Sparks v. Sparks

• Decision Date: 04 April 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. Cum–12–73.
• Citation: 2013 ME 41,65 A.3d 1223
• Parties: Judy SPARKS v. Brant SPARKS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

65 A.3d 1223

2013 ME 41

Judy SPARKS

v.Brant SPARKS.

Docket No. Cum–12–73.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: Dec. 13, 2012.

Decided: April 4, 2013.

Courtney I. Beer, Esq. (orally), Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc., Portland, for appellant Judy Sparks.

Allison M. Ouellet, Stud. Atty. (orally), and Christopher Northrop, Esq., Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic, Portland, for appellee Brant Sparks.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

JABAR, J.

[¶ 1] Judy Sparks appeals from a judgment entered in the District Court (Portland, Powers, J.) granting a protection from abuse order that she requested on behalf of her fifteen-year-old stepson against Brant, his biological father, but denying her temporary parental rights and responsibilities for her stepson. On appeal, Judy contends that, pursuant to 19–A M.R.S. § 4005(1) (2012), she was a “person responsible” for her stepson and therefore the court had the authority to award her temporary parental rights to her stepson. See19–A M.R.S. § 4007(1)(G) (2012). Because we conclude that the protection from abuse statute permits the court to award temporary parental rights to a stepparent, and that the award would not have violated the father's rights pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we vacate the portion of the trial court's judgment denying temporary parental rights and responsibilities to the stepmother.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Judy and Brant Sparks married in 2009 and separated about a year and a half later. Brant has a biological son—Judy's stepson—who was born in 1996. After Judy and Brant separated, Brant moved out, but Brant's son continued to live with Judy and her three biological children. In the year after the family dissolved, Brant saw his son only a few times. Brant's son considers Judy to be his “mom.” ¹

[¶ 3] On December 21, 2011, Judy filed a protection from abuse complaint against Brant on behalf of herself, two of her biological children who were under the age of eighteen at the time (Brant's stepchildren), and Brant's son. Judy also petitioned for full guardianship of Brant's son in the Probate Court. Brant agreed to an order of protection for Judy and two of her biological children but contested the need for a protective order on behalf of his son. At the protection from abuse hearing, Brant admitted that he had confessed to his son that he had assaulted the son's biological mother and molested the son's biological sister, who no longer resided with Brant. Brant's son testified that Brant had struck him in the face, grabbed him by the back of the head, and had punched walls and other objects around him. Brant's son also testified that he saw his father slapping Judy, pinning her and his stepbrothers to the wall by their necks, and that Brant had told him that “he had actually beaten [the son's biological mother] up, and that if he stayed with her he would have killed her.”

[¶ 4] Judy requested temporary parental rights and responsibilities for Brant's son at the protection from abuse hearing, pending the outcome of the guardianship proceeding. She testified that she had sought counseling services for Brant's son after Brant moved out, but the service providers required Brant's permission for his son to attend the sessions. Brant refused to allow his son to attend the counseling sessions unless Brant was present with him. Judy informed the court that she needed temporary parental rights because she was the primary caregiver for Brant's son, and she needed to be able to make decisions on his behalf concerning service providers, including counselors and the local public school.

[¶ 5] On January 27, 2012, the court awarded protection to all four petitioners—Judy, two of her sons, and Brant's son. The court found that Brant had abused his son and prohibited Brant from having any contact with him until the order expires in 2014. However, the court denied Judy's request for temporary parental rights and responsibilities for Brant's son, effectively leaving the boy without a legal caretaker. On February 10, 2012, the Cumberland County Probate Court awarded Judy full guardianship of Brant's son in a separate, unopposed hearing. On February 17, 2012, Judy filed a timely notice of appeal of the District Court's decision denying her request for temporary parental rights and responsibilities.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 6] Judy contends that the court erred by denying her request for temporary parental rights and responsibilities for Brant's son in the protection from abuse proceeding. The protection from abuse statute gives Judy standing to file a complaint on behalf of her stepson because she is a “person responsible for the child.” See19–A M.R.S. § 4005(1); 22 M.R.S. § 4002(9) (2012) (defining “[p]erson responsible for the child”). Judy argues that because the protection from abuse statute lists the award of temporary parental rights to minor children among the various forms of relief, the District Court also had the authority to award her temporary parental rights to Brant's son, even though she is not his legal parent. See19–A M.R.S. § 4007(1)(G).

