Southern Worcester County Regional Vocational School Dist. v. Labor Relations Com'n

• Decision Date: 05 October 1981
• Citation: 422 N.E.2d 791,12 Mass.App.Ct. 189
• Parties: , 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2120 SOUTHERN WORCESTER COUNTY REGIONAL VOCATIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 791

422 N.E.2d 791

12 Mass.App.Ct. 189, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2120

SOUTHERN WORCESTER COUNTY REGIONAL VOCATIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued June 8, 1981.

Decided July 3, 1981.

Further Appellate Review Granted Oct. 5, 1981.

James F. Cosgrove, Worcester, (Paul S. Hughes, Holden, with him), for plaintiff.

Jean Strauten Driscoll, Boston, for defendant.

Before HALE, C. J., and GRANT and BROWN, JJ.

GRANT, Justice.

The school year 1972-1973 was the first year of operation of the regional vocational school run by the Southern Worcester Regional Vocational School District (district). The last collective bargaining agreement between the district and the union which represents the school's teachers expired on August 31, 1974. On August 13 a tentative agreement was reached by negotiators for a new contract for the school year 1974-1975. That agreement was overwhelmingly rejected by the teachers on September 6. Further negotiations broke off abruptly on September 16. In November both the union and the district filed charges of prohibited labor practices with the Labor Relations Commission (commission). The relations between the parties following September 16 and the ultimate disposition of their respective complaints are set out in Southern Worcester County Regional Vocational Sch. Dist. v. Labor Relations Commn., 377 Mass. 897, 388 N.E.2d 1190 (1979) (the earlier case).

During the period March 31 through July 24, 1975, eight teachers ¹ (some of them officers of the union) filed complaints with the commission in which they severally alleged (in effect) that by reason of one or more votes taken by the school committee (committee) on March 3, April 7 and July 7, 1975, they had not been reappointed for the school year 1975-1976 and that the relevant votes constituted reprisals against the teachers for their having engaged in protected union activities, contrary to various of the provisions of G.L. c. 150E, § 10(a ). ² Following some sort of investigation, the commission issued a consolidated complaint which (as subsequently amended) alleged that the committee had voted not to reappoint each of the eight teachers "(by) reason of his participation and engagement in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, including picketing and related activities." ³ The district was charged with violations of G.L. c. 150E, § 10(a )(1) through (4).

Following some procedural skirmishes, hearings on the complaint were commenced on September 4, 1975, and ultimately concluded on December 16, 1977. ⁴ On December 28, 1978, the commission rendered a decision in which it found that the district had engaged in certain prohibited practices and ordered relief as to each of the eight teachers. The district took the decision to the Superior Court under G.L. c. 30A, § 14; the commission counterclaimed for enforcement of its orders. The court denied a motion to intervene filed by the teachers and by the union, which had prosecuted the case before the commission. After a perfunctory review of the record before the commission, the court entered a judgment which affirmed the decision and ordered the district to comply with its provisions. The district appealed.

1. The district complains of a number of procedural irregularities.

(a) It argues with considerable force that the provisions of G.L. c. 150E, § 11, contemplate that proceedings such as the present be heard and determined by the commission on complaints filed by employees and that it was error for the commission to issue its own complaint and determine the truth of its own allegations. If the question were one of first impression, we might be inclined to agree. The difficulty with the contention is that in Dedham v. Labor Relations Commn., 365 Mass. 392, 399, 405, 312 N.E.2d 548 (1974), the Supreme Judicial Court read the provisions of the third paragraph of G.L. c. 149, § 178L (as in effect prior to St. 1973, c. 1078, §§ 1, 2 and 7), which were substantially similar to those now found in G.L. c. 150E, § 11, to authorize the commission to issue and proceed on its own complaint and in its own name. That practice was followed in Massachusetts Bd. of Regional Community Colleges v. Labor Relations Commn., 377 Mass. 847, 848, 388 N.E.2d 1185 (1979), and in the earlier case, 377 Mass. at 898, 388 N.E.2d 1185. We have expressed the view that that practice does not violate due process. School Comm. of Stoughton v. Labor Relations Commn., 4 Mass.App. 262, 272-273, 346 N.E.2d 129 (1976). As the district does not complain that the practice employed here resulted in any prejudice to it, we do not pursue the question. ⁵

