Spencer v. State, 43497

Decision Date07 April 1971
Docket NumberNo. 43497,43497
Citation466 S.W.2d 749
PartiesCharles Robert SPENCER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

Charles W. Tessmer, Ronald L. Goranson, Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., John B. Tolle, Harry J. Schulz, Jr., W. T. Westmoreland, Jr., and Edgar A. Mason, Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, and Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sale of marihuana; the jury assessed the punishment at 50 years.

Sam J. Roberts, a special agent of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, testified outside the presence of the jury, in a hearing to determine the admissibility of his in-court identification of appellant, that on July 3, 1968, he met the appellant, who identified himself to Roberts by the name of 'Chuck.' He further testified that on that date he purchased marihuana from the appellant and that since that date he had seen the appellant in the Dallas County Jail in a one to one confrontation with no attorney present, but that his identification was based solely on having seen the appellant on July 3, 1968, and that he would still be able to identify the appellant had he not seen him in the Dallas County Jail. The sale was made in Lee Park in Dallas. At that time, he described the appellant as having a moustache, a goatee, and long hair which was not long enough to hang down on his shoulders. He saw the appellant in the jail on two different nights in July of 1969. On one of those visits, the appellant signed a waiver of constitutional rights, and Roberts tried to persuade him to become an informer.

The appellant moved that Roberts' testimony be suppressed on the grounds that his identification was influenced by the jail visits which did not meet the requirements of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149. The court then denied the motion to suppress.

The jury was then returned to the courtroom and Roberts testified that he had been a narcotics agent for seven years. In response to a prosecution question as to why he was wearing sun glasses, he stated that his left eye had been 'severely injured' in another narcotics raid in February, 1969. On July 2, 1968, he went to Lee Park and saw the appellant, who had longer hair than he now had and also had a moustache and a goatee. Roberts testified that the appellant told him that in a few hours he would pick up a pound of marihuana and some LSD. They made an agreement for Roberts to purchase 10 tablets of LSD at $7 a tablet and one or two 'lids' of marihuana. The next day, July 3, Roberts purchased two 'lids' from 'Chuck' for $30, while they drove around the block in a yellow, 1958 Volkswagen. The two bags of marihuana were then introduced into evidence. Prior to June 1, 1969, Roberts had never seen the appellant without the long hair, moustache, and goatee.

Roberts further testified that he had made approximately 800 buys of marihuana during the last seven years. Also, he traced the yellow Volkswagen and it was owned by Randy Thornton.

A chemist with the Dallas Regional Laboratory of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs testified that he had analyzed the contents of the two bags given him by Roberts and found that the substance was marihuana. The bags contained 32.7 grams, which could make from 50 to 150 marihuana cigarettes.

James Williams, another agent for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, observed the incident, saw a person drive up in a yellow Volkswagen, and identified the appellant as that person who had longer hair, a moustache, and a goatee. Williams had never seen the appellant shaven and with short hair until the day of trial, but had seen pictures of him. On re-direct examination, Williams testified, 'I would say he resembles him greatly.'

The appellant took the stand in his own behalf and testified that he was 22 years old, was working as a gravedigger in Smithfield, and had quit school in the tenth grade to enlist in the Navy. He denied that he sold or offered to sell either marihuana or LSD to Roberts, denied that he was ever paid $30 for either marihuana or LSD, and denied that he ever saw Roberts. He further testified that he did not know Randy Thornton, had never driven a yellow Volkswagen, and had never been in a Volkswagen with Roberts. He admitted that in July of 1968, he had longer hair, a moustache, and a goatee. He also testified that he had never seen the type of substance contained in the two bags before.

Appellant's first ground of error is that Roberts' in-court identification was inadmissible because it was tainted by unlawful pre-trial identification.

The cases of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct.1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 'were fashioned to deter law enforcement authorities from exhibiting an accused to witnesses prior to trial for identification purposes without notice to and in the absence of counsel absent an intelligent waiver by the accused.' Martinez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 437 S.W.2d 842. If, as was done in this case, the accused is subjected to a pre-trial identification process in the absence of counsel, 'the in-court identification is not admissible at all unless the prosecution can establish by clear and convincing proof that the testimony is not the fruit of the earlier identification made in the absence of the accused's counsel.' Martinez v. State, supra. Put another way, these cases mean that the in-court identification 'is not to be received into evidence without first determining that it was not tainted by the illegal lineup or pre-trial identification procedure but was of independent origin.' Martinez v. State, supra; Gilbert v. California, supra.

