Spears v. City of Fordyce, 01-220.
| Decision Date | 12 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-220.,01-220. |
| Citation | 92 S.W.3d 38,351 Ark. 305 |
| Parties | Barbara SPEARS and Jerel Saeler v. CITY OF FORDYCE, Joseph Watson, Arkansas Public Risk Management Association, and Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Jewell, Moser, Fletcher & Holleman, by: John T. Holleman, IV, North Little Rock, and Paul Pfeifer, for appellants.
Batchelor & Newell, by: Angela R. Echols; and Ralph C. Ohm, Hot Springs, for appellees City of Fordyce, Joseph Watson, and Arkansas Public Risk Management Association.
Wright, Chaney, Berry, Daniel, Hughes & Moore, P.A., by: Rodney P. Moore, Arkadelphia, for appellee Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company.
On May 8, 1997, appellant, Barbara Spears, was driving a car owned by appellant, Jerel Saeler, when a Coyote C-26 front-end loader, which was owned by appellee, the City of Fordyce, and operated by appellee, Joseph Watson, collided with the car. When the accident occurred, Mr. Watson was driving the front-end loader on the highway through a school zone to an area in Fordyce where he intended to "clip shoulders."1
On April 26, 2000, appellants filed a complaint against the City of Fordyce, Joseph Watson, and the Arkansas Public Entities Risk Management Association. The complaint alleged that appellants suffered physical injuries and property damages as a result of the City of Fordyce and Joseph Watson's negligence.
On May 24, 2000, appellants filed their first amended and substituted complaint. In this complaint, appellants realleged all claims and allegations against the City of Fordyce, Joseph Watson, and the Arkansas Public Entities Risk Management Association. Additionally, appellants claimed that they were entitled to receive benefits from appellee, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, based on an underinsured motorist policy.
On May 26, 2000, the City of Fordyce, Joseph Watson, and the Arkansas Public Entities Risk Management Association filed a motion for summary judgment. The appellees argued that because the City of Fordyce is a governmental entity, it is entitled to immunity from tort liability. The appellees further contended that Mr. Watson was entitled to immunity because the accident occurred while he was performing his duties as a government employee. Finally, citing Cousins v. Dennis, 298 Ark. 310, 767 S.W.2d 296 (1989), the appellees argued that the City was not required to carry liability insurance on the front-end loader because it was not a motor vehicle.
On June 29, 2000, appellants filed a second amended and substituted complaint once again re-alleging previous claims. In this complaint, appellants claimed that they were entitled to recover the entire policy limits from an uninsured motorist policy if the trial court determined that the City of Fordyce, Joseph Watson, and the Arkansas Public Entities Risk Management Association were immune from suit.
On August 4, 2000, a hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment. On November 2, 2000, the trial court granted the motion. The trial court, relying on Ark.Code Ann. § 21-9-301 (Repl.2001), determined that the City of Fordyce was immune from liability except to the extent of coverage by liability insurance. The trial court further found that insurance coverage was not required for the frontend loader because it was "special mobile equipment" pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. 27-14-211 (Repl.1994), and as such was not subject to registration with the State pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 27-14-703 (Repl.1994). Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that there was no material issue of fact for determination by a jury.
On November 10, 2000, appellee Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company filed a motion for summary judgment. Farm Bureau argued that appellants' claims for benefits from their uninsured motorist policy were improper because the front-end loader was not an "auto" as defined in the policy.
On November 20, 2000, a hearing was held on Farm Bureau's motion. On November 29, 2000, the trial court entered an order granting Farm Bureau's motion. The trial court concluded that a front-end loader was special mobile equipment and was not a vehicle that was designed primarily to be used on public roads. Based on this finding, the trial court concluded that appellants could not recover from their uninsured motorist policy.
It is from these orders that appellants appeal. They raise two points for our review. We reverse the trial court's order, and remand the matter for development of unresolved questions of fact.
