South Carolina Dep't Of Transp. v. Horry County
Decision Date | 18 January 2011 |
Docket Number | Opinion No. 26911 |
Parties | South Carolina Department of Transportation, Respondent, v. Horry County, Burroughs and Chapin Company, Inc., Wendell A. Grainger, Wanda B. Grainger, William Michael Grainger, Augustus Mace Grainger, and Rachel Louise Grainger Rabon, Defendants, of whom Wendell A. Grainger, Wanda B. Grainger, William Michael Grainger, Augustus Mace Grainger, and Rachel Louise Grainger Rabon are Appellants. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Horry County
John Hamilton Smith, Special Referee
AFFIRMED
Louis David Nettles, of Folkens Law Firm, of Florence, W. E. Jenkinson, III and Jennifer R. Kellahan, both of Jenkinson, Jarrett and Kellahan, of Kingstree, for Appellants.
Barbara Munig Wessinger, of SCDOT, of Columbia, and John Samuel West, of Moncks Corner, for Respondent.
John L. Weaver, of Office of Horry County Administrator, of Conway, for Defendants.
The South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a determination that it had a valid easement across the Graingers' (Appellants) land. The special referee found SCDOT does hold a valid easement, and this appeal followed.
By way of a deed executed in 1924, the Burroughs & Chapin Co. (B&C) conveyed a 400 feet by 700 feet easement over a parcel of land to Horry County for the purposes of "laying out and opening, widening and relocating" Pee Dee Road.1 In August 1930, Horry County conveyed this easement to the state highway department.2 In September 1930, B&C conveyed a 75 feet wide easement over the same parcel to the State for the construction of a different state highway project.
In 1979, Horry County gave B&C a quitclaim deed, purporting to transfer its interest in the 1924 easement back to B&C.3 The deed references the 1924 transaction between Horry County and B&C, but makes no mention of Horry County's transfer to the state highway department in 1930. In 1985, B&C conveyed Appellants portions of the parcel; their deeds made no mention of an easement across their property. Appellants did not conduct title examinations until seeking mortgages to construct residences upon the properties. The examinations missed the 1930 grant of the easement to the highway department, although it was in the chain of title. In 2006, SCDOT notified Appellants that it was planning to replace an existing bridge and was going to relocate the access road, which meant coming through the properties occupied by the Appellants.
Appellants claim this is the first they knew of the easement, and that they had no way of knowing about the easement before SCDOT notified them of its intentions. SCDOT ultimately filed a declaratory judgment action against Appellants and other defendants. Appellants filed cross-claims against B&C and others. All parties agreed that the declaratory judgment action should be adjudicated first, with all other claims held in abeyance. The declaratory judgment action was referred to a master-in-equity, who was unable to hear the case due to a medical condition. The parties then agreed to have the case heard by a special referee. Former circuit court judge John Smith sat as a special referee for the non-jury trial of this matter, and issued a decision holding that SCDOT obtained title to the valid easement in 1930, and theories of adverse possession, presumption of a grant, equitable estoppel, and abandonment do not operate to deprive SCDOT of its title.
Appellants present the following issues for review:
+------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | I. | Did the special referee err in finding a valid easement was created | | | by the 1924 deed from B&C to Horry County? | +------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | II. | Did the special referee err in not finding a public dedication? | +------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | III. | Did the special referee err in holding equitable estoppel | | | did not deprive SCDOT of its rights to the easement? | +------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | IV. | Did the special referee err in holding the doctrine of presumption of grant | | | did not deprive SCDOT of its rights to the easement? | +------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Standard of Review
Declaratory judgment actions are neither legal nor equitable; therefore, the standard of review depends upon the nature of the underlying issues. Judy v. Martin, 381 S.C. 455, 458, 674 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2009). "In an action at law tried without a jury, an appellate court’s scope of review extends merely to the correction of errors of law." Temple v. Tec-Fab, Inc., 381 S.C. 597, 599-600, 675 S.E.2d 414, 415 (2009). This Court will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are without evidence reasonably supporting those findings. Id. In equitable actions, an appellate court may find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Denman v. City of Columbia, 387 S.C. 131, 140, 691 S.E.2d 465, 470 (2010). "When legal and equitable actions are maintained in one suit, each retains its own identity as legal or equitable for purposes of the applicable standard of review on appeal." Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 338 S.C. 572, 580, 527 S.E.2d 371, 375 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Corley v. Ott, 326 S.C. 89, 92, n.1, 485 S.E.2d 97, 99, n.1 (1997)).
Appellants argue the special referee erred in finding a valid easement because the language in the 1924 deed was too vague to create an easement. We disagree.
The determination of the existence of an easement is a question of fact in a law action and subject to an "any evidence" standard of review when tried by a judge without a jury. Hardy v. Aiken, 369 S.C. 160, 165, 631 S.E.2d 539, 541 (2006). Therefore, this Court will not overturn a trial court's finding that an easement exists unless that conclusion is controlled by an error of law or without evidentiary support. See S.C. Const. art. V, § 5 ( ); Hardy, 369 S.C. at 165, 631 S.E.2d at 541.
Appellants contend the 1924 deed did not describe the boundaries of the easement adequately to create a valid easement. The special referee, however, found the deed gives the dimensions of the easement and sufficiently refers to the boundaries. SeeBinkley v. Rabon Creek Watershead, 348 S.C. 58, 72, 558 S.E.2d 902, 909 (Ct. App. 2001) (). The special referee's findings are supported by evidence in the record; therefore, the special referee did not err in concluding a valid easement was created by the 1924 deed.
The special referee then found that because the 1924 deed created a valid easement, and because Horry County conveyed that easement to the state highway department in 1930, Horry County did not have title to the easement when it gave B&C a quitclaim deed in 1979. Therefore, SCDOT retains valid title to the easement.
Appellants argue that if the 1924 deed created a valid easement, then that easement was dedicated to the public, and the law of dedication requires the dedication be construed in the least restrictive manner. Therefore, the Appellants argue, the special referee erred in not finding and restrictively construing the easement as a public dedication. The special referee, however, made no findings as to public dedication, and there is nothing in the record to show Appellants made any post-trial motions regarding this issue. Thus, we find this issue has not been preserved for review by this Court. See S.C. Dept. of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 641 S.E.2d 903 (2007) ( ); Lucas v. Rawl Family Ltd. P'ship, 359 S.C. 505, 598 S.E2d 712 (2004) (issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal).
Appellants argue SCDOT is estopped from asserting its right to the easement. We disagree.
As a general rule, estoppel does not lie against the government to prevent the due exercise of its police power or to thwart the application of public policy. Grant v. City of Folly Beach, 346 S.C. 74, 80-81, 551 S.E.2d 229, 232 (2001). To prove estoppel against the government, the relying party must prove: (1) the lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth of the facts in question; (2) justifiable reliance upon the government's conduct; and (3) a prejudicial change in position. Id.
The special referee found that the 1924 deed creating the easement was properly recorded and indexed and that Appellants had constructive notice of the easement. The special referee relied heavily upon Binkley v. Rabon Creek Watershead, 348 S.C. 58, 558 S.E.2d 902 (Ct. App. 2001) in reaching his conclusion. In Binkley, the homeowners challenged the scope of a flowage easement, claiming the easement did not allow for the flooding of their lands past a certain...
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