Thayer v. State
| Decision Date | 21 July 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 47481,47481 |
| Parties | George THAYER, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE of Florida, etc., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
S. LaRue Williams, Kinsey, Vincent, Pyle & Williams, Daytona Beach, for plaintiffs.
Charles L. Curtis, Tallahassee, for defendants.
Pursuant to Rule 4.6 of the Florida Appellate Rules we are responding to questions certified to this Court by the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Volusia County. See Jaworski v. City of Opa-Locka, 149 So.2d 33 (Fla.1963).
The questions are:
1. Does the enactment of Section 561.20(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes, by Chapter 72--230, Laws of Florida, which states in pertinent part: apply to those special restaurant licenses issued prior to the effective date of Chapter 72--230?
2. If the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, does that application violate those sections of the Florida and Federal Constitutions guaranteeing due process, equal protection, non-discrimination and non-impairment of contract and, if so, are all provisions of Chapter 72--230 unconstitutional or only that provision relating to the 51% Requirement?
We have jurisdiction even though our answer to the first question makes it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues. Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch Inc., 275 So.2d 521 (Fla.1973); McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48 (Fla.1974).
In answering the first question we must determine whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply prospectively or to all special restaurant licenses even if issued prior to the effective date of the statute.
The respondents claim the Legislature simply amplified and made more restrictive a rule of the Beverage Department existing since 1969 which required special license restaurants to derive at least 30% Of all proceeds from food and non-alcoholic beverages.
To determine the legislative intent we look to the plain language of the statute.
Section 561.20(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes, speaks in terms of future licenses only:
According to Webster's New International Dictionary (unabridged edition) the word 'henceforth' is defined as 'From this time forward.' The Legislature is simply imposing the 51% Requirment on special restaurant licenses issued after the effective date of the Act.
The law clearly requires that the legislative intent be determined primarily from the language of the statute because a statute is to be taken, construed and applied in the form enacted. Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693, (1918); Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So.2d 664 (Fla.1st DCA 1960). The reason for this rule is that the Legislature must be assumed to know the meaning of words and to have expressed its intent by the use of the words found in the statute.
In the same subsection of Section 561.20(2)(a)3, the Legislature made three direct references to the treatment of existing licenses. In one instance the followin language appears:
'However, any license heretofore issued to any such hotel, motel, motor court, or restaurant or hereafter issued to any such hotel, motel, or motor court . . . under the general law shall not be moved to a new location. . . .'
At another point in the same subsection the Act says:
'Any special license now in existence heretofore issued under the provisions of this law cannot be renewed except in the name of the owner . . . and must remain in the name of said owner or lessee so long as the license is in existence.'
Finally, the Act attempts to protect those persons relying on the predecessor section of the statute:
'(N)othing herein provided shall limit, restrict, or prevent the issuance of a special license for any restaurant or motel which shall hereafter meet the requirements of the law existing immediately prior to the effective date of this act, if construction of such restaurant has commenced prior to the effective date of this act and is completed with thirty days thereafter, or if an application is on file for such special license at the time this act takes effect; and any such licenses issued under this proviso may be annually renewed as now provided by law.'
If the Legislature intended to protect those licenses which had not even been issued and allow such licenses to come under the old section of the law then certainly petitioners' licenses, which have been in existence for a number of years, are likewise protected.
It is of course, a general principle of statutory...
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