Southwest Airlines Co. v. Jaeger

• Decision Date: 24 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. 08-93-00067-CV,08-93-00067-CV
• Citation: 867 S.W.2d 824
• Parties: SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO., Appellant, v. J.J. JAEGER, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 824

867 S.W.2d 824

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO., Appellant, v. J.J. JAEGER, Appellee.

No. 08-93-00067-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas El Paso.

Nov. 24, 1993.

Rehearing Overruled Jan. 6, 1994.

John Chaussee, Dallas, for appellant.

C.H. Hal Brockett, Jr., Brockett & Lindemood, Midland, for appellee.

Before OSBORN, C.J., and KOEHLER and BARAJAS, JJ.

OPINION

BARAJAS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered against Southwest Airlines Co., Appellant, for the sum of $108,068.89, plus interest and attorney's fees following a jury trial of a breach of employment contract case. In eleven points of error, Appellant attacks the admission and sufficiency of evidence establishing that Appellee was a party to the written employment contract, the amount and measure of damages and interest awarded to Appellee, and the trial court's failure to dismiss the case for want of prosecution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

In 1982, J.J. Jaeger, Appellee, was employed as a provisioning agent by Southwest Airlines. ¹ At the time of his employment, a contract between Southwest Airlines and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) governed the employment of customer and fleet service employees, including provisioning agents.

In 1984, Appellee was promoted to "Chief Operations Agent," a supervisor's position in Midland, Texas. Appellee's job title was subsequently changed to "Operations Supervisor," although the title change did not affect his classification or duties. He continued in this position until his termination in 1988.

In 1986, during the term of Appellee's employment as an operations supervisor, Southwest's operations agents, ramp agents, and provisioning agents voted to decertify their union (the IAM). This vote left these employees without a collective bargaining agreement with Southwest. Thereafter, Southwest offered a written employment contract to its operations agents, ramp agents, and provisioning agents. This contract was presented to the affected employees for a vote, and the contract was ratified. The record shows that Appellee participated in the vote to ratify the contract with Southwest Airlines.

The agreement entered into between Southwest Airlines and the above employees, also known as the "Blue Book," contained the following provisions:

ARTICLE TWO

SCOPE OF AGREEMENT

A. This Agreement covers all employees in the classification of ramp agent, provisioning agent, and operations agent.

. . . . .

ARTICLE FIVE

CLASSIFICATIONS

. . . . .

OPERATIONS AGENT

The work of an Operations Agent includes the functions which have been historically performed by Operations Agents at Southwest Airlines stations and includes, but is not limited to, any or all of the following:

. . . . .

ARTICLE EIGHT

SENIORITY

I. ... Employees while occupying supervisory positions will not be considered as working under the terms of this Agreement for the purpose of accruing seniority....

. . . . .

ARTICLE TWENTY-FIVE

DISCHARGE AND DISCIPLINE

A. No employee who has passed his probationary period will be disciplined to the extent of loss of pay or discharge without just cause.

. . . . .

ARTICLE THIRTY-ONE

DURATION AND AMENDMENTS

This Agreement ... shall remain in effect until March 1, 1989 or until amended by proper authority of the Company and receipt and notice thereof has been received by affected employees.

. . . . .

The record shows that Appellee was discharged by Southwest on May 10, 1988. Efforts at reinstatement with the company were commenced pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Blue Book. On May 17, 1990, when efforts to secure reinstatement failed, Appellee filed suit against Southwest for wrongful termination and breach of contract. The central issue in the trial court below was whether Appellee, as a chief operations agent or operations supervisor, was covered by the provisions of the Blue Book. The jury found that Appellee was covered by the agreement and that Southwest Airlines had terminated his employment without just cause.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Employment Contract

In Point of Error No. One, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence establishing that Appellee was a party to the written employment contract between Southwest and its operations, ramp, and provisioning agents, because such evidence violates the parol evidence rule.

Texas adheres to the "employment at will" doctrine, which gives an employer the right to discharge an employee with or without cause unless the employee is a party to a contractual provision to the contrary. East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex.1991); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 795 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.1990); Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). Thus, in order to sustain an action for wrongful termination, the discharged employee has the burden to prove that the employment relationship was based on the existence of a contract that specified that the employment was not terminable at will. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1992, writ denied); Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist] 1992, no writ); Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).

The agreement between Appellant and certain of its employees, i.e., the Blue Book, is without question an employment contract. The preamble to the agreement itself states that Appellant "... contracts with each one of you...." It is also not disputed that the agreement contains the discharge for cause only provision. Appellant's contention, however, is that Appellee was not among the employees covered by the Blue Book.

Appellant asserts that the provisions of the Blue Book, in particular Article Two, Scope of the Agreement, is clear and unambiguous in its description of the employees covered by the agreement: ramp agents, provisioning agents, and operations agents. The Blue Book also describes the duties and responsibilities of each of these job classifications. The position of chief operations agent or operations supervisor is not listed in the scope clause or any other clause, and the duties of this position are not described anywhere in the Blue Book. Appellant asserts that the clear and unambiguous language of the agreement establishes that Appellee was not among the employees covered by the agreement.

At trial, over Appellant's objections that testimony was in violation of the parol evidence rule, Appellee was permitted to introduce evidence to show that an operations supervisor or chief operations agent he was a party to the agreement. This evidence included Appellee's testimony as to how the Blue Book was adopted and the fact that he was given no indication that as a supervisor he was not covered under the Blue Book.

The parol evidence rule precludes consideration of extrinsic evidence to contradict, vary, or add to the terms of an unambiguous written agreement, absent fraud, accident, or mistake. Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 159 Tex. 166, 317 S.W.2d 30, 32 (1958); NHA, Inc. v. Jones, 500 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It is well established that the threshold question of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the trial court's determination, after examining the contract as a whole in light of circumstances existing at the time the contract was signed. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.1983); R & P Enterprises v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex.1980). A contract is ambiguous if, after applying the rules of construction, its meaning is uncertain and doubtful or it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393.

In construing a contract, the trial court should ascertain the objective intent of the parties as expressed in the writing itself. Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex.1981). It should do this by examining the entire instrument, harmonizing and giving effect to all provisions to the extent possible so that none of the provisions will be rendered meaningless. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393. It is only after a determination by the trial court that the contract is in fact ambiguous that parol evidence becomes admissible, and then only to assist the fact finder in determining what the subjective intent of the parties was at the time they entered into the contract. Id.

The record shows that Article Two states that the agreement applies to ramp, provisioning, and operations agents, suggesting that supervisors are not covered under the agreement. Article Five gives a non-inclusive list of the duties of operations agents, suggesting that employees classified as operations agents may perform other duties, such as supervisory functions, as well. Article Eight states that supervisory employees are not considered as working under the agreement for seniority purposes only, suggesting that for all other purposes they are to be considered as falling under the agreement. Thus, when the entire Blue Book agreement is read as a whole, it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. ²

In light of the above, since the contract was ambiguous as to whether Appellee was among the employees covered by the agreement, the evidence admitted was helpful to the jury in determining the subjective intent of the parties at the time of contract formation. This evidence helped to clarify and explain an essential term present in the contract, i.e., which parties were covered by the agreement. The evidence admitted did not add to the terms of the contract, since it is a reasonable interpretation of the contract as a whole that operations supervisors or chief operations agents were included within the classification of operations agents.

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