(b) The district urges that it was error for the commission to deny its motion to sever the various charges and to proceed on them seriatim. The argument makes light of the factual background of strained labor negotiations and subsequent union activism which was material to the question of the motives of the committee and the school's superintendent-director (superintendent) and which was common to all the charges. It was not until quite late in the proceedings that counsel for the district made any effort (and then in only two instances) to limit the application of evidence to a particular charge. The commission, in its decision, followed a pattern of marshalling most of the evidence material to each charge and resolving each individually. The district points to no prejudice flowing from the procedure which was followed, and we are not persuaded that the commission abused its discretion in the premises.

(c) The commission had issued its decision in the earlier case more than a year prior to the conclusion of the hearings in the present case. Without prior notice to anyone (see G.L. c. 30A, § 11(4) and (5)) the commission repeated verbatim in its decision in this case the bulk of its findings of fact in the earlier case concerning the breakdown in the labor negotiations and subsequent union activism. The commission purported to act on principles of collateral estoppel. We find it unnecessary to decide whether there was error. The facts found in the earlier case assumed significance only as they served to illuminate the atmosphere which prevailed between certain teachers and the union on the one hand and certain members of the committee and the superintendent on the other and thus to lay the basis for an inference that the actions of the committee and the superintendent had been motivated by antiunion bias. A careful review of the evidence in the present case discloses that the critical findings from the earlier case were supported by the evidence in the present case. In particular, the evidence in this case was sufficient to warrant findings of all the facts discussed in the court's opinion in the earlier case. Again, we are not persuaded of prejudice.

2. There are two basic obstacles which stand in the way of affirming the commission's present decision. The first is that Stephen and Maryann Yurek have failed to sustain their respective burdens of proving that a majority of the members of the committee were motivated by antiunion bias when they voted not to employ either for another year. See Smith College v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 221, 226, 232, 380 N.E.2d 121 (1978). The following is a summary of the evidence relevant to this problem.

Stephen Yurek, who was the president of the union, was in his second year at the school. Maryann, his wife, ⁶ was in her third year and up for tenure under G.L. c. 71, § 41. ⁷ Shortly prior to March 3, 1975, the superintendent, one Gorman, recommended to the committee that Stephen be appointed for a third year and that Maryann be appointed for a fourth year. At its meeting on March 3 the committee voted unanimously to appoint Stephen for a third year. One of the members of the committee who had been the chairman of its negotiating team (Lenky) succeeded in having the question of Maryann's candidacy postponed to a subsequent meeting of the committee. That meeting took place on April 7, 1975, eight days prior to the April 15 deadline for giving Maryann written notice under § 41 if she were not to be given tenure.

At that meeting one of the members (Abbey) moved the appointment of Maryann for a fourth year; the motion was defeated by a vote of six to five against. ⁸ The six who voted against were Bachand (the chairman), Champeau, DeAngelis, Lenky, Vendetti and Ziemski. There was evidence from which (we shall assume for purposes of this opinion) the commission could properly have found that the votes of Bachand, Vendetti and Ziemski were motivated by general antiunion bias that might have rubbed off on Maryann. ⁹ There was no substantial evidence from which it could have been found that Champeau, Lenky or DeAngelis entertained any antiunion bias. ¹⁰ For all that appears, two of them (Champeau and DeAngelis) could have been rabid union enthusiasts. ¹¹

At a meeting of the committee on April 23, Abbey expressed the sentiment that the vote as to Maryann had been motivated by "her or her husband's involvement with the (union)." There was no evidence that any of the other members of the committee expressed agreement with that sentiment. See and compare School Comm. of Stoughton v. Labor Relations Commn., 4 Mass.App. at 263-264, 266-267, 346 N.E.2d 129. On July 7, 1975, the committee voted to terminate Stephen ¹² and to grant tenure to Maryann. ¹³ The record does not disclose how any member voted on either question. Indeed, it is matter of conjecture whether any of Bachand, Vendetti and Ziemski were even present at the meeting.

It follows from the foregoing analysis that both Yureks failed to present a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination (see Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 135-136, 355 N.E.2d 309 (1976); Massachusetts Bd. of...