South Carolina Dept. of Social Services v. Deglman

• Decision Date: 18 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. 22648,22648
• Citation: 351 S.E.2d 864,290 S.C. 542
• Parties: SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Petitioner, v. Iva N. DEGLMAN, Respondent. . Heard
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 864

351 S.E.2d 864

290 S.C. 542

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Petitioner, v. Iva N. DEGLMAN, Respondent.

No. 22648.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Nov. 18, 1986.

Decided Dec. 29, 1986.

[290 S.C. 543] Attorney Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Nan L. Black, Asst. Atty. Gen. Ruby E. Brice, Chief State Atty. Edgar W. Dickson, State Atty. S. Belinda Ellison, and Staff Atty. George T. Burnett, Columbia, for petitioner.

Francis Draine, of Draine, McLaren and Lee, Columbia, for respondent.

OPINION

HARWELL, Justice:

Robert Deglman (father) assigned his child support rights to his employer, South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS). DSS brought this action to establish a support obligation on the part of Iva Deglman (mother) for her sixteen year old daughter. The family court judge dismissed the action. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed and awarded double costs to mother. South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Deglman, 288 S.C. 149, 341 S.E.2d 638 (Ct.App.1986). We granted DSS's petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Father and mother were divorced in 1978. Father was granted temporary custody of the two children. Mother appealed the amount of alimony and attorney fees awarded to her. This Court reversed and remanded. Deglman v. Deglman, 276 S.C. 600, 281 S.E.2d 123 (1981). On October 1, 1981, father assigned his child support rights to his employer, DSS. Twelve days later, father instituted a new suit against mother involving matters that are not relevant to this appeal. That suit and the hearing on remand were consolidated in the lower court. Alimony and attorney fees were increased. Immediately after that hearing was concluded, DSS sued mother for child support.

The family court dismissed the action on the ground of collateral estoppel, stating that the father should have asked for child support during previous litigation. This holding was clearly erroneous since child support is a continuing obligation. See Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 306 S.E.2d 624 (1983). The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, but on different grounds. The Court of Appeals held that DSS lacked standing to bring the action and that the action was frivolous. The Court of Appeals awarded double costs to mother. We granted DSS's petition for Writ of Certiorari.

DSS claims that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that it lacked standing. We agree. DSS contends that its participation in this suit is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 654 (1983). In 1974, Title IV, Part D of the Social Security Act was amended by Congress to establish a Child Support Enforcement Program. The legislation requires each state to adopt a plan for providing designated services. Upon approval of the state plan, the federal government reimburses the state for a certain percentage of the costs that are incurred. This program primarily focuses on obtaining and collecting support for recipients of Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC). Congress recognized, however, that often a family's dependence on AFDC in the first instance is caused by the failure of an absent parent to meet obligations. See S.Rep. No. 1356, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 8133, 8145-46, 8158.

The Act plainly provides that "the child support collection or paternity determination services established under the [state] plan shall be made available to any individual not otherwise eligible for such services upon application filed by such individual with the state...." 42 U.S.C. § 645(6)(A) (Supp.1986). All services available to AFDC families are to be made available to non-AFDC applicants. Carter v. Morrow, 562 F.Supp 311 (W.D.N.C.1983). Among the services that the state must provide to receive federal approval is establishment of the support obligation through the state courts or other legal process. 45 C.F.R. §§ 302.5, 303.4 (1982); S.Rep. No. 1356, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 8133, 8134; S.C.Code Ann., Vol. 27, Reg. 114-25-10(B)(1) (1981).

The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the program included non-AFDC families in order to prevent them from having to apply for welfare, Congress intended for DSS to make the program's benefits available to non-AFDC families only when three conditions are met. These conditions are: (1) a support obligation has been established against a legally responsible parent; (2) the applicant is eligible for AFDC, or likely to need welfare if collection services are not made available; and (3) the dependent child has a present need for support. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that since these three conditions were not met, DSS had no standing to bring the suit.

The first requirement is clearly contrary to federal and state regulations. The establishment of the support obligation is one of the services the program was designed to provide. The second requirement receives no support from the Act or the regulations. The Act provides that individuals, "whether or not eligible" for AFDC, are to receive the same services as AFDC recipients. 42 U.S.C. § 651 (Supp.1986). The third requirement is inherent in the process of obtaining child support since the family court may not order support absent a need for it. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that DSS had no standing to bring this action.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that DSS failed to prove that father assigned his rights to DSS. The Court of Appeals found that while the trial judge stated that a copy of the assignment was attached to the complaint, the record did not indicate that the assignment was offered or...