[¶ 7] Brant responds that this issue is moot because the Probate Court appointed Judy as full guardian of Brant's son on February 10, 2012. He argues that even if the issue is not moot, the protection from abuse statute unambiguously limits awards of temporary parental rights to the child's legal parents. Further, he contends that awarding temporary rights and responsibilities for his child to a nonparent infringes upon his rights pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

[¶ 8] We turn first to the threshold issue, (A) whether this appeal is moot and should be dismissed. If the dispute survives the mootness analysis, we then consider (B) whether the statute permits an award of temporary parental rights and responsibilities for children to nonparents, and, if so, (C) whether that award violates the due process protections of the Federal and Maine Constitutions.

A. Mootness

[¶ 9] Because Judy received the same rights by obtaining a guardianship of Brant's son as those that she would have received if the court had awarded her temporary parental rights and responsibilities, Brant argues that her appeal is moot. See18–A M.R.S. § 5–209 (2012) (“A guardian of a minor has the powers and responsibilities of a parent....”). We will decline to hear a case that has “lost [its] controversial vitality” and is moot because “a decision by this court would not provide an appellant any real or effective relief.” Int'l Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 551 A.2d 1356, 1360, 1361 (Me.1988) (quotation marks omitted). “In the family law context, a case is moot when an appellate decision cannot offer a [party] any more relief than what th[at] [party] received in an earlier proceeding.” Young v. Young, 2002 ME 167, ¶ 7, 810 A.2d 418 (quotation marks omitted). We agree with Judy and Brant that our decision in this appeal will provide no additional relief because the Probate Court appointed Judy as legal guardian of Brant's son, granting her the same rights that she sought in the protection from abuse proceeding. See 18–AM.R.S. § 5–209.

[¶ 10] Nevertheless, we will hear an appeal, although technically moot, in three circumstances:

(1) sufficient collateral consequences will flow from a determination of the questions presented, (2) the question, although moot in the immediate context, is of great public interest and should be addressed for future guidance of the bar and public, or (3) the issue may be repeatedly presented to the trial court, yet escape review at the appellate level because of its fleeting or determinate nature.

Young, 2002 ME 167, ¶ 8, 810 A.2d 418 (quotation marks omitted). In Young v. Young, we addressed a similar question of mootness involving an award of temporary parental rights and responsibilities to a stepparent in a protection from abuse hearing. Id. ¶¶ 2–5. We concluded in Young that the question presented did not meet the first and third exceptions, but that the issue could fall within the second, public interest, exception to the mootness doctrine. Id. ¶¶ 8–9.

[¶ 11] In deciding whether an issue meets the public interest exception, “we consider the following criteria: whether the question is public or private, how much court officials need an ‘authoritative determination’ for future rulings, and how likely the question is to recur in the future.” Id. ¶ 9 (quoting King Res. Co. v. Envtl. Improvement Comm'n, 270 A.2d 863, 870 (Me.1970)). In Young, we concluded that the issue of whether to award temporary parental rights to nonparents in protection from abuse proceedings was public in nature because it involved the State's interest in protecting victims of abuse and the parents' fundamental liberty interest in raising their children free from state interference. Id. Further, given the “significant number of blended families with children in Maine,” the issue was likely to recur in the future. Id. Although we recognized that an “authoritative determination on the question presented could be of great benefit,” we concluded that the facts as presented did not allow us to render that determination. Id. ¶ 10. Our analysis was limited in Young because the order of protection was awarded only on behalf of an abused parent, not “on behalf of a minor child who was found to have been abused,” and thus we were unable “to analyze all relevant facets of the protection from abuse statute.” Id.

[¶ 12] In contrast, here the court found that Brant had abused his son and issued a judgment granting protection and restricting contact between Brant and his son. Given the critical importance of the State's role in protecting victims of domestic violence, particularly child victims,² and the consistently large number of protection from abuse complaints filed in Maine every year,³ there is no reason to...