Spechler v. Tobin

• Decision Date: 10 December 2008
• Docket Number: Case No. 08-61130-CIV.
• Citation: 591 F.Supp.2d 1350
• Parties: Jay S. SPECHLER, Plaintiff, v. Victor TOBIN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

591 F.Supp.2d 1350

Jay S. SPECHLER, Plaintiff, v. Victor TOBIN, Defendant.

Case No. 08-61130-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida, Miami Division.

December 10, 2008.

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Robert A. Sweetapple, Sweetapple Broeker Varkas Feltman & Sosin, Boca Raton, FL, Douglas Crane Broeker, Sweetapple, Broeker & Varkas, P.L., Miami, FL, for, Plaintiff.

David J. Glantz, Florida Attorney General, John Hudson Richards, Cooney Mattson Lance Blackburn Richards & O'Connor, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

FEDERICO A. MORENO, District Judge.

"For after all, the best thing one can do when it is raining is to let it rain." Rather than heed Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's famous words, Plaintiff, former Broward County Judge Jay Spechler resigned his judgeship one business day after receiving a letter from Chief Judge Victor Tobin. The letter, which forms the crux of Plaintiff's complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, reassigned Plaintiff to work on a civil traffic docket and indicates that Plaintiff should not return to the central courthouse without permission. See Exh. A (the reassignment letter). The alleged reason for Plaintiff's resignation—the docket to which he was assigned did not exist on the day he received the reassignment letter. See Exh. B (the resignation letter).

Chief Judge Tobin has moved to dismiss this suit asserting qualified immunity. Because the Court agrees that Chief Judge Tobin was acting within his discretion as the Chief Judge in reassigning former Judge Spechler to a separate division, the Court grants him qualified immunity. Moreover, the Court also finds that Plaintiff lacks standing. By resigning and failing to pursue a remedy in the Florida courts to redress his reassignment, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant's actions are "causally connected" to the injuries claimed. Having found Chief Judge Tobin acted within his discretion, the Court also finds sovereign immunity bars the Plaintiff's state law claims.

I. Background

Plaintiff, Jay S. Spechler, is a former County Court Judge in Broward County who is suing Chief Judge Victor Tobin in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chief Judge Tobin has moved to dismiss claiming he has qualified immunity from the federal claims and sovereign immunity on the state law claims.

On March 31, 2008, Plaintiff resigned his judgeship, which he had held since he was elected in 1988. Plaintiff had approximately five years left in his fifth term in office when he resigned. Plaintiffs claim is that he was forced to resign when Chief Judge Tobin "banished" him to a satellite court office and to a nonexistent court docket.

Plaintiff alleges that he received a confidential letter from Chief Judge Tobin on March 28, 2008. The letter¹ dated March 27, 2008 and delivered by hand reads as follows:

Dear Judge Spechler:

This will serve as notice of your reassignment to civil traffic and parking ticket cases at the satellite courthouses for Broward County, Florida effective March 28, 2008. You are not to return to the Central Courthouse except at my direction. I am also requesting you provide me with a telephone number where you may [be] reached with regard to your judicial duties. Your judicial assistant, Lori Brave, shall continue support for County Civil Division 52.

While you are assigned to civil traffic and parking ticket dockets at the satellite courthouses, the Clerk of Court will provide you with the dockets. You will communicate with the staff for the Clerk of Court and Judge Zeller to determine dates and times for dockets.

Sincerely, Victor Tobin Chief Judge

Plaintiff alleges that his new assignment in the satellite courthouses was bogus and Judge Sharon Zeller's lack of response to Plaintiff's inquiry about the docket is proof of the docket's nonexistence. Plaintiff claims that he separately confirmed with the Clerk's staff that no dockets existed in the satellite courthouse on March 28, 2008. Defendant has provided the Court with an Administrative Order of the Courts of Broward County, which establishes the dockets of the satellite courthouses. See Exh. C (Administrative Order VI-07-A-1A).

As a result of receiving this letter, Plaintiff claims he had no choice but to postpone two personal foreclosure proceedings that had been previously set for early April 2008. He ultimately obtained favorable judgments in both foreclosure actions but claims the "notice of banishment" precluded him from personally attending the sheriff sales once he obtained those judgments.

When confronted with questions about the "notice of banishment," Chief Judge Tobin provided no comment to the press, which Plaintiff claims was a calculated response to cast a shadow over Plaintiff's reputation as a County Judge. Plaintiff resigned his post as a County Court Judge by letter dated Monday March 31, 2008 after receiving Chief Judge Tobin's reassignment letter on Friday March 28, 2008. The resignation letter to Governor Charlie Crist reads as follows:

Dear Governor Crist,

Please allow this to serve as notice of my resignation as Broward County Judge effective Monday March 31, 2008 at 5 P.M. It has been an honor and privilege to have served the people of Broward County and the State of Florida during the past 20 years. I look forward to continue working in the legal system in the future.

Cordially, Jay Spechler Broward County Judge

The harm that Plaintiff claims he suffered due to the "notice of banishment" is best quoted from the amended complaint:

Defendant deprived the Plaintiff of 1) his constitutional guarantee of liberty to enter public places, such as the courthouse, without interference, to (a) conduct personal business, (b) avail himself of the courthouse library, and (c) assemble or meet with his fellow judges; and (2) his constitutional right of access to the courthouse to pursue personal litigation.

Plaintiff's five-count amended complaint alleges the following causes of action: 1) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Defendant for depriving Plaintiff of a his access to a public place and the courts, his property interest (i.e. his job) without due process, and his liberty interest (i.e. stigma to his reputation) without due process of law; 2) a violation of the Florida Constitution for not allowing the Judicial Qualifications Commission and the Supreme Court to conduct their investigative and disciplinary functions; 3) constructive discharge; 4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and 5) false light invasion of privacy.

II. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.2006). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must have "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"; if it does not "nudge[ ] the[ ] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [it] must be dismissed." Id. at 1974.

Generally, "the Court is constrained to review the allegations as contained within the four corners of the complaint and may not consider matters outside the pleading without converting the defendant's motion into one for summary judgment." Makro Capital of Am., Inc. v. UBS AG, 372 F.Supp.2d 623, 627 (S.D.Fla.2005) (quoting Crowell v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Servs. Co., 87 F.Supp.2d 1287, 1290 (S.D.Fla.2000)). However, "[t]he Eleventh Circuit has held that, when considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may take judicial notice of the public record, without converting the motion to one for summary judgment, because such documents are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Id. (quoting Davis v. Williams Comms., Inc., 258 F.Supp.2d 1348, 1352 (N.D.Ga.2003)).

III. Legal Analysis

A. Qualified Immunity

The qualified immunity defense may be raised and addressed on a motion to dismiss, and will be granted if the complaint "fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right." Smith v. Siegelman, 322 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Williams v. Ala. State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir.1997)). The doctrine protects government officials sued in their individual capacities as long as their conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). "The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation." Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.2002)). Only "the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law" are subjected to liability. Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir.2001).

1. Was Chief Judge Tobin Acting Within Scope of Discretionary Authority in Reassigning County Judge Spechler?

To establish a qualified immunity defense, "the public official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194). To act within the scope of discretionary authority means that "the actions were (1) undertaken pursuant to the performance of [the official's] duties and (2) within the scope of [his] authority." Collier v....