Spellman v. Lincoln Rapid Transit Company
Decision Date | 03 May 1893 |
Docket Number | 4997 |
Citation | 55 N.W. 270,36 Neb. 890 |
Parties | THOMAS SPELLMAN v. LINCOLN RAPID TRANSIT COMPANY |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
ERROR from the district court of Lancaster county. Tried below before TIBBETS, J.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Charles A. Burke and Stearns & Strode, for plaintiff in error.
Webster Rose & Fisherdick, contra.
Thomas Spellman brought suit in the district court of Lancaster county, Nebraska, against the Lincoln Rapid Transit Company alleging that it was a corporation owning and operating a street railroad in the city of Lincoln, and that, on the 23d of May, 1890, while he, Spellman, was a passenger upon one of the transit company's cars, the defendant, its agents and servants, so negligently and carelessly used, managed, and controlled the said car and the engine by which it was drawn and so negligently and carelessly managed, used, looked after, and repaired said road and the tracks and switches connected therewith, that the car in which the plaintiff was carried, and the engine drawing the same, were allowed to run off the track; that in consequence of the car running off the track plaintiff was thrown with great force and violence against the seat and the railing thereof in front of him, and then back on the seat and edges thereof behind him, and was thereby permanently injured, and that the plaintiff was careful and did not contribute to the injury in any degree whatever, and prayed for damages against the transit company.
The answer of the defendant denied all negligence of itself or servants; admitted that the car was derailed as claimed by the plaintiff; denied that the plaintiff's injuries were permanent, and alleged that the plaintiff was suffering from a rupture of old and long standing. To this there was a reply, consisting of a general denial, by the plaintiff.
There was a trial to a jury and a verdict for the transit company, and Spellman brings the case here on error.
On the trial it was admitted that the transit company was a corporation and engaged in the carrying of passengers for hire. There was no pleading or proof that Spellman was guilty of any contributory negligence whatever. The motive power of the cars was a dummy steam engine. The evidence in the record does not afford any precise explanation for the cause of the car's leaving the track.
The trial judge, at the request of the transit company, gave the jury the following instruction:
The giving of this instruction is here assigned for error. It will be observed that the test submitted by the learned judge to the jury was whether the transit company used ordinary and reasonable care. The defendant in error was a common carrier of passengers for hire, and the question to be determined in passing upon the correctness of this instruction is, what degree of care is due from a common carrier of passengers to its passengers?
In Rorer, Railroads, vol. 2, p. 1434, it is said: "For injuries occasioned by negligence, street railways are liable, as others are, upon common law principles, and no more so." And on page 1436 the same authority says: "The company is bound to the highest degree of care and utmost diligence to prevent their (passengers) injury." To the same effect, see Shearman & Redfield, Negligence, sec. 226.
In Smith v. St. Paul City Street R. Co., 32 Minn. 1, 18 N.W. 827, the court say: "Street railway companies, as carriers of passengers for hire, are bound to exercise the highest degree of care and diligence consistent with the nature of their undertaking, and are responsible for the slightest negligence."
In Sales v. Western Stage Coach Co., 4 Iowa 547, the rule is thus laid down: "Carriers of passengers for hire are bound to exercise the utmost skill and prudence in conveying their passengers, and are responsible for the slightest negligence or want of skill in either themselves or their servants." (See also Bounce v. Dubuque Street R. Co., 5 N.W. 177.)
In Derwort v. Loomer, 21 Conn. 245, the supreme court of that state laid down the rule thus: "In the case of common carriers of passengers, the highest degree of care which a reasonable man would use is required by law."
This is also the doctrine of the supreme court of California. See Wheaton v. North Beach & M. R. Co., 36 Cal. 590, where it is said: "Passenger carriers, by their contract, bind themselves to carry safely those whom they take into their coaches or cars, as far as human foresight will go; that is, for the utmost care and diligence of very cautious persons."
This is also the rule in New York. See Maverick v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 36 N.Y. 378, where it is said: "Passenger carriers bind themselves to carry safely those whom they take into their coaches, to the utmost care and diligence of very cautious persons." (See also Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co., 58 N.Y. 126.)
This is also the doctrine of the supreme court of Colorado. (See Denver, S. P. & P. R. Co. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 1.)
This is the doctrine of the supreme court of the United States. In Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. 468, 14 HOW 468, 485, it is said: "When carriers undertake to convey persons by the powerful, but dangerous agency of steam, public policy and safety require that they be held to the greatest possible care and diligence." This doctrine is reaffirmed by the same court in Steamboat New World v. King, 57 U.S. 469, 16 HOW 469. See these cases cited and approved in Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, where the court say, in reviewing the cases cited above: "We desire to reaffirm the doctrine, not only as resting on public policy, but on sound principles of law." They also cite New York C. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 17 Wall. 357, and quote and affirm that case as saying: "The highest degree of carefulness and diligence is expressly exacted." Continuing, the court say:
"The rule, as gathered from the foregoing authorities, requires that a common carrier of passengers shall exercise more than ordinary care; it requires the exercise of extraordinary care; the exercise of the utmost skill, diligence, and human foresight; and makes the carrier liable for the slightest negligence."
It follows from the foregoing that the giving of the instruction complained of was error.
Spellman also assigns as error the giving by the court below, at the request of the transit company, instructions Nos. 2 and 3. They are as follows:
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