Spanish River Resort Corp. v. Walker, 85-1645

• Decision Date: 19 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1645,85-1645
• Citation: 497 So.2d 1299,11 Fla. L. Weekly 2420
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2420 SPANISH RIVER RESORT CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Spanish River Management Corporation, a Florida corporation, and Spanish River Resort and Beach Club Association, Inc., a Florida corporation not-for-profit, Appellants, v. Rebecca WALKER, as Palm Beach County Property Appraiser, Allen C. Clark, as Palm Beach County Tax Collector, and Randy Miller, as Executive Director of the Florida Department of Revenue, a state agency, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1299

497 So.2d 1299

11 Fla. L. Weekly 2420

SPANISH RIVER RESORT CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Spanish River Management Corporation, a Florida corporation, and Spanish River Resort and Beach Club Association, Inc., a Florida corporation not-for-profit, Appellants, v. Rebecca WALKER, as Palm Beach County Property Appraiser, Allen C. Clark, as Palm Beach County Tax Collector, and Randy Miller, as Executive Director of the Florida Department of Revenue, a state agency, Appellees.

No. 85-1645.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

Nov. 19, 1986.

Robert S. Goldman of Messer, Vickers, Caparello, French & Madsen, Tallahassee, for appellants.

Willa A. Fearrington, West Palm Beach, and Gaylord A. Wood, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee-Walker.

Cone Wagner Nugent Johnson Roth & Romano, P.A., and Larry Klein of Klein & Beranek, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee-Allen C. Clark.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and J. Terrell Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee-Miller.

James M. Spoonhour of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, Orlando, amici curiae.

LETTS, Judge.

Before us is the question of whether a property appraiser can assess each individual time-share unit for statutory ad valorem taxation purposes or whether that assessment must be limited to the value of the entire unit as if it were still an ordinary condominium apartment not subject to time-sharing. The trial court found that each time-share unit could be separately assessed because each owner enjoyed "all of the sticks which constitute the bundle of rights that is fee ownership of real estate ... capable of being separately conveyed and assessed." We affirm.

The development in question involves an eleven-story building containing seventy-two units, converted in 1980 to a condominium authorizing time-sharing pursuant to section 718.103(19), Florida Statutes (1983). There is no question but that the conversion involved a fee time-share project rather than the non-fee alternative, the latter not pertinent here. Not all of the units in the building were converted to time-share estates; some remain as standard condominium units. The time-share unit owners insist that the appraisals should have been limited to the land, building and improvements thereon (i.e., each apartment as a whole) pursuant to section 192.001(14), Florida Statutes (1983). Accordingly, they claim that the appraiser's decision to base the assessments on the listed asking prices for individual unit "weeks" was erroneous because it altered the essential character of the ad valorem tax and the basic character of real estate, thus disregarding the constitutional standard of "just valuation." In support of this contention, the unit time-share owners cite, as an example, apartment 1006, in which no time-share estates have been created, which was assessed for $25,000. The physically identical adjoining unit 1007, in which fifty-one time-share estates have been offered, ¹ was assessed for $236,634.

There are several sections of the Florida Statutes which are applicable to the matter at hand, but we are of the opinion that the polestar must be section 192.037(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1983), which states:

192.037 Fee time-share real property; taxes and assessments.--

(1) For the purposes of ad valorem taxation and special assessments, the managing entity responsible for operating and maintaining fee time-share real property shall be considered the taxpayer as an agent of the time-share period titleholder.

(2) Fee time-share real property shall be listed on the assessment rolls as a single entry for each time-share development. The assessed value of each time-share development shall be the value of the combined individual time-share periods or time-share estates contained therein.

Florida's constitution provides that "no tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law." Article VII, section 1(a), Florida Constitution. As a result, property taxes are of a purely statutory nature which can be levied, assessed and collected "only by the express method pointed out by statute." State ex rel. Seaboard Air Line Railroad v. Gay, 160 Fla. 445, 35 So.2d 403 (1948). In view of the statute quoted above, it would appear that an ad valorem tax may be assessed against time-share estates. However, the time-share unit owners disagree and point to the second sentence of the particular section, quoted above, which for emphasis we again repeat:

THE ASSESSED VALUE OF EACH TIME-SHARE DEVELOPMENT SHALL BE THE VALUE OF THE COMBINED INDIVIDUAL TIME-SHARE PERIODS OR TIME-SHARE ESTATES CONTAINED THEREIN.