In their first point on appeal, appellants contend that the trial court erred when it granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the City of Fordyce, Joseph Watson, and the Arkansas Public Entities Risk Management Association. Summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Baldridge v. Cordes, 350 Ark. 114, 85 S.W.3d 511 (2002). Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Id. On appellate review, we determine if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. Id,. We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id.
Appellants challenge several of the findings upon which the trial court relied in granting the motion for summary judgment. First, appellants argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the City was entitled to tort immunity. Next, appellants contend that the trial court erred when it determined that the City was not required to maintain insurance on the front-end loader. Finally, appellants argue that the trial court erred when it determined that the front-end loader was not a motor vehicle.
In addressing appellants' contention, we must start with the basic principle that:
all counties, municipal corporations, school districts, special improvement districts, and all other political subdivisions of the state and any of their boards, commissions, agencies, authorities, or other governing bodies shall be immune from liability and from suit for damages except to the extent that they may be covered by liability insurance. No tort action shall lie against any such political subdivision because of the acts of its agents and employees.
Ark.Code Ann. § 21-9-301. Pursuant to the statute, the City enjoys immunity from liability and from suits for damages except to the extent that it is covered by liability insurance, or acts as a self insured for certain amounts as provided by statute.
With this basic principle in mind, we then look to Ark.Code Ann. § 21-9-303 (Repl.1996) for guidance on maintaining liability insurance. The statute provides:
(a) All political subdivisions shall carry liability insurance on their motor vehicles or shall become self-insurers, individually or collectively, for their vehicles, or both, in the minimum amounts prescribed in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, § 27-19-101 et seq.
* * *
(c) Any person who suffers injury or damage to person or property caused by a motor vehicle operated by an employee, agent, or volunteer of a local government covered by this section shall have a direct cause of action against the insurer if insured, or the governmental entity if uninsured, or the trustee or chief administrative officer of any self-insured or self-insurance pool. Any judgment against a trustee or administrator of a self-insurance pool shall be paid from pool assets up to the maximum limit of liability as herein provided.
Ark.Code Ann. § 21-9-303. Pursuant to the statute, the City must carry liability insurance on its motor vehicles, or assume statutory responsibility as a self-insured.
Based on this language, we consider whether the City's front-end loader, which collided with Mr. Saeler's car, was a "motor vehicle" as that term is used in the statute. Arkansas Code Annotated § 27-19-206 (Rep1.1994) defines a "motor vehicle" as "every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires but not operated upon rails." Id. This definition is a broad declaration that every self-propelled vehicle that does not operate on rails is a "motor vehicle." However, our analysis does not end with this broad definition. In Cousins v. Dennis, 298 Ark. 310,767 S.W.2d 296 (1989), a case somewhat similar to the one now on review, we articulated a test that accompanies the statutory definition, and which may be used to determine whether the front-end loader is a motor vehicle.
In Cousins, a student was injured by a bush-hog mower being pulled by a tractor. The school district did not maintain liability insurance on the tractor. The injured student argued that the tractor was a motor vehicle and that pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 21-9-303 the school was required to carry liability insurance on the tractor. The school district argued:
21-9-303(a) requires insurance on motor vehicles in the minimum amounts prescribed in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, 27-19-101 et seq. By referring to 27-19-101 et seq., the General Assembly obviously intended that the insurance coverage required of political subdivisions under 21-9-303(a) should be subject to all of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.
Cousins, supra. We agreed with the school district's contention, and looked to the Motor Vehicle Responsibility Act for guidance in our determination of whether a tractor was a motor vehicle. We explained:
Ark.Code Ann. 27-19-605 and 27-19-713 (1987) provide the...
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...are no genuine issues of material fact at issue, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Spears v. City of Fordyce, 351 Ark. 305, 92 S.W.3d 38 (2002). Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proo......
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...are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Spears v. City of Fordyce, 351 Ark. 305, 92 S.W.3d 38 (2002). Once a moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet pro......
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...are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Spears v. City of Fordyce, 351 Ark. 305, 92 S.W.3d 38 (2002). Once a moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet pro......
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