Southern Ry. Co. v. Order of Railway Conductors
| Decision Date | 31 October 1945 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1367. |
| Citation | 63 F. Supp. 306 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. ORDER OF RAILWAY CONDUCTORS OF AMERICA. |
Frank G. Tompkins, of Columbia, S. C., J. M. Cohen and L. M. Abbot, both of Washington, D. C., and Barnwell & Whaley, of Charleston, S. C., for plaintiff.
Mitchell & Horlbeck, of Charleston, S. C., and V. C. Shuttleworth, of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for defendant.
The above entitled cause was instituted in the Court of Common Pleas for Charleston County, State of South Carolina, praying a declaratory judgment under the South Carolina Statutes, Code of Laws of S. C. 1942, Sec. 660. The plaintiff is a nonresident corporation. The defendant is an unincorporated association, its membership being made up of railway conductors in various parts of the United States, including a number of members in Charleston County. The suit was properly brought in the name of the unincorporated association in accordance with Sections 7796 and 7797 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina 1942. The controversy relates to the construction of a contract of employment between the plaintiff railway company and the railway conductors.
The defendant removed the cause from the State Court by appropriate proceedings, alleging in the petition for removal that the suit is one that arose under the Constitution and laws of the United States and involves a federal question arising under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act of 1934, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. Although it is alleged that the matter in dispute exceeds $3,000 there is no diversity of citizenship alleged or shown.
The plaintiff railway company has appeared and filed its motion to remand. The Railway Labor Act as adopted by Congress contains many provisions relating to relations between railroads and their employees. Among other things, there is established an adjustment board known as "National Railroad Adjustment Board", which board is divided into certain divisions. The "First Division" is "To have jurisdiction over disputes involving trainand yard-service employees of carriers." 45 U.S.C.A. § 153(h). Subdivision (i) of the same section is as follows:
"(i) The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data hearing upon the disputes."
It will be noted that the first part of the above section provides that these disputes "shall" be handled by certain negotiations up to the point of reaching an adjustment. But the latter part of the section provides that where the parties fail to reach an adjustment the dispute "may" be referred by petition to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board.
From the foregoing language it appears that Congress intended that disputes of the character covered by the pending cause may be adjusted in either of two ways. First, under the authority of the act by carrying it before the Adjustment Board, or second, by exercising the common law rights of any parties to bring an action to construe a contract and protect his rights. And so it is quite clear that there is concurrent jurisdiction of the subject matter of this suit either by the Adjustment Board or a court of competent jurisdiction. The parties by agreement may use either method of adjudication, or either party may institute an action in a court or before the board. I am of the opinion that if the matter is taken first before a court it will retain jurisdiction and carry the case through to an adjudication. If, however, the board has taken jurisdiction the court will not interfere. These views seem amply sustained by numerous decisions of our courts. In Moore v. Illinois Cent. Railroad Co., 312 U.S. 630, 635, 61 S.Ct. 754, 756, 85 L.Ed. 1089, the court says:
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