As the time-share unit owners see it, this language calls for the assessed value of the development, i.e., land and buildings (in other words, the entire units unaffected by subdivision into time-share weeks). They further argue that their interpretation is bolstered by the use of the word value in the singular and that only their interpretation "Fee time-share real property" means the land and buildings and other improvements to land that are subject to time-share interests which are sold as a fee interest in real property.

can conform to section 192.001(14), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides:

Nonetheless, we do not agree with the time-share unit owners' contention. Section 192.037(2) must be read in pari materia with all of the other subsections in section 192.037, particularly the preceding subsection (1). Subsection (1) provides that the managing entity shall be considered the agent for all the time-share unit holders, so that, as subsection (2) contemplates, only a single entry for each development need appear on the assessment rolls. However, Subsection (2) quite clearly goes on to provide that that single assessment entry shall be the value of the combined individual time-share periods. While we are not very impressed with this statutory choice of words, we are confident that the language employed contemplates that the single assessment entry is to reflect the sum of the individual assessments of each time-share unit. Our conclusion is bolstered by all the other statutory enactments or amendments which took place during this same period. For example, there are now at least thirteen separate occasions on which the term "fee" has been engrafted into the applicable statutes. In addition, section 721.03(5), Florida Statutes (1983), now clearly specifies that "the treatment of time-share estates for ad valorem purposes and special assessments shall be as prescribed in Chapters 192 through 200." This quoted language, appearing contemporaneously with the enactment of section 192.037, is an unmistakable expression of the legislature's intent to bring individual time-share units or "weeks" within the ambit of ad valorem taxation. The Legislature is presumed to know the meaning of words which have accepted meaning and usage which it adopts for statutory use. See Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 (Fla.1976). In this context, the use of the word "fee" on so many occasions cannot be ignored. We quote with approval from the final judgment below:

C. The interval owner at Spanish River has all of the "sticks" which constitute the "bundle of rights" that is fee ownership of real estate: the complete right to use (or not to use) the property during the period of ownership; the right to exclude others during that period, and the right to mortgage, lease, sell, bequeath or give away the time-share estate. Every time share period is a unique ownership, even if it is located in part within the same physical space as the other time share estates in the same apartment. In short, it is a parcel of real estate.

In this same vein, we find it appropriate to comment on the posture assumed by the developers themselves in pursuit of sales of these units:

1. In the sales brochure is found the following excerpt:

It's fantastic to think your family could be guaranteed a tranquil tropical vacation home, forever, at a price that doesn't keep climbing year after year ... Unlike traditional real property concepts, interval ownership is multidimensional. You buy property and time ... The person who buys at Spanish River Resort is an owner with deed, and full rights of ownership. You may lend your property, sell it, rent it, or give it away during the weeks you own it. Or you can keep it forever.

2. Standard warranty deeds were used to transfer the title to each individual time-share unit and documentary stamps were affixed thereto in the full amount of the purchase price being paid for each individual time-share unit.

3. An owner's policy of title insurance was provided in the full amount of the purchase price for each time-share unit sold upon which institutional financing was offered if required.

Turning next to the question of whether the property appraiser's valuation of the time-share units was "just," we are of the opinion that it was. All sides agree The time-share unit owners insist that the subject assessments are both unjust and not representative of fair market value. As they see it, the property appraiser has failed to properly consider the eight criteria set forth in section 193.011, Florida Statutes (1983), necessary to arrive at a "just" valuation. In particular, they refer to the eighth criterion which directs the appraiser to take into consideration "the costs of the sale." We note first that while all eight criteria must be "considered," any one of them may be "discarded entirely where they are not under the circumstances probative of present value." Vero Beach Shores, Inc. v. Nolte, 467 So.2d 1041, 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). As it was said in Bystrom v. Valencia Center, Inc., 432 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), pet. for rev. den., 444 So.2d 418 (Fla.1985):

and this court has held, that just valuation, as required by Article VII section 4 of the Florida Constitution, and market value are synonymous. See State Dept. of Revenue v. Markham, 426 So.2d 555, 557 n. 2 (Fla. 4th...