Souden v. Johnson

Decision Date27 December 1963
Docket NumberNo. 38916,38916
PartiesDonald M. SOUDEN, Appellant, v. Cordelia JOHNSON et al., Respondents.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. A driver who permits or causes her car, stopped on the highway in response to a traffic signal, to move ahead and rear end a vehicle, also stopped in plain sight in front of her, is guilty of negligence as a matter of law in the absence of any evidence by which the accident could be justified in terms of road or weather conditions or mechanical defect, and under circumstances where her only explanation of failure to keep her vehicle under control was that her attention was distracted by her attempt to observe the condition of one of her children sitting in the back seat of the car she was driving.

2. Cross-examiner's question so framed as to constitute an assertion that the plaintiff in an automobile negligence case had been involved in another accident and had then pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident is improper and prejudicial.

John M. Miller, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Wilbur Lasley, Minneapolis, for respondents.

SHERAN, Justice.

The appeal is from an order of the district court denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

Action was instituted by plaintiff Donald M. Souden for damages in the amount of $75,000 for personal injuries allegedly sustained as the result of an automobile accident occurring August 31, 1960, at the intersection of University Avenue and Highway 100 in Anoka County. A motor vehicle operated by defendant Cordelia Johnson, with the permission and consent of the owner, her husband, defendant David R. Johnson, rear ended a motor vehicle operated by plaintiff which was stopped on Highway 100 waiting for the signal at the intersection to change. By agreement the damage to the forward car was fixed at $42.40. One of the special interrogatories submitted to the jury was: 'At and immediately prior to the collision, was Cordelia Johnson negligent in respect to management and control?' The jury responded in the negative and consequently no answers were given to the remaining interrogatories submitted, which pertained to proximate cause and damages.

Upon appeal, plaintiff contends that the negative answer to the quoted interrigatory is without support in the evidence and claims error in the trial proceedings.

1. The only attempt to explain the fact that plaintiff, properly stopped on the highway, was hit from the rear appears in the testimony of Mrs. Johnson. She testified that she was driving from Minneapolis to Duluth for the weekend with her children, three of whom were in the back seat and one in the front. She observed the Souden car come to a stop and brought her vehicle to a stop also 'about six or seven feet behind him.' She remained in this position 2 or 3 seconds, 'at which time one of my children commented on the condition of another child who had not been feeling well. I turned around to look at her and was horrified to see she was covered with blotches, and during this time my foot eased up on the brake, and the car must have inched ahead and then my car contacted the car in front of me with a slight bump.' She was still partially turned around when the impact occurred. In turning around, she had released the pressure on the brake and the vehicle moved forward. The collision which followed was proximately caused by this failure to keep the Chevrolet under control.

In our opinion the evidence establishes negligence on the part of Mrs. Johnson as a matter of law. It is undisputed that her vehicle was in a stopped position about 6 feet to the rear of the vehicle operated by plaintiff and that she caused or permitted it to strike the rear of the forward car properly stopped on the highway in obedience to the traffic signal. No attempt is made to justify this admitted fact either on the basis of the...

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13 cases
  • Taylor v. Walter
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • October 6, 1970
    ... ... 33, 356 S.W.2d 744; Book v. Datema (1964), 256 Iowa 1330, 131 N.W.2d 470; Warren v. Marsh (1943), 215 Minn. 615, 11 N.W.2d 528; Souden v. Johnson (1963), 267 Minn. 151, 125 N.W.2d 742 ... 6 Lingle v. Bulfer (1926), 322 Ill. 606, 611, 153 N.E. 589; Heating Acceptance Corporation v ... ...
  • Roberts v. Kettner, 40588
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • August 16, 1968
    ...negligence was a question for the jury. Plaintiff claims that defendant was negligent as a matter of law, relying on Souden v. Johnson, 267 Minn. 151, 125 N.W.2d 742, and Wilson v. Sorge, 265 Minn. 125, 97 N.W.2d 477, as We think the following statement made by the court in the Souden case ......
  • Pluwak v. Lindberg
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • July 3, 1964
    ...v. Dick Thayer Motor Co., 253 Minn. 199, 91 N.W.2d 585; Lee v. Lee, 248 Minn. 496, 80 N.W.2d 529, 67 A.L.R.2d 176; Souden v. Johnson, 267 Minn. 151, 125 N.W.2d 742. Mr. Justice SHERAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 1 Ferguson v. Kehoe, 245 Minn. 46, 71 N.W.2d 16......
  • Harfield v. Tate, 980345
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • August 25, 1999
    ...the Minnesota Supreme Court held sufficient distracting circumstances did not exist to excuse a driver's negligence. Souden v. Johnson, 125 N.W.2d 742, 743 (Minn. 1963). In that case, two vehicles were stopped six feet apart when one child in the defendant's vehicle commented on the appeara......
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