Spencer v. Pub. Storage

• Decision Date: 24 September 2012
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:11-cv-00357-JEO
• Parties: CAREY SPENCER; SUSAN SPENCER, and JOSHUA SPENCER, through his father and next friend, CAREY SPENCER, Plaintiffs, v. PUBLIC STORAGE, f.k.a. PUBLIC STORAGE, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

CAREY SPENCER; SUSAN SPENCER,and JOSHUA SPENCER, through his fatherand next friend, CAREY SPENCER, Plaintiffs,

v.PUBLIC STORAGE, f.k.a. PUBLIC STORAGE, INC., Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:11-cv-00357-JEO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: September 24, 2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On January 5, 2011, plaintiffs Carey Spencer, Susan Spencer and Joshua Spencer, by and through his father and next friend Carey Spencer ("the Spencers" or "the plaintiffs"), initiated this civil action against defendant Public Storage ("Public Storage" or "the defendant") with a complaint filed in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama. (See Exhibit A to Doc. no. 1, at 1-5,¹ Carey Spencer, et. al. v. Public Storage, Inc., 01-CV-2011-900034.00). The Spencers are residents of Birmingham, Alabama, and Public Storage "is a foreign corporation which operates storage warehouses in the State of Alabama and in Jefferson County, Alabama." (Id. at 2).

I. BACKGROUND

The Spencers allege four causes of action: (1) conversion, (2) negligence and/or wantonness, (3) violations of the Alabama Self-Service Storage Act ("the Storage Act" or "the Act") and (4) a violation of the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("ADTPA"). (Id. at 1-4). For conversion, the Spencers demand $100,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. (Id. at 4-5). For negligence and/or wantonness, the Spencers demand $100,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 for emotional distress. (Id. at 5). The Spencers demand "treble damages for the financial value of their personal and business property," as well as attorney fees and expenses for the ADTPA violation. (Id.)

On November 14, 2011, the Spencers filed a motion for partial summary judgment and supporting brief, along with evidentiary submissions in the form of documents, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions and the like. (Docs. 8 & 9). The motion for partial summary judgment concerns two issues. First, the Spencers move for partial summary judgment "on the issue of liability" as to their conversion claim. (Doc. 8 at 1). Second, the Spencers "seek partial summary judgment striking any defenses based upon contractual exculpatory language with regard to the plaintiff's claims for conversion." (Id.) The Spencers contend that "the case should be submitted to the jury for a determination of the full damages suffered by the Spencers in accordance with the law of damages." (Doc. 9 at 10).

Also on November 14, 2011, Public Storage filed a motion "for summary judgment denying each of [the p]laintiffs' claims in their entirety." (Doc. 10 at 1, 4-30). In the alternative, Public Storage moves for partial summary judgment to restrict the Spencers' available damages to $10,000.00, in accordance with the $5,000.00 limitation of liability language set out each ofthe rental agreements. (Id. at 1-2).

Thereafter, pleadings in opposition to the respective motions for summary judgment were filed by Public Storage and the Spencers. (Docs. 14 & 15, respectively). Public Storage and the Spencers also filed replies in support of their own motions. (Docs. 16 & 17, respectively). The motions are ripe for summary judgment review. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issue as to any material fact is present, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(c). "Only factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment." Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). Stated another way,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curium) (citing Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotes and citation omitted)).

The moving party carries the initial burden of "informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those materials that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 840 (11th Cir. 2000) (citingCelotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). "Only when that burden has been met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The non-moving party is then required "to go beyond the pleadings" and present competent evidence such as affidavits, depositions, and admissions that identify "specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" supporting the non-movant's case is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252.

The reviewing court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 248. "[F]acts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). "When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of facts for the purpose of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Id. If the record does not blatantly contradict the non-movant's versions of events, the court must determine "whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also EPL, Inc. v. USA Federal Credit Union, 173 F.3d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 1999).

In the present case, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to some of the claims and issues to be resolved. It is understood that

"[t]he applicable Rule 56 standard is not affected by the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment." Murray v. Holiday Isle, LLC, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1307 (S.D. Ala. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Godard v. AlabamaPilot, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1291 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (same). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that "[c]ross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed." United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); see also Wermager v. Cormorant Tp. Bd., 716 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1983) ("the filing of cross motions for summary judgment does not necessarily indicate that there is no dispute as to a material fact, or have the effect of submitting the cause to a plenary determination on the merits"). Nonetheless, "cross-motions may be probative of the absence of a factual dispute where they reflect general agreement by the parties as to the dispositive legal theories and material facts." Murray, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (citations omitted); see also Godard, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.

First Financial Bank v. CS Assets, LLC, 678 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1226 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 2010).

III. CLAIMS THREE AND FOUR

The Spencers concede that Public Storage's motion for summary judgment (doc. 10) is due to be granted in part. (Doc. 15 at 8, 14). The court concurs. First, the Spencers agree that the Storage "Act does not create a private cause of action."² (Doc. 15 at 8 (citing ALA. CODE § 8-5-31, et. seq. (1975)). Therefore, to the extent Public Storage's motion for summary judgment pertains to the "Third Cause of Action" in the Spencers' complaint, that Public Storage violated "provisions of the Alabama Self-Storage Act,"³ Public Storage's motion for summary judgment (doc. 10 at 1) is due to be granted.

Second, the Spencers "agree that Public Storage is entitled to partial summary judgmentsolely on the [p]laintiffs' claim under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act." (Doc. 15 at 14). Therefore, to the extent Public Storage's motion for summary judgment pertains to the "Fourth Cause of Action" in the Spencers' complaint, that Public Storage "engaged in unlawful trade practices and deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act," Public Storage's motion for summary judgment (doc.10) also is due to be granted.

IV. THE REMAINING CLAIMS

The remaining claims are conversion and negligence/wantonness.

A. Facts

Carey and Susan Spencer are a married couple who reside in Birmingham, Alabama. Carey Spencer is a lawyer and Susan Spencer is a flight attendant. In 2007, Carey Spencer rented one storage unit from Public Storage, which is located at 1900 Mini Warehouse Road in Birmingham, Alabama. Sometime prior to May 26, 2009, the Spencers decided to rent a second storage unit. Carey Spencer and Susan Spencer executed separate rental agreements for the two storage units. Rent was due on the storage units on or before the 1st day of each month, but during the majority of the time they rented units from Public Storage, the Spencers suffered medical and financial problems, and thus often made late rental payments. For example, the Spencers did not pay the monthly rent due on August 1, 2009, and September 1, 2009, but after being notified that...