motion for a new trial must respect the role of the jury and the integrity of the jury trial system."); Creamer v. Troiano , 108 Ariz. 573, 576, 503 P.2d 794, 797 (1972) ("Almost always when there is a conflict in the evidence, the trial judge should not interfere with what is peculiarly the jury's function."). Such reticence preserves the jury's important role and protects the right to a jury trial under article 2, section 23, of the Arizona Constitution.

¶ 8 Although we urge trial courts to sparingly exercise discretion in modifying a jury's verdict, we recognize that a trial judge plays a role akin to a "thirteenth juror" (a ninth juror in a civil case) when ruling on a motion for new trial, including motions based on excessive or insufficient damages. Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 49 ¶ 14, 50 ¶ 19, 392 P.3d at 493 ; see also Reeves v. Markle , 119 Ariz. 159, 163, 579 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1978) ("[The trial judge] has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record."); Brownell v. Freedman, 39 Ariz. 385, 389, 6 P.2d 1115 (1932) (noting that a trial judge, as an extra juror, "must be convinced that the weight of the evidence sustains the verdict, or it is his imperative duty to set it aside"). A trial judge's unique position is "the primary buffer against unjust verdicts," and the trial judge "performs an indispensable function without which our system of justice could not hold out the promise of [a] uniform application of the law." Reeves , 119 Ariz. at 163, 579 P.2d at 1386 ; see also Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 48 ¶ 12, 392 P.3d at 492. For this reason, we grant significant latitude to trial courts in ruling on new trial motions. Reeves , 119 Ariz. at 163, 579 P.2d at 1386 ("Whenever a new trial order is justified by any of the grounds cited in the order, an appellate court will not disturb the lower court's exercise of its discretion."). But a trial court should not disturb a jury's damage award unless the judge is firmly convinced it is inadequate or excessive and is contrary to the weight of the evidence. See Creamer , 108 Ariz. at 576–77, 503 P.2d at 797–98.

¶ 9 If the trial judge finds that the damage award is tainted by "passion or prejudice," or is "shocking[ly] or flagrantly outrageous," remittitur is not an appropriate remedy. Hanscome , 227 Ariz. at 162 ¶ 13, 254 P.3d at 401 (quoting Stallcup v. Rathbun , 76 Ariz. 63, 65, 67, 258 P.2d 821 (1953) ). Under those circumstances, the court must instead order a new trial. Id. When, as here, the verdict is neither the result of passion or prejudice nor shockingly outrageous, but "instead reflects an exaggerated measurement of damages," "the trial court may exercise its discretion to order remittitur." Id. (citation omitted).

¶ 10 In differentiating between the standard for a new trial, which requires a finding of "passion or prejudice" or a "shockingly or flagrantly outrageous" verdict, and the lower standard for remittitur, which requires an exaggerated measurement of damages not supported by the evidence, we break no new ground. We merely affirm our longstanding jurisprudence and remain in the majority of jurisdictions, including the United States Supreme Court, which permit remittitur of an excessive jury award absent a finding of "passion or prejudice" or a similarly heightened standard.²

II. Rule 59(m)'s Application to Rule 59(i)

¶ 11 We conclude that Rule 59(m) applies to Rule 59(i). Rule 59(i) permits a trial court to "grant the new trial conditionally," and if the party against whom the remittitur is ordered refuses to accept it, a new trial is granted without further order. Rule 59(m) states that "[n]o order granting a new trial shall be made and entered unless the order specifies with particularity the ground or grounds on which the new trial is granted." The trial court expressly recognized that Rule 59(m)...