South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen

• Decision Date: 16 November 1964
• Citation: 41 Cal.Rptr. 277,230 Cal.App.2d 628
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: SOUTH SHORE LAND COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent, v. Elinor E. PETERSEN, Defendant and Appellant, and Carol E. Heche, Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Appellant. Civ. 21549.

Page 277

41 Cal.Rptr. 277

230 Cal.App.2d 628

SOUTH SHORE LAND COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent, v. Elinor E. PETERSEN, Defendant and Appellant and Carol E. Heche, Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Appellant.

Civ. 21549.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Nov. 16, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 1964.

Elinor E. Petersen, Oakland, and Carol E. Heche, Alameda, in pro. per.

Weinmann, Rode, Burnhill & Moffitt, Ralph N. Mendelson, Alameda, for respondent.

AGEE, Justice.

Defendants appeal from a judgment quieting title in plaintiff to six tideland lots lying south of and substantially adjacent to the line of ordinary high tide of San Francisco Bay where it abuts the southern shore line of the City of Alameda.

In 1871 these lots were sold at public sale pursuant to a statute enacted shortly prior thereto. (Stats.1867-1868, p. 716 et seq., as supplemented by Stats.1869-1870, p. 541 et seq.)

The first deed in respondent's chain of title to each of the six lots is a deed thereof from the Board of Tide Land Commissioners of the State of California to the purchaser or purchasers at such sale. Subsequent deeds introduced in evidence show a complete and unbroken chain of title to the six lots to be in respondent.

All of these deeds describe the northern boundary of each of the lots as the line of ordinary high tide of san Francisco Bay. However, in order to eliminate minor disputes as to the exact location on the ground of such tide line, the judgment adopts a line which in some instances is below or to the south of the line of ordinary high tide but which never extends above or to the north of said tide line.

The basis of appellants' claim of interest in the tidelands of the 'Island of Alameda,' upon which the City of Alameda is situated is the same as that related in Petersen v. United States, 9 Cir., 327 F.2d 219 (January 17, 1964) and need not be repeated in this opinion. The appellants are the same in both actions. The reclaimed land involved in the other action is part of the Alameda Naval Air Station and is west of land involved herein.

For the same reasons as set forth by the United States Court of Appeals in the cited decision, we conclude that the United States patent issued to Antonio Peralta in 1874, rather than the Spanish grant of 1820 issued to his father, Don Luis Peralta, is 'the title deed from which any subsequent owner had to trace his ownership' and that this patent 'plainly and unambiguously excluded from its coverage any land covered by the waters of the bay.' (Petersen, supra, 327 F.2d p. 221.)

Thus, whatever interest appellants may have acquired under the Spanish grant of 1820, as defined and limited by the subsequent patent issued by the United States, did not extend beyond or to the south of the line of ordinary high tide involved herein.

Appellants attempt to avoid the effect of this limitation with the argument that the artificial filling in of the subject lots, after being acquired by respondent, eliminated the old line of ordinary high tide and thereby gave them, as holders of an interest in the upland property, an interest in the reclaimed tideland up to the newly created line of ordinary high tide.

Assuming, arguendo, that appellants have any interest in the upland property, they did not by reason thereof acquire any interest in the tidelands artificially filled.

Although it is true that an owner of upland may see the quantity of his land increased by natural accretion, that is, by the action of tides washing soil up along the shoreline, it is settled that such owner, having no rights or title in the tidelands, acquires no interest therein when they are filled by artificial means. (People v. Hecker, 179 Cal.App.2d 823, 840, 4 Cal.Rptr. 334; Los Angeles Athletic Club v. City of Santa Monica, 63 Cal.App.2d 795, 799, 147 P.2d 976; 52 Cal.Jur.2d 445, 446.)

Appellants also question the authority of the State of California to make the original sales of the subject lots. There were no restrictive legislative or constitutional provisions in the year 1871 which in any way prohibited these sales. The Supreme Court, in Ward v. Mulford (1867) 32 Cal. 365, 372, had but recently affirmed the State's ownership of lands covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of the neap or ordinary tides. Where these lands were of no possible use for navigation or public use, the court stated: 'Such lands the State may undoubtedly grant in private ownership for the purposes of reclamation and use, for by such a course no right of the public to their use for the purposes of navigation would be prejudiced.' (See also, People...