The trial court should determine whether the courtroom identification is tainted or is of independent origin. Here, the trial court properly held a hearing to determine the question, but it failed to enter written findings or state into the record the reason for admitting the testimony. See: Martinez v. State, supra. We adhere to the rule that the court should make findings but in the present case there was no request or objection to the failure to do so. The record contains sufficient evidence for the court to conclude as he no doubt did, that the in-court identification was not tainted.

At the hearing, the burden is upon the prosecution to establish by 'clear and convincing proof' that the testimony is not the fruit of the earlier identification made in the absence of counsel or intelligent waiver of counsel. By 'clear and convincing' is meant 'so clear as to leave no substantial doubt' and 'sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.' Martinez v. State, supra; In re Jost (1953), 117 Cal.App.2d 379, 256 P.2d 71.

The waiver alluded to is not in the record and therefore not reviewable by this Court.

The appellant argues that Roberts' visits to Spencer were made for the purpose of allowing Roberts to identify Spencer, since out of several Federal Narcotics Officers in Dallas County, it was he who went to the jail to question Spencer. Some of the relevant testimony was as follows:

'Q I will ask you, at a time after that, that is the date of July the 3rd, 1968, if you had an occasion to see him in the Dallas County Jail?

'A Since July the 3rd I have seen him in the County Jail.

'Q Had you not seen him in the County Jail, would you be able to identify him in Court today as one and the same person that you observed on July the 3rd of 1968 that sold to you a narcotic drug?

'A Yes, sir.

'Q And your identification is made solely on having seen him on the date of July the 3rd of 1968 and is not based on having seen him since nor any other reason, is that correct?

'A Yes, sir.

'A I asked him if he would cooperate with us on trying to get some sources of narcotics.

'Q And by cooperation, just what did you mean?

'A I meant by his giving us names of people who were buying--dealers that he was aware of and so on so we could take it from there and try and develop cases against them.

'Q * * * Did you or did you not seek to make an informer of my client?

'A I sought to get some cooperative information from him.

'Q That was in the nature of information, wasn't it?

'A Yes, sir.

'Q That would make him an informer, wouldn't it?

'A Yes, sir.

'Q Would you explain to us the duties of an undercover Federal Narcotics Officer?

'A Yes, sir. We conceal our identity and use various forms of names and employments in order to try to develop cases on major dealers of narcotics and drugs.'

From this testimony, it would not be an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to find that the visits were made solely to seek the appellant's help in apprehending narcotics dealers and not for the purpose of identifying the appellant. Since Roberts, as a State's witness, did view the appellant his visits to the appellant in jail necessarily constituted a pre-trial identification without counsel as contemplated by Wade, Gilbert, and Martinez, and a determination as to whether the identification was tainted was clearly necessary. Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that the rationale of Wade and Gilbert was that a witness to a crime may be unduly influenced by an identification procedure which unfairly suggests that a particular person is the one the witness is trying to identify. Because it is the suggestiveness that is crucial, it is relevant for the court to consider that the witness is a trained law enforcement officer, experienced in making identifications, and who first comes in contact with the accused for the sole purpose of watching and observing him in order to be able to accurately identify him in court. Under those circumstances, the Wade-Gilbert proscription against undue suggestiveness is more easily satisfied than when the witness is a victim of a...

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32 cases
  • Perryman v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 16 Septiembre 1971
    ...or to state into the record following such hearing his reasons for admitting such evidence, if he does.' See also Spencer v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 466 S.W.2d 749. We are confronted with the question of whether or not appellant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his right to coun......
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    ...error. Compare Bolding v. State, 493 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Hendrix v. State, 474 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Spencer v. State, 466 S.W.2d 749 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); McDaniel v. State, 461 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Perbetsky v. State, 429 S.W.2d 471 Appellant's fourth ground of err......
  • Lopez v. State
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    • 19 Julio 2007
    ...of appellant was of independent origin (Sergeant Rhodes's observation of defendant during the two sales). See Spencer v. State, 466 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex.Crim.App.1971). Although appellant has relied heavily in his argument that Sergeant Rhodes failed to mention appellant's teardrop tattoo i......
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