Southern Pac. Co. v. Porter
Decision Date | 06 January 1960 |
Docket Number | No. A-7191,A-7191 |
Citation | 331 S.W.2d 42,160 Tex. 329 |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Parties | SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, Petitioner, v. George A. PORTER, Respondent. |
Underwood, Wilson, Sutton, Heare & Boyce, Amarillo, for petitioner.
Gibson, Ochsner, Harlan, Kinney & Morris, Amarillo, for respondent.
The Court of Civil Appeals held as a matter of 'federal law' that a shipper's claim for damages for the negligent handling of cattle in transit could be offset as a recoupment against the carrier's claim for freight charges. 319 S.W.2d 810. The case of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Miller, 5 Cir., 124 F.2d 160, 162, 140 A.L.R. 811 writ of certiorari denied 316 U.S. 676, 62 S.Ct. 1047, 86 L.Ed. 1750 was relied upon as supporting this holding.
The present action involved an interstate shipment of 290 head of cattle from Kinsey, Montana to El Centro, California under the terms of the Uniform Live Stock Contract which contained the following provision:
It was stipulated that the carrier was entitled to recover as prayed for in its petition, except as its right of recovery might be defeated by the shipper's pleaded theory of recoupment, and that no written notice of claim for damage to cattle was filed with the carrier within the nine month's period specified in the shipping contract. The trial court allowed the recoupment defense and its judgment was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals.
In Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Miller and identical or similar clause to that above set out was contained in a bill of lading covering three cars of onions, allegedly damaged in transit. As to the shipper's right to offset such damages against the carrier's freight charges, a difference of opinion between the judges developed. Judges Holmes and McCord held (1) that the time limit clauses in the bill of lading were limitation provisions and (2) that as long as the claim for freight was outstanding so was the right of recoupment based upon the damages to the onions. Judge Hutcheson, in dissenting, said:
As we read the Miller case, it was the view of both the majority and the dissenting judge that the question of 'recoupment' was a matter controlled by Texas and not federal law. The majority position upon the point was stated by Judge Holmes as follows:
In his dissenting opinion Judge Hutcheson said:
'But, if I am mistaken in this, and the provision does not extinguish the liability but merely fixes a period of limitation within which suits can be brought, the opinion of the majority is no better based. For in Texas, and Texas law governs, defendant's claim for damages is not a defense to plaintiff's suit to be set up by way of recoupment, but a counter claim to be affirmatively sued on, and as such, it is barred. In support of its view, that defendant's claim for damages is available in recoupment rather than as a counter claim, the majority cites Federal cases and cases from other jurisdictions, and construed the Texas cases cited below as not in conflict therewith. With its general statement of the law as applicable elsewhere I have no quarrel, but the law in Texas is controlling, and as announced by the highest court of this state, in Morris-Buick Co. v. Davis, 127 Tex. 41, 91 S.W.2d 313, 314, it is, I think, exactly to the contrary of the view the majority takes. There expressly rejecting the cited decisions of courts of other jurisdictions, the court declared: 'The intent of our remedial statutes * * * regulating the subject of counterclaim and set-off, is such that the remedy of recoupment, to the extent that same has been expanded and applied in some jurisdictions, has no place in the jurisprudence of this state. It is the law of this state that where the subject-matter of a defense interposed by the defendant constitutes an independent cause of action which does not go to the foundation of the plaintiff's demand, it cannot effect a reduction of the amount of the plaintiff's recovery except by way of set-off, and the statutes of limitation are available to the plaintiff in respect to such defense. Nelson v. San Antonio Traction Co., 107 Tex. 180, 175 S.W. 434. On the other hand, if the subject-matter of the defense, be of an intrinsically defensive nature, which, if given effect, will operate merely as a negation of the plaintiff's asserted right to recover, or an abatement, either wholly or partially, of the amount claimed, the statute of limitation does not apply. Mason v. Peterson, Tex.Com.App., 250 S.W. 142."
The Miller case seems to afford no basis for saying that the decision as to common law recoupment is based upon an Act of Congress or some other legally adopted federal regulation. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487; 15 C.J.S. 630, Common Law, § 16. The question then for our decision is whether the majority or the dissent in Miller expressed the correct view of common law recoupment as it exists in Texas. And this is true whether we regard the applicable law as being that of the place where the contract was made or that of the place where the suit was brought. (As to the conflict of laws question, see, 11 Am.Jur. 502, §§ 189, 190.) In Miller, the contract was made in Texas and suit was brought in Texas. In the case now before us, the situation is essentially the same. Although it appears that the contract was executed in the State of Montana, Porter did not assert that the matter of recoupment should be determined by the law of Montana as the lex loci contractus, nor did he claim that the law of Montana on the point is different from that of Texas. Accordingly, we presume that they are identical. Milner...
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