Spaulding v. Brady

• Decision Date: 28 May 1895
• Citation: 31 S.W. 103,128 Mo. 653
• Parties: SPAULDING v. BRADY.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

31 S.W. 103

128 Mo. 653

SPAULDING v. BRADY.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

May 28, 1895.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — SPECIAL LEGISLATION — COMPENSATION OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.

1. Acts 1891, p. 175, providing for the election districts and compensation of justices of the peace in the city of St. Louis, is not in conflict with Const. art. 4, § 53, prohibiting special legislation.

2. Though Acts 1891, p. 175, while providing for the salary of justices, makes no direct provision for the disposition of fees of justices collected by a constable, such fees are to be paid to the city treasurer, and not to the justice.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; L. B. Valliant, Judge.

Action by James J. Spaulding against Benjamin F. Brady to recover fees as justice of of the peace. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

T. J. Rowe, for appellant. W. C. Marshall, for respondent.

MACFARLANE, J.

This case was submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts. Judgment was rendered for defendant by the circuit court, and plaintiff appealed. The agreed statement, briefly given, discloses these facts: Plaintiff was, at the November election, 1894, elected justice of the peace of the Fifth district of the city of St. Louis, as created under an act of the general assembly approved April 23, 1891. See Acts 1891, p. 175. Defendant was elected constable of the same district at the same time. Both of these officers duly qualified. From the 28th day of November, 1894, to the 31st day of December, 1894, defendant, as constable, collected fees and costs in divers cases amounting to $113.55, which were taxed as cost in such cases in favor of plaintiff, as justice of the peace. Defendant refused to pay said fees to the justice, for the reason, as stated, that under the said act of 1891 plaintiff is not entitled to receive them, but that they should be paid to the treasurer of the city of St. Louis. Plaintiff insists that said act, so far as it undertakes to deprive him of his duly-taxed costs, is unconstitutional and void.

1. This appeal puts directly in issue the constitutionality of those provisions of the act of the general assembly of the state approved April 23, 1891, which provides for paying justices of the peace of the city of St. Louis a salary, and for paying into the treasury of the city his costs and fees. The act, after providing for dividing the city into districts, the election of justices of the peace therein, and fixing their jurisdiction, provides, by section 12, as follows: "Each of said justices shall receive a salary of twenty-five hundred dollars per annum, payable monthly, to be paid out of the treasury of the city in which they are elected." Other sections make provision for the collection of the fees of justices of the peace, and the payment of the amount thereof to the city treasurer every 30 days. The constitutionality of these provisions of the act is challenged upon the ground that they are in violation of section 53 of article 4 of the constitution of the state, which prohibits local or special legislation. If they are unconstitutional, as asserted by plaintiff, then he should have had judgment for his fees collected and held by defendant, and the judgment should be reversed. The act came before this court for construction in the recent case of State v. Higgins, 28 S. W. 638. That case, as presented, involved only the power of the legislature to provide for the division of cities, having the specified population, into justice of the peace districts. The section making provision for such division was held constitutional, and no other portion of the act was directly passed upon. The only question discussed and decided in that case was whether the sections of the act in question were unconstitutional as being in conflict with the mandate of the constitution forbidding local or special legislation, for the reason that the act, by its terms, was applicable only to the city of St. Louis. The court did not undertake to decide whether the act did, in fact, apply to that city alone, but held that, though such was the case, the sections in question could not be regarded as special, within the meaning and intent of the constitution. The decision was placed upon the authority of State v. Walton. 69 Mo. 556. In that case Norton, J., who delivered the unanimous opinion of the court, in speaking of another act making provision for dividing the city of St. Louis into such districts, and for electing justices therein, said: "While the act in question, when viewed simply with reference to the territory in which it is to operate, may in strictness be classed as a local law, yet, when it is considered that other provisions of the constitution have so separated the city of St. Louis from other territorial divisions of the state as to give it an organization different from that of any county or other city, thus necessitating legislation applicable to it alone, and which cannot be made applicable to a general law, we are forced to the conclusion that the act of 1877, providing for the election of justices of the peace in said city, is not such local law as falls within the prohibitions of sections 53 and 54, art. 4, of the constitution." Taking these decisions together, it must be held as settled that the general assembly has the same power to provide, by an act applicable alone to the city of St. Louis, for the division of that city into justice of the peace districts.

2. It is urged, in the second place, that the act is in conflict with the clause of section 53, art. 4, of the constitution, which prohibits special or local legislation "creating officers, or prescribing powers and duties of officers in counties, cities, and towns." I am unable to see why the decisions in the cases heretofore cited do not necessarily settle the proposition here urged. The power to divide the city into districts would be meaningless unless the power to provide for electing justices also existed. It is true, the constitution does not, in terms, provide for electing or appointing justices of the peace in the city of St. Louis. It may also be said that there is an absence of express authority...