Spencer v. Spencer

Decision Date31 December 1974
Docket Number74--406,74--521 and 74--522,Nos. 74--405,s. 74--405
Citation305 So.2d 256
PartiesPhilip P. SPENCER, Appellant, v. Mrs. Rochelle Terebelo SPENCER, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Paul E. Gifford, Miami, for appellant.

Heller & Kaplan, Miami, for appellee.

Before HENDRY, HAVERFIELD and NATHAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This a consolidated appeal involving two orders, one granting permanent child custody to the appellee, the other granting appellee child support and an attorney's fee.

Some of the history of this bitter divorce controversy is recounted in two Louisiana appellate court decisions reported at 261 So.2d 702 (La.App.1972) and 273 So.2d 605 (La.App.1973).

For the sake of brevity, we now mention only that custody of the parties' five children, one boy and four girls, ages 16 to 9, has been divided between the mother and the father since their divorce in 1971.

The last proceeding held in Louisiana occurred on November 30, 1973, in which the appellee was held in contempt of court for refusing to return the children to the appellant after taking them for visitation.

That evening the appellee and the children boarded an airplane, together with the appellant's second wife, Barbara Spencer and her two children, and flew to Miami.

Thereafter, when appellant learned of the whereabouts of his ex-wife and his present wife (who along with the seven children were living together in a two-bedroom South Dade apartment) and his children, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Dade County Circuit Court.

Initially, following an ex parte hearing, the trial court on January 10, 1974, ordered that permanent custody be restored to the appellant under the doctrine of comity.

Then on the morning of January 12, 1974, the appellant along with deputies of the Dade County Public Safety Department went to the apartment where the children were living after the appellee had left for work and physically attempted to retake custody and return them to Louisiana.

As the testimony of the apartment manager in this case rather graphically reveals, the children resisted these efforts, and 'bedlam' broke out resulting in doors being broken, furniture being overturned, and 15-year old Harry Spencer, appellant's son, running out of the apartment in his pajamas to summon help.

Eventually other police officers, attorneys and the trial judge were contracted, and it was learned that the day before, the appellee had filed an emergency counterclaim with another trial judge and had received a temporary restraining order enjoining the appellant from removing the children from this state.

The counterclaim also alleged that the appellant was an unsafe person to be caring for the children and that he had acted irrationally in recent dealings with them. Therefore, it was contended that the appellant was unfit to have custody. On the other hand, appellee contended that she was a fit and proper person to have custody.

Subsequently, a hearing was held on January 24, 1974, in which the trial judge heard testimony from all five of the children, from Barbara Spencer, from the appellee, and others.

At the conclusion of this hearing, the court entered the first order appealed making several specific findings which have been helpful in our deliberations on this case.

First, the court recognized that the principle of comity should be given consideration in cases of this nature. See, Crane v. Hayes, Fla.1971, 253 So.2d 435; Mitchell v. Mitchell, Fla.App.1974, 294 So.2d 44; Scarpetta v. DeMartino, Fla.App.1971, 254 So.2d 813; Powell v. Powell, Fla.App.1971, 242 So.2d 138; Fox v. Fox, Fla.App.1965, 179 So.2d 103; Morris v. Kridel, Fla.App.1965, 179 So.2d 130; State ex rel. Fox v. Webster, Fla.App.1963, 151 So.2d 14.

However, the court held that material changes in circumstances and the best interests and welfare of the children dictated a change in the Louisiana custody award.

More specifically, the court found that the appellee's romance with a married man, one Carl Munch, which concerned the Louisiana appellate court, had ended in October, 1971, and since then she had demonstrated the moral and spiritual fitness necessary to the upbringing of minor children.

Moreover, the court found that appellee was loving and devoted to the children, and each child testified that he or she would prefer to live permanently with their mother.

The children testified that they felt their father was mean to them, that he beat them, and this testimony was corroborated by appellant's second wife, Barbara Spencer, also separated from him, who testified that appellant had a 'dual personality' and that he was easily subject to rages and other irrational conduct.

Finally, the court stated, 'It is the duty and obligation of the Court to make and enter such orders and decrees affecting the custody of minor children as will promote their best interest and general welfare.' Thereupon the court granted to the appellee permanent custody of the children.

Appellant has raised two points in his brief attacking this order (appellate case numbers 74--405 and 406). We have carefully considered each in light of the record and the law, and we conclude that they do not present reversible error.

We have scrutinized the testimony in this case, and we think the court's findings are amply supported by competent evidence. Further, the court was completely correct in its interpretation of the law applicable to this case.

We certainly do not condone appellee's defiance of the lawful orders entered by the Louisiana courts (see also, State ex rel. Fox v. Webster, supra); however, it is clear that where both parties have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state and where the children also are before the court and residing in Florida, the court has the duty to make the best interests of the children its paramount consideration.

We direct our attention next to the appeal taken in case numbers 74--521 and 74--522. The appellant here challenges the court's order directing him to pay $250.00 per week as child support for the five children and a $10,000.00 attorney's fee to the wife's attorney.

The trial court conducted another hearing on child support and the attorney's fee, almost two months after the first hearing transferring custody. We have closely examined the record of this hearing.

From the record, it appears clear that the appellee now has a job from which she nets approximately $575.00 per month as take-home pay....

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8 cases
  • Kendrick v. Everheart
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • November 6, 1980
    ...will affect him. See In re Brock, 157 Fla. 291, 25 So.2d 659 (1946); Porter v. Porter, 60 Fla. 407, 53 So. 546 (1910); Spencer v. Spencer, 305 So.2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); In the Interest of R. L. G., 274 So.2d 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Tom v. State, 153 So.2d 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). Although......
  • Broudy v. Broudy, 82-182
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 14, 1982
    ...may take into account the disregard of the court's order in considering a motion to assess attorney's fees) (citing Spencer v. Spencer, 305 So.2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 315 So.2d 470 (Fla.1975)); Jaffee v. Jaffee, 394 So.2d 443, 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (totally meritless attem......
  • Silvestri v. Silvestri
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • February 25, 1975
    ...keeping in mind that the paramount concern of the court should be the best interest of the child's welfare. See, Spencer v. Spencer, Fla.App.1974, 305 So.2d 256, (opinion filed December 31, 1974); Mitchell v. Mitchell Fla.App.1974, 294 So.2d 44; Powell v. Powell, Fla.App.1973, 274 So.2d 24;......
  • Patterson v. Patterson
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 27, 1981
    ...into account the disregard by that other spouse of the court's order in considering a motion to assess attorney fees. Spencer v. Spencer, 305 So.2d 256 (Fla.3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 351 So.2d 470 (Fla.1975). We agree with that portion of the specially concurring opinion of Judge McCord i......
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