Spencer v. City of Reading Charter Bd.

• Decision Date: 08 August 2014
• Citation: 97 A.3d 834
• Parties: The Honorable Vaughn D. SPENCER, Mayor of the City of Reading v. CITY OF READING CHARTER BOARD, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

97 A.3d 834

The Honorable Vaughn D. SPENCER, Mayor of the City of Reading
v.
CITY OF READING CHARTER BOARD, Appellant.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 13, 2014.
Decided Aug. 8, 2014.

[97 A.3d 837]

Eric B. Smith, Norristown, Kevin J. McKeon, Harrisburg for appellant.

Robert L. Byer, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

BEFORE: MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge, and P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge, and ANNE E. COVEY, Judge.

OPINION BY Judge LEAVITT.

The City of Reading Charter Board (Charter Board) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County (trial court) that reversed the Charter Board's adjudication charging The Honorable Vaughn D. Spencer, Mayor of the City of Reading, with violations of the City of Reading's Charter. ¹ The trial court held, without taking additional evidence, that the Charter Board capriciously disregarded evidence and made findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence. Mayor Spencer has filed a motion to quash asserting the Charter Board lacks standing to appeal. We deny the motion to quash and affirm the trial court.

Background

Mayor Spencer was elected to office in November 2011. During his campaign, Spencer announced a “Policy Action Plan” to restructure the Mayor's office. To achieve that goal, Mayor-elect Spencer sought to have several new staff appointed to the Mayor's office who would be ready to assume their duties on January 2, 2012, when his term began. The prospective employees were Eron Lloyd, Lawrence Murin, Marisol Torres, Michael Dee, and Mark Drabinsky (Employees). In December 2011, Spencer sought the advice of the City's Managing Director, Carl Geffken, and others to determine whether the Employees could be hired and in place on January 2, 2012, without violating the Charter, the Administrative Code, or any other applicable law. At a meeting on December 28, 2011, Geffken advised Mayor-elect Spencer that Lloyd, Murin, Drabinsky and Dee ² could be hired on a part-time basis without reopening the previous year's budget or amending the City's annual

[97 A.3d 838]

Position Ordinance. Geffken further advised Spencer that there was precedent for this procedure. Several part-time positions in the police department had not been listed in the Position Ordinance but were nevertheless filled.

Following the meeting, Geffken made offers of part-time employment to Lloyd, Murin, Dee and Drabinsky. On January 3, 2012, Geffken sent a letter to each employee confirming the offer and acceptance of employment and indicating that the position was part-time and without benefits. During their tenure, Lloyd, Murin, Drabinsky and Dee worked more hours than the definition of a part-time employee allows, albeit without the compensation paid to full-time employees. ³

On February 28, 2012, in response to questions about hiring part-time employees for positions not included in either the City's annual budget or Position Ordinance, the Charter Board issued Advisory Opinion No. 28, stating that the Charter requires all employment positions to be listed in the annual Position Ordinance and budget before they can be filled. Thereafter, City Council enacted an ordinance to amend the 2012 budget and Position Ordinance to include the positions for Lloyd, Murin, and Torres.⁴

On March 23, 2012, a City Council Member, Donna Reed, filed a complaint with the Charter Board regarding the City's hiring of the Employees. The Charter Board's Investigative Officer concluded that the Mayor had violated the Charter by hiring the Employees without the proper authorization. In response, Mayor Spencer obtained a sworn statement from Geffken about the hiring of the Employees. In the affidavit, Geffken stated that he had advised Mayor-elect Spencer in December 2011 that hiring the Employees part-time was permitted and that Geffken “solely determined and decided that offers of part-time employment would be promptly made.” Reproduced Record at 408a (R.R. ––––). Geffken confirmed that the offers of employment were made and accepted prior to January 1, 2012, and prior to Mayor Spencer taking office on January 2, 2012. Based on the Geffken Declaration, the parties stipulated that if called to testify at the Charter Board hearing,

former City Managing Director Carl Geffken would state that, while Mayor-elect Spencer desired to have his senior team hired, Mr. Spencer did not in any way pressure or influence Mr. Geffken with respect to his determination that [the Employees] could properly be hired on a part-time basis.

R.R. 406a.

