Spaugh v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1930
• Docket Number: 12986.
• Parties: SPAUGH v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

155 S.E. 145

158 S.C. 25

SPAUGH v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

No. 12986.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 1, 1930

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Florence County; W. H Townsend, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Olive Spaugh against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

F. L Willcox, of Florence, for appellant.

D Gordon Baker, of Florence, for respondent.

CARTER J.

This action by Mrs. Olive Spaugh, as plaintiff, against the defendant, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, was commenced in the court of common pleas for Florence county May 18, 1929, for the purpose of recovering damages against the defendant in the sum of $2,900, for injury to the plaintiff, alleged to have been sustained as a result of misinformation given her by defendant's ticket agent, at Florence, S. C., in regard to the train connections between the said city of Florence and the town of Holly Hill, S.C. Issues being joined, the case was tried at the November (1929) term of said court before his honor, Judge William H. Townsend, and a jury. The complaint contained two causes of action. At the close of the testimony introduced on behalf of the plaintiff (the defendant offered no testimony), the defendant made a motion for direction of a verdict as to both causes of action, and his honor granted the motion as to the second cause of action, the nature of which cause of action is not disclosed by the record; but since there is no appeal from the order as to that cause of action, we are not concerned with that question. The motion as to the other cause of action was refused, and the case was submitted to the jury. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,450. Motion for a new trial was made by the defendant, which motion was refused. From the entry of judgment on the verdict the defendant has appealed to this court.

The exceptions impute error to the trial judge in the following particulars:

(1) Error in refusing to direct a verdict for defendant;

(2) Error in his honor's charge to the jury;

(3) Error in refusing to grant defendant's motion for a new trial.

The motion for direction of a verdict was based upon several grounds, but summed up may be stated thus: (1) The plaintiff having suffered no bodily injury, she could not recover for mere mental suffering; (2) even if it be conceded that the plaintiff was injured in the nature alleged, it was not caused by the negligence of the defendant, but was caused by her peculiar condition of which the defendant had no notice.

Based on the allegations of her complaint, the plaintiff offered testimony tending to establish the following facts: At the time in question the plaintiff and her husband, together with their infant children, were temporarily residing in the town of Holly Hill, S. C., in the home of her invalid mother having moved there temporarily because of her husband being out of work; that on the day in question, May 6, 1929, the plaintiff procured a colored woman to stay in the house with her infant children and invalid mother for the day in order to be able to go with her husband to Florence, S. C., in an automobile, for the day, where her husband went seeking employment, fully expecting to return to Holly Hill the afternoon of the same day, in time to care for her mother and infant children. After arriving at Florence in company with her husband, plaintiff learned that her husband would not be able to return to Holly Hill that afternoon, or if he did so it would be necessary for him to return to Florence that night, in order to be there early the next morning for the purpose of definitely learning about the position he was seeking-- could not get definite information that day, May 6, 1929. For that reason the plaintiff and her husband decided it would be best for the plaintiff to go home on the train that afternoon, if she could make connections, so as to save her husband from having to take the long drive from Florence to Holly Hill and return from Holly Hill to Florence that night, or very early the following morning. Accordingly the plaintiff and her husband went to the office of the defendant's passenger railway station and inquired of its agent in charge of said station about the train connections from Florence to Holly Hill, and upon being informed by said agent, after looking up the schedule, that she could go on defendant's passenger trains from Florence to Holly Hill, by way of Creston, making close connection at Creston, and arrive at Holly Hill that afternoon. At the time plaintiff's husband impressed upon the said agent of the defendant the necessity of making the connections and stated to said agent at the time that if the connection could not be made so that the plaintiff could get home that afternoon it was his purpose to take her home to Holly Hill in automobile, and explained to the agent reason therefor, that their infant children and invalid mother of the plaintiff were at said home alone and that it was necessary for the plaintiff to get there that afternoon. On being informed at the time of said conversation by the agent that the connection would be made and that the plaintiff would arrive at Holly Hill that afternoon, the plaintiff's husband purchased from said agent ticket for transportation for the plaintiff on defendant's passenger trains from Florence to Holly Hill, by way of Creston, and paid the regular charges for the same, and the plaintiff boarded the train the agent instructed her to go on; that after traveling some distance on said train the conductor in charge thereof took up her ticket and at the time informed her that the train on which she was riding (which train plaintif...