Southeast Land Developers v. All Fla. Site
Decision Date | 12 February 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 1D09-2170.,1D09-2170. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Parties | SOUTHEAST LAND DEVELOPERS, INC., a Florida corporation, John Reaves, III, an individual, and Richard J. Aboud, as Trustee of "John J. Reaves, Jr., Living Trust," Appellants, v. ALL FLORIDA SITE AND UTILITIES, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee. |
John S. Mills of Mills Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellants.
Michael Bowlus of Michael Bowlus, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.
Appellants seek review of the trial court's order denying their motion to set aside a default judgment filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540. Appellants argue that the judgment is void because it is based upon a complaint that failed to state a claim. We agree that the judgment is void, and reverse.
Appellee All Florida Site & Utilities, Inc. ("Subcontractor") filed a complaint against Appellant Southeast Land Developers, Inc. ("Contractor") for breach of a construction contract by failure to pay for the Subcontractor's work. The Subcontractor's complaint alleged that the parties entered into a subcontract for the installment of water, sewer, and drainage systems at the Marsh's Edge development in St. Simons Island, Georgia, and that $113,040.13 was "due and owing" to the Subcontractor for labor and materials.
The Contractor did not file an answer, but successfully compelled arbitration. The Contractor's counsel filed a motion to withdraw, explaining that the arbitration hearing had been cancelled due to the illness and death of the Contractor's principal, John Reaves, and that counsel had been unable to make arrangements to continue representation with Richard Aboud, a trustee who had taken over operations for the Contractor. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw and ordered the Contractor to obtain separate counsel; however, the Contractor did not obtain new counsel, and arbitration was never held. The Subcontractor moved for default final judgment, and a default judgment was entered. The Contractor filed a motion to set aside the default final judgment, which was denied.
On appeal, the Contractor asserts the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion to vacate the default final judgment. The Contractor asserts that the judgment is void because the complaint on which it was based failed to state a claim, as it did not allege that conditions precedent to payment had been satisfied. In North Shore Hospital, Inc. v. Barber, 143 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla.1962), the Florida Supreme Court noted that in order to reverse a trial judge's ruling on a motion to vacate a default final judgment, the district court must find a gross abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, a number of more recent district court decisions have applied a simple abuse of discretion standard. See Tutwiler Cadillac, Inc. v. Brockett, 551 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ( ); BoatFloat, LLC v. Central Transp. Int'l, Inc., 941 So.2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) () (quoting Top Dollar Pawn Too, Inc. v. King, 861 So.2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)); Szucs v. Qualico Dev., Inc., 893 So.2d 708, 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (); KFC USA, Inc. v. Depew, 879 So.2d 55, 56 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) () (footnote omitted). Further, there is a strong preference for lawsuits to be determined on the merits rather than by default judgment. Tutwiler Cadillac, 551 So.2d at 1272; Geer v. Jacobsen, 880 So.2d 717, 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) provides that, on a party's motion, a court may relieve a party from a final judgment for several reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing; (3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) that the judgment or decree is void; or (5) that the judgment or decree has been satisfied, released, or discharged. . . .
The remainder of the rule requires that the motion be filed "within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than 1 year after the judgment, decree, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
A default judgment is void and should be set aside when the complaint fails to state a cause of action. See Moynet v. Courtois, 8 So.3d 377, 378-79 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (...
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