After a hearing, the Charter Board determined that Mayor Spencer had violated the Charter by hiring the Employees to positions that did not appear in an amended budget or Position Ordinance. The Charter Board further held that the Mayor hired the Employees through his subordinate Geffken. Finally, although the Charter Board found that the January 3, 2012, letters to the Employees confirmed the “offers and acceptances of employment previously made and given,” the Charter Board also determined that the offers and acceptances “occurred on January 3, 2012.” R.R. 604a, 610a (emphasis added). The

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Charter Board rejected the stipulation of the parties regarding the statements Geffken would have made if called to testify, finding those statements “not credible.” The Charter Board publicly censured Mayor Spencer and levied a $1,000 administrative fine.

Mayor Spencer appealed the Charter Board's decision to the trial court. The trial court reversed and vacated the Charter Board's order, holding that its findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court also held that the Charter Board capriciously disregarded the Geffken Declaration by simply rejecting it as “not credible.” The Charter Board now appeals to this Court.

On appeal,⁵ the Charter Board argues that the trial court erred by applying an incorrect standard of review, holding that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and substituting its own judgment for that of the Board.

Mayor Spencer has filed a motion to quash the instant appeal, arguing that the Charter Board, an adjudicatory tribunal, lacks standing to appeal a reversal of its adjudication.

Motion to Quash Appeal

We begin with the motion to quash. Mayor Spencer argues that the Charter Board lacks standing to appeal for two reasons. First, as an adjudicatory tribunal, the Charter Board could not be aggrieved by the trial court's order reversing its adjudication, any more than an Article V court of law under the Pennsylvania Constitution can be aggrieved by an appellate court reversal of its decision. Second, any standing conferred upon the Board by reason of its prosecutorial function is destroyed because this appeal is being pursued by the adjudicative side of the board, which, in turn, improperly commingles the Board's prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. We consider these two standing arguments seriatim.

In support of his first standing argument, Mayor Spencer cites to Appeal of Board of Adjustment, Lansdowne Borough, 313 Pa. 523, 170 A. 867 (1934). In Lansdowne, the board of adjustment denied an application for a special exception. The landowners appealed to the trial court, and it reversed the decision of the board of adjustment. The board of adjustment appealed the trial court's order. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the board of adjustment was an adjudicatory tribunal, not an agency, and, thus, could not be aggrieved by the trial court's order. Accordingly, it lacked standing to appeal.

The Charter Board counters that Lansdowne is not applicable because the Charter Board has been assigned functions that give it a stake in the outcome of its decisions. The Charter Board claims to have been modeled after the State Ethics Commission, which was created to administer, prosecute, enforce, and adjudicate cases

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under the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act, 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 1101–1113. Specifically, pursuant to the Charter, the Charter Board has the power and duty to “[h]ear and decide all complaints alleging violations of the Charter and Administrative Code.” Charter Board Ordinance § III.A(1); R.R. 117a. Further, the Charter Board may impose penalties, initiate preliminary investigations, issue subpoenas, adopt rules and regulations, issue advisory opinions, enforce and interpret the Charter and “have all other powers necessary” to effectuate the Charter. Charter Board Ordinance §§ II and III.A.(1)-(7); R.R. 114a–117a. As such, the Charter Board's interest in appeals from its decisions is direct and substantial.

The basic principle of standing is that a person is not adversely affected or aggrieved by a judicial determination unless he has a direct and substantial interest in the matter. William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269, 280 (1975). In the context of an agency, “when the legislature statutorily invests an agency with certain functions, duties and responsibilities, the agency has a legislatively conferred interest in such matters.” Pennsylvania Game Commission v. Department of Environmental Resources, 521 Pa. 121, 555 A.2d 812, 815 (1989). Here, the Charter Board argues that its interest is direct and substantial because the trial court's ruling directly conflicts with its ability to enforce and interpret the Charter. If the Charter Board is unable to appeal a reversal, its authority as guardian of the Charter is compromised.

We agree with the Charter Board that its functions are different from those of a zoning board, i.e., the tribunal held to have lacked standing in Lansdowne. The Charter was adopted pursuant to the Home Rule Law, 53 Pa.C.S. § 2941. A home rule charter has the force and status of an enactment of the legislature. In re Addison, 385 Pa. 48, 122 A.2d 272 (1956). Where an agency has been given “certain functions, duties and responsibilities” it is deemed to have been “conferred” an interest, absent statutory language to the...