Southern Ry. Co. v. Webb

• Decision Date: 07 August 1902
• Citation: 42 S.E. 395,116 Ga. 152
• Parties: SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. WEBB.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

42 S.E. 395

116 Ga. 152

SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. WEBB.

Supreme Court of Georgia

August 7, 1902

Syllabus by the Court.

1. While the general rule is that if, subsequently to an original wrongful or negligent act, a new cause has intervened, of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the misfortune, the former must be considered as too remote still if the character of the intervening act claimed to break the connection between the original wrongful act and the subsequent injury was such as its probable or natural consequences could reasonably have been anticipated apprehended, or foreseen by the original wrongdoer, the causal connection is not broken, and the original wrongdoer is responsible for all of the consequences resulting from the intervening act.

2. There was no error in any of the rulings complained of which required the granting of a new trial. The evidence authorized the verdict, and the court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial.

Error from city court of Richmond county; W. F. Eve, Judge.

Action by Louis Webb against the Southern Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Jos. B. & Bryan Cumming, for plaintiff in error.

H. C Hammond and C. H. Cohen, for defendant in error.

COBB J.

This was an action by the father of John W. Webb against the Southern Railway Company for damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff on account of the homicide of his son. The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant complained that the court erred in refusing to grant it a new trial.

1. The petition alleged that John W. Webb was a passenger on one of the trains of the defendant; that while in one of the cars of the train, in the exercise of all ordinary care and diligence, and just as he was about to take a seat near the rear door of the car, the train was negligently, suddenly, forcibly, and with great violence jerked, jarred, and jolted, and as a result Webb was suddenly and without fault on his part thrown through the rear door of the car, and fell across the platform at the end of the car onto the track on a bridge over which the train was passing at the time the jolt took place; that he was stunned by the fall, and rendered insensible; and that while upon the track in a stunned, insensible, and injured condition, and unable to walk or protect himself, he was negligently run over and killed by another engine passing along the track over the bridge. There was evidence authorizing the jury to find that Webb was a passenger upon a train of the defendant, and that while this train was going over a bridge a sudden and violent jolt occurred, sufficient to throw one from his feet who was standing in the train, and which had the effect of jostling the passengers and throwing down bundles from the racks of the car; that Webb was seen upon the train just before this jolt occurred, and he was then near the rear door of the car; that he was not seen afterwards by any one who was in the car; that shortly after the train upon which he was last seen had passed over the bridge an engine belonging to the Georgia Railroad Company ran over and killed Webb, who was lying across the track on the bridge just at the point where the train was when the jolt occurred; that, while the defendant had no control over this engine, the engines of the Georgia Railroad Company had a right to use this track, and it was known to the defendant that the engines of that company might pass along the track at any time when it was not otherwise in use. While the evidence was conflicting as to some of the points above referred to, there was ample evidence authorizing the jury to find all of the facts above stated. It is contended by the counsel for the plaintiff that from this evidence the jury could have inferred that Webb was thrown from the rear door of the car upon the track, and was there in a stunned condition at the time the engine ran over him. Counsel for the railway company contends that the jury were not authorized to draw any such inferences, and that the plaintiff has failed to establish the case made in the petition, but that, even if this position is not correct, and the jury were authorized to infer, from the facts above referred to, that Webb was thrown from the inside of the car through the rear door of the same upon the track, and stunned by the fall, still the plaintiff could not recover, for the reason that the negligence of the defendant which resulted in Webb's being hurled upon the track was not the proximate cause of his death, but that the immediate cause of his death was the intervention of another independent agency,--that is, the running of the engine of the Georgia Railroad Company upon the tracks at that point.

As we have reached the conclusion, for the reasons which will be hereafter stated, that the jury were authorized to infer from the facts above detailed, that Webb was negligently thrown from the inside of the car through the rear door upon the track, it becomes necessary to determine whether this negligence on the part of the defendant was so far the proximate cause of the death of Webb that the defendant would be liable, notwithstanding the death was not actually brought about by the fall from the train, but by the running of the engine which ran over and killed him while he was lying in an insensible condition upon the track. See, in this connection, Hopkins, Pers. Inj. §§ 14-16. "No branch of the subject of personal injuries presents greater difficulty than the determination of liability for a specific loss, with reference to its naturalness and proximity as a consequence of the wrongful act complained of." Watson, Pers. Inj. § 25. As was said by Elbert, J., in Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Colo. 344, 34 Am.Rep. 89: "What is the proximate cause of an injury in a legal sense is often an embarrassing question, involved in metaphysical distinctions and subtleties difficult of satisfactory application in the varied and practical affairs of life." Chief Justice Shaw, in Marble v. City of Worcester, 4 Gray, 397, said: "The whole doctrine of causation, considered in itself metaphysically, is of profound difficulty, even if it may not be said of mystery." In Scott v. Hunter, 46 Pa. 195, 84 Am.Dec. 542, Strong, J., said: "Indeed, it is impossible by any general rule to draw a line between those injurious causes of damage which the law regards as sufficiently proximate and those which are too remote to be the foundation of an action." In Smith v. Telegraph Co., 83 Ky. 114, 4 Am.St.Rep. 126, Judge Holt remarked: "The line between proximate and remote damages is exceedingly shadowy; so much so that the one fades away into the other, rendering it often very difficult to determine whether there is such a connection between the wrong alleged and the resulting injury as to place them, in contemplation of law, in the relation of cause and effect." It has been said that, notwithstanding the maze of doubt and difficulty with which this subject seems to be involved, still it is possible to take a more practical and simpler view than the observations of learned jurists would indicate; that the practical administration of justice prefers to disregard the intricacies of metaphysical distinctions and subtleties of causation, and to hold that the inquiry as to natural and proximate cause and consequence is to be answered in accordance with common sense and common understanding. Watson, Pers. Inj. § 28. From the author just cited we quote the following: "A natural consequence is one which has followed from the original act complained of in the usual, ordinary, and experienced course of events; a result, therefore, which might reasonably have been anticipated or expected. Natural consequences, however, do not necessarily include all such as, upon a calculation of chances, would be found possible of occurrence, or such as extreme prudence might anticipate, but only those which ensue from the original act, without any such extraordinary coincidence or conjunction of circumstances as that the usual course of nature should seem to have been departed from." Section 33. "From the very outset the practical distinction between causes and consequences should be borne in mind in this particular: a consequence of an original cause may, in turn, become the cause of succeeding consequences. But such a cause should not, manifestly, be regarded as an intervening cause, which will relieve from liability the author of the original cause, but rather as only a consequence along with the other consequences. A tortious act may have several consequences, concurrent or successive, for all of which the first tort feasor is responsible. It is not intervening consequences, but intervening causes, which relieve. The test is to be found, it has been said, not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their character, and in the natural and probable connection between the wrong done and the injurious consequence. So long as it affirmatively appears that the mischief is attributable to the original wrong as a result which might reasonably have been foreseen as probable, legal liability continues." Section 58. "Some authorities have formulated rules on this subject designed for general application,--as that the defendant is not responsible where there has intervened the willful wrong of a third person, or is liable where such act is of a negligent character merely. But the better doctrine is believed to be that whether or not the intervening act of a third person will render the earlier act too remote depends simply upon whether the concurrence of such intervening act might reasonably have been anticipated by the defendant." Section 71. In Railway Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. 315, 49 Am.Rep....