The State ex rel. Manning v. Higgins
| Decision Date | 10 December 1894 |
| Citation | 28 S.W. 638,125 Mo. 364 |
| Parties | The State ex rel. Manning v. Higgins |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Peremptory writ denied.
T. J Rowe and Nat. C. Dryden for relator.
(1) The law in question is special and unconstitutional. Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 Mo. 479; State ex rel. v Miller, 100 Mo. 448; State ex rel. v. Hammer, 42 N. J. Law, 440; Board v. Buck, 49 N. J. Law, 228; State v. Sloane, 49 N. J. Law, 356; see, also Coutieri v. Mayor (1882), 44 N. J. Law, 58; Hammer v. State (1882), 44 N. J. Law, 667; Pierson v. O'Connor (1891), 54 N. J. Law, 36; State ex rel. v. Orange (1892), 25 A. 268; State v. Trenton (1892), 25 A. 113; Wheeler v. Philadelphia (1874), 77 Pa. St. 338. (2) It is said there is no reasonable probability that any other city in this state will attain that population during the life of the law. There is no limit to the act in point of duration. A like argument was made against some other laws made applicable in cities of one hundred thousand or more inhabitants but a few years ago, but the prediction proved a false one in a very short space of time. State ex rel. v. Bell, 24 S. Rep. 765; State ex rel. v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 650; Rutherford v. Hedden, 82 Mo. 388; State ex rel. v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 73.
W. C. Marshall for respondent.
Black, P. J. Barclay, J., will express his views in a separate opinion.
Mandamus.
Black, P. J. -- John G. Manning, intending to become a candidate at the November, 1894, election for the office of justice of the peace in the ninth district of the city of St. Louis, as that district was established by the act of the twenty-seventh of April, 1877 (Acts of 1877, p. 283), obtained a certificate of nomination signed by the requisite number of electors and presented the same to the respondent in his capacity of recorder of voters. Respondent refused to receive or file the certificate, assigning as a reason therefor that the act of 1877 had been repealed by the act of the twenty-third of April, 1891 (Acts of 1891, p. 175), and that a new district had been created. Thereupon the relator commenced this mandamus proceeding.
The controversy turns upon the validity of the act of 1891, the relator insisting that it is a special act within the meaning of those clauses of the constitution which provide that "the general assembly shall not pass any local or special law * * * creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers in counties, cities, townships, election or school districts." And, "in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted."
The first section of the act of 1877 provides that: "The city of St. Louis is hereby divided into fourteen election districts for the election of justices of the peace." The same section creates the fourteen districts by designating the wards which shall compose each district. The second provides for the election of justices in the several districts so created.
The first section of the act of 1891 provides: "In all cities which now contain, or may hereafter contain, three hundred thousand inhabitants or more, there shall be elected, on the general election day A. D. 1894, and every four years thereafter, one justice of the peace and one constable for each district in said cities, which district shall be determined, fixed and located as hereinafter provided." The third section makes it the duty of the "judges of the probate court, criminal court, criminal court of correction and of the circuit court, or a majority thereof," to divide their respective cities into districts upon the basis of population as specified in the second section. All inconsistent acts and parts of acts are repealed. A majority of the judges of the designated courts performed the duty thus imposed upon them in due time.
In the case of State ex rel. v. Walton, 69 Mo. 556, the act of 1877 was assailed on the ground that it was a special law within the meaning of the constitutional clauses before quoted, but this court held it could not be a special act, because other provisions of the constitution had so separated the city of St. Louis from the former county of St. Louis as to give it an organization different from that of any county or other city, thus making legislation necessary, which would be applicable to it alone. Let it be conceded, as is insisted by counsel for the relator, that the act of 1891 was intended to, and can only apply to, the city of St. Louis, still it is no more a local or special law than the act of 1877, so far as it relates to the establishment of districts and provides for the election of justices of the peace therein. That case is, therefore, directly in point, and it is deemed useless to go over the ground again.
It is true the act of 1891 differs from the act of 1877 in this, that it gives to each justice a salary, and allows each justice to appoint a clerk, and defines the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in the city of St. Louis; but these and some other provisions have nothing to do with the question now in hand. The only question here is whether those questions are constitutional, which provide for districts and the election of justices of the peace therein. With the other sections we are not concerned at this time; for an act may be valid in part and void in part.
It is next insisted, or rather suggested, that dividing a city into districts is a legislative duty, and as the act of 1891 devolves that duty on judicial officers, it...
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