Spell v. Blalock
| Decision Date | 05 April 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 34553,34553 |
| Citation | 254 S.E.2d 842,243 Ga. 459 |
| Parties | SPELL v. BLALOCK. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Dickey, Whelchel, Miles & Brown, J. Thomas Whelchel, Brunswick, for appellant.
Thomas & Howard, W. Glover Housman, Jr., Jesup, for appellee.
This case arises from an attempt by Blalock, the county administrator of Wayne County, to suspend or discharge Spell, the chief tax appraiser. The procedural aspects of the case are considered in passing upon Blalock's motion to dismiss the appeal.
1. After Blalock had attempted to discharge Spell, and Spell had denied Blalock's authority to terminate his employment, Blalock filed suit against Spell and obtained an order restraining Spell from going about the tax assessor's office and interfering with the operation of the office and the tax appraisal program. Spell answered, moved for dismissal of the complaint, and counterclaimed, denying the authority of Blalock to dismiss him. After hearing, an order was entered on November 20, 1978, denying Spell's motion to dismiss and granting Spell's counterclaim on the ground that the attempted discharge did not comply with applicable procedural requirements for discharge of county employees. The order continued the restraint against Spell's going about or interfering with the tax assessor's office and modified the restraining order by providing that Spell would remain employed and entitled to his regular compensation "pending appeal and until further order of this Court." Thereafter, Blalock filed with the trial court his notice of dismissal of his complaint. Spell then filed his notice of appeal from the November 20, 1978 order.
Supplemental record establishes that Blalock thereafter notified Spell that Spell was being dismissed as chief tax appraiser of Wayne County pursuant to the procedures of the Wayne County personnel system. Spell then sought an injunction against Blalock's terminating his employment and sought an order holding Blalock in contempt for violation of the injunctive provisions of the November 20, 1978 order from which the present appeal was taken. Blalock responded by moving that he be purged from contempt by allowing him to pay Spell's salary into the registry of the court pending a decision by this court in this appeal and until further order of the trial court. After hearing, the trial court granted Blalock's motion and ordered Spell's salary paid into the registry of the court pending this appeal and until further order of the trial court.
Blalock contends in support of his motion to dismiss the present appeal that his voluntary dismissal of his complaint dissolved the injunctive provisions of the order entered on November 20, 1978, and moots the issue of whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to grant Spell's motion to dismiss Blalock's complaint. Further Blalock urges that upon entry of the trial court's order on November 20, 1978, Spell prevailed against Blalock on his counterclaim.
Blalock's contention in this court that his voluntary dismissal of his complaint dissolved the injunctive provisions of the order of November 20, 1978 is in irreconcilable conflict with his contention in the trial court that he should be purged of his contempt of those injunctive provisions by being allowed to pay Spell's salary into the registry of the court. The supplemental record reveals that the trial court and the parties, including Blalock, treated the injunctive features of the November 20, 1978 order as being in force and effect when the court granted Blalock's motion that he be purged of contempt of that order.
Spell has appealed from the order entered on November 20, 1978, and has enumerated as error the refusal of the trial court to rule in his favor on the issue of whether or not Blalock has authority to terminate his employment. This enumeration of error adequately raises the issue of whether or not the trial court, by entry of the November 20, 1978 order, after hearing, correctly continued the restraint against Spell's going about or interfering with the tax assessor's office. If Blalock lacked authority to discharge Spell,...
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...Under Georgia law, the board of tax assessors of the county has the authority to hire and terminate tax appraisers. Spell v. Blalock, 243 Ga. 459, 461, 254 S.E.2d 842 (1979); Richmond County v. Jackson, 234 Ga. 717, 719, 218 S.E.2d 11 (1975). Logically, the board of tax assessors, and not t......
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