U.S. Cas. Co. v. Smith
| Decision Date | 14 September 1925 |
| Docket Number | 15823. |
| Citation | 129 S.E. 880,34 Ga.App. 363 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES CASUALTY CO. v. SMITH. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where upon the filing of an application by an employee for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the insurance carrier and the employee made a settlement by an agreement approved by the Industrial Commission, on the hearing of a subsequent application by the employee for a review of the settlement, upon the ground of a change in his condition, the insurance carrier, in the absence of fraud accident, or mistake, and in the absence of a reservation of such right in the agreement, was precluded from raising the question of whether the original injury arose out of and in the course of the employment.
A stipulation in the settlement agreement, that the employer and the insurance carrier were relieved and forever discharged from all claims and demands whatsoever by reason of the original injury, did not bar such application for review, nor preclude an award thereon contrary to the stipulation.
The provision of section 25 of the Workmen's Compensation Act to the effect that the right to compensation shall be forever barred, unless a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after the accident, has no application where the employee is seeking a review of an award or settlement, under section 45.
The Industrial Commission was authorized to find that the employee was suffering from the disease of blastomycosis, and that it resulted naturally and unavoidably from his original injury. The superior court did not err in refusing the insurance carrier's appeal.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
Generally a party may waive that which the law has provided in his favor.
Disease from which employee suffers, to be within Workmen's Compensation Act, must result "naturally" and unavoidably from injury received in course of employment; "naturally" meaning according to the laws of nature, or usual course of things (citing Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, "Naturally").
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; E. D. Thomas, Judge.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by C. L. Smith, claimant, opposed by the United States Casualty Company, the insurance carrier, and another. Settlement of compensation claim between insurance carrier and employee was approved by the Industrial Commission. Claimant's application for review and modification of settlement was granted, and compensation was awarded. The insurance carrier's appeal to the circuit court was denied, and it brings error. Affirmed.
Harry L. Greene and McDaniel & Neely, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Frank P. Stockton and Hendrix & Buchanan, all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.
In June or July, 1921, C. L. Smith, as an employee of the International Vegetable Oil Company, was repairing a pipe in a well when water leaking out of a drain pipe fell upon the back of his neck and caused a blister about the size of a nickel or a quarter. The blister was burst and became a sore. Some time in July or August of the same year the wound was exposed to ammonia gas, which enveloped him as he was repairing a pipe from which the gas was escaping. As described by the employee, it was not a "liquid gas," but was lighter than air, "and it will burn your hand to hold a pipe." His neck then commenced to give him trouble, and he was forced to remain away from his work for about a week, after which he returned to his employment and continued to work for approximately two months. He then quit on the advice of a physician, and was never able to work again.
On November 16, 1921, he made application to the Industrial Commission for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. At the hearing of his application, on November 25, 1921, he testified that he was injured by "being burned on the back of his neck by steam and poisoned by ammonia gas." At this time, it appears, his trouble was confined to his neck, except that he could not stand to be around gas or in a warm room, and was at times weak or fainty. At the close of this hearing, the presiding commissioner appointed a physician to make a physical examination of the claimant and to report thereon. Before a decision was rendered, an application was made by the claimant for the submission of further proofs, and a new hearing was ordered to be held on December 29, following. On December 20, an agreement had been signed by the insurance carrier and the claimant, for the payment of compensation for nine weeks at the rate of $12 per week, in which it was stipulated that the facts and the amounts to be paid were "in strict accordance with the compensation law." The settlement was submitted to, and approved by, the commission, and the case was apparently closed. The order of approval was dated December 30.
On August 18, 1923, the claimant moved for a review and modification of the previous award or settlement, on the ground of a change in his condition. This application was granted, and a hearing was ordered for October 26, following. In this hearing, it was developed by the evidence that the applicant's condition had continued to grow worse from the date of the settlement. Sores had appeared soon afterwards upon different parts of his person, similar to the one upon his neck. His general system appeared to be diseased, and one of his arms had become so affected that it was necessary to amputate it on July 4, 1922. Certain physicians testified that he was suffering from a disease known as blastomycosis. At the conclusion of this evidence, it was found by the commissioner "that the claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment, and that the disease of blastomycosis arose naturally and unavoidably from the accident suffered by the claimant in 1921." An award of compensation was made for 350 weeks (less the nine weeks covered by the settlement) at $12 per week. Upon a review by the full commission, the finding and award by the sole commissioner were affirmed, the insurance carrier entered an appeal to the superior court, where the appeal was denied, and it excepted. Other facts are stated in the opinion.
1. It is contended that the commission erred in ruling that the approved settlement of December 29, 1921, closed the question as to whether the original injury arose out of and in the course of the employment, and in refusing to allow the insurance carrier to introduce evidence upon that issue. It is provided in section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state (Ga. L. 1920, p. 167) that settlements between an employee and employer are to be encouraged so long as the amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment are in accordance with the provisions of the act, but that a copy of the settlement agreement shall be filed with the commission, and shall not be binding until approved by the commission. See also section 55. The approval of the settlement is in the nature of a judgment, and necessarily implies, when there is no reservation to the contrary in the agreement, that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The more especially is this true where the agreement stipulates that the facts were in accordance with the act. It might be possible for a settlement agreement to provide that the employer, or insurance carrier, was not committed to the proposition that the injury had arisen in and out of the employment, and, in case of the approval of such agreement by the commission, such issue would be open and subject to contest in the event of a subsequent application for a review or modification of the settlement on the ground of a change in the employee's condition. Whether or not the commission would approve a settlement agreement containing such reservation, if submitted, it might not be unwise for it to do so, as such action might tend the more to encourage settlements and reduce litigation.
In any event, the agreement made by the insurance carrier and the employee in this case, when approved by the commission, was, so far as it related to the cause and circumstances of the original injury, the equivalent of a judgment to the effect that the injury was a compensable one, and it would not have been compensable unless it arose out of and in the course of the employment. In the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake in the making of the agreement, and in the absence of a reservation of such right, the insurance carrier was not entitled to be heard upon that question upon the application for a modification of the former award or approved settlement. Compare Webster v. Dundee, 93 Ga. 278 (3), 20 S.E. 310; Price v. Carlton, 121 Ga. 12 (2), 48 S.E. 721; Allen v. Allen, 154 Ga. 581 (4), 115 S.E. 17; Bloomington, D. & C. R. Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 120, 114 N.E. 511; Pedlow v. Swartz Electric Co., 68 Ind.App. 400, 120 N.E. 603; Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Shiveley, 75 Ind.App. 620, 121 N.E. 50;
2 Schneider's Workmen's Compensation, 1270, § 500.
2. It is also insisted that the settlement could not be reviewed upon the ground of a change in condition, because of a further agreement, signed by the parties on December 29, and stipulating that the employer and insurance carrier were forever relieved and discharged from all claims and demands whatsoever by reason of the injury. Assuming that this further agreement was duly approved by the commission, it was subject, however, to the terms of section 45 of the act, in which it is provided that upon the application of any party at interest on the ground of a change of condition, the Industrial Commission may at any time...
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