Southern Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire. & Eng.

• Decision Date: 21 July 1967
• Docket Number: No. 21124.,21124.
• Citation: 384 F.2d 323
• Parties: SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

384 F.2d 323 (1967)

SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN, Appellee.

No. 21124.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

July 21, 1967.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mr. Charles A. Horsky, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Hugh B. Cox, Washington, D. C., was on the pleadings, for appellants.

Mr. Joseph L. Rauh, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Isaac N. Groner, Washington, D. C., was on the pleadings, for appellee.

Before WRIGHT, TAMM and LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

This cause came on for hearing on appellants' motion for suspension of injunction pending appeal and the Court heard arguments of counsel.

Upon consideration whereof, it is

Ordered by the Court that the aforesaid motion be granted and, with the exception of paragraphs (h) and (i), the order of the District Court of June 30, 1967, is stayed, and it is

Further ordered by the Court that the record in this case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with the attached opinion. The Clerk is authorized to transmit a certified copy of this order to the Clerk of the District Court as promptly as the business of his office will permit.

MEMORANDUM

PER CURIAM:

In 1965, following our decision in Southern Railway Company v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 119 U.S. App.D.C. 91, 337 F.2d 127 (1964), the parties to that case executed a new collective bargaining agreement changing, inter alia, the rules with respect to employment of firemen. The 1965 agreement in effect requires Southern to place firemen on 10% of its freight and yard runs in each "seniority district" if such runs are designated by the union. These are referred to as "vetoed jobs," since to that extent the union may veto the carrier's decision to dispense with firemen. The agreement further provides: "All agreements, rules, regulations, interpretations, and practices, however established, with respect to the employment of firemen (helpers) shall continue undisturbed except as modified by the terms of this agreement." The agreement previously existing between the parties was executed in 1959.

On May 10, 1967, the union filed suit in the District Court alleging that the appellants had committed "deliberate, systematic and wholesale" violations of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. and the 1959 and 1965 collective bargaining agreements, and seeking "injunctive and other relief." Many of the alleged violations relate to 1) the appellants' failure to place firemen on all "vetoed jobs" and 2) the use of personnel other than firemen for "hostling" duties (moving engines short distances in connection with service and repair). With respect to these violations, the nub of the controversy is the union's contention that the railroad has failed to respect its obligation, under the 1959 and 1965 agreements, to hire a sufficient number of firemen to man the designated runs and to perform "hostling" duties. The appellants admit that in about 500 instances firemen were not placed on "vetoed jobs" and on a number of occasions supervisors or other personnel performed "hostling" duties. However, they point out that the 500 instances in which firemen were not placed on "vetoed jobs" constitute only 1% of all designated runs since the adoption of the 1965 agreement, and assert that in nearly all those instances the placing of a fireman was made impossible by the existence of an "emergency," such as last-minute absence of an assigned fireman. Appellants deny that they have an obligation under the agreement to cancel a designated run when use of a fireman is made impossible by unforeseen circumstances. They advance similar arguments with respect to some of the alleged "hostling" violations, and contend that other alleged violations did not involve "hostling" within the meaning of the agreements. Appellants state that the latter question is now pending in a grievance proceeding before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. And finally, appellants allege, and the union does not deny, that they hired additional firemen in response to complaints by the union on several occasions.

In addition to the violations relating to "vetoed jobs" and "hostling," the union alleges that the appellants have violated the agreements by refusing to give examinations for the hiring of firemen and for the promotion of firemen to engineer, and by hiring engineers other than from the ranks of firemen. On the question of examinations, the appellants admit that the 1959 agreement requires examinations to be given to firemen to determine suitability for retention, by examinations given within a year after hiring, and for their promotion to engineer. Appellants allege, however, that no such examinations have been given since 1958, and therefore under the "practices, however established" language of the 1965 agreement, examinations are no longer required. They also contend that no promotions from fireman to engineer have been made since 1966 because there were no qualified firemen to fill the positions. The union admits that under a provision of the 1959 agreement the railroad may hire engineers other than from the ranks of firemen, but alleges that the uniform practice until 1966 was to fill all engineer vacancies by promoting firemen.

Following a hearing, at which both parties submitted affidavits and other documentary evidence, and the union in addition called several witnesses, the District Court granted the union's motion for a Preliminary Injunction. In addition to enjoining the alleged violations discussed above, the court enjoined the appellants from "failing or refusing to meet and treat with the plaintiff or to exert every effort in good faith to resolve any disputes which may have arisen or which may arise with the plaintiff." Appellants have now requested that the order of the District Court be suspended pending its appeal therefrom, under Rule 11 of the General Rules of this Court and Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

It is true, of course, that this court will not ordinarily disturb the order of the District Court granting or denying a preliminary injunction except for "abuse of discretion" or "clear error." Maas v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 251, 371 F.2d 348 (1966); Young v. Motion Picture Association of America, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 299 F.2d 119, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922, 82 S.Ct. 1565, 8 L.Ed. 2d 504 (1962). It is also true that "ordinarily this court will not consider the merits of the case further than necessary to determine whether that discretion was abused." Young v. Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., supra, 112 U.S. App.D.C. at 37, 299 F.2d at 121. We must take these principles into account, of course, in determining whether appellants have made such a "strong showing" that they are "likely to prevail on the merits" as to warrant staying the order of the District Court. Va. Petroleum Job Association v. FPC, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921 (1958). Where, as here, we believe there is substantial doubt whether the District Court had jurisdiction to grant part of the relief afforded, we think that, as to that portion of its order, such a showing has been made.

I.

The parties seem generally agreed that the question whether the District Court had power to enjoin the alleged violations of the 1959 and 1965 agreements depends primarily on whether a "major" or "minor" dispute is involved. If the controversy is a "minor" dispute, the District Court had jurisdiction only to the extent that injunctive relief might be required to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the controversy by the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R., 363 U.S. 528, 80 S.Ct. 1326, 4 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1960). Thus, if a "minor" dispute is presented the District Court exceeded its authority for two reasons: 1) rather than enjoining alteration of the status quo, the court's order requires the appellants to make numerous significant changes in present practices, some of which are allegedly of long standing; and 2) there is no proceeding pending before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, and thus no basis for the assertion of jurisdiction by the District Court. Manion v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 353 U.S. 927, 77 S.Ct. 706, 1 L.Ed.2d 722 (1957) (per curiam); Westchester Lodge 2186 v. Railway Express Agency, 329 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1964); Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R. R., 290 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1961) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed. 2d 96 (1961). On the other hand, the District Court clearly had jurisdiction to enjoin unilateral attempts by the appellants to modify the existing agreement without following statutory procedures, if the dispute is "major." Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 91, 337 F.2d 127 (1964).

The difference between "minor" disputes, over which the National Railroad Adjustment Board has...