Goocher v. State

• Decision Date: 10 March 1982
• Docket Number: No. 60539,No. 2,60539,2
• Citation: 633 S.W.2d 860
• Parties: Brenda Gail GOOCHER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 860

633 S.W.2d 860

Brenda Gail GOOCHER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 60539.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Panel No. 2.

March 10, 1982.

Rehearing Denied April 14, 1982.

Kenneth W. Boyd and Michael J. Rogers, Cleburne, for appellant.

Dan M. Boulware, County Atty., Wayne Bridewell, Asst. County Atty., Cleburne, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before ONION, P. J., and TOM G. DAVIS and CLINTON, JJ.

OPINION

CLINTON, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of commercially exhibiting obscene materials under former V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 43.23(a)(1). The jury assessed punishment at confinement in the county jail for 180 days and a fine of $200.00, but recommended probation.

In appellant's first ground of error she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction. Specifically, she complains that the State's evidence failed to show the whole of the material. A review of the facts is necessary.

Deputy Sheriff D. J. Moulder attended a showing at the Trail Drive-In on the evening of December 5, 1977 in Johnson County where the movies "Cherry Truckers," "Fulfillment," and an unnamed film were playing. Moulder purchased a ticket from appellant, watched all three features and, the following day, consulted with the district attorney regarding institution of criminal charges against the employees of the theater. Moulder procured arrest warrants and a search warrant describing all three films from a Justice of the Peace in Alvarado and again proceeded to the Trail Drive-In; he purchased a ticket for admission from appellant. At some point in the evening while watching the films, Moulder went to the snack bar where he observed two other people, Mrs. Acevedo and Bauldwin, serving refreshments. After purchasing a hamburger and a Coke, Moulder returned to his car and watched the remainder of the films. After watching all three films, Moulder executed the arrest warrants by taking appellant, Mrs. Acevedo and Bauldwin into custody. In addition Moulder arrested Mr. Acevedo, who was standing in the doorway between the snack bar and the projection room. ¹ All three films were confiscated. As part of the presentation of the State's case, the jury viewed "Cherry Truckers" and "Fulfillment." ²

In appellant's first ground of error, she claims that the evidence is insufficient because the material was not considered as a whole. Appellant asserts that since Moulder paid a single admission price for all three films, the jury should have considered all three films in making its determination of obscenity.

V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 43.23, provided in relevant part:

"(a) A person commits an offense if, knowing the content of the material:

(1) he sells, commercially distributes, commercially exhibits, or possesses for sale, commercial distribution, or commercial exhibition any obscene material;" ³

"Obscene" was defined in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 43.21 as meaning:

"(1) ... having as a whole a dominant theme that:

(A) appeals to the prurient interest...;

(B) depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way...;

(C) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."

The concept of examining the material as a whole was first enunciated in the Supreme Court's decision of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). In Roth, supra, the court finally rejected the concept, stemming from Regina v. Hicklin, (1868) LR.3Q. 360, that obscenity could be judged on the basis of an isolated excerpt from the material. ⁴ Instead, Roth substituted the requirement that material could be obscene if, and only if, the "dominant theme of the material taken as a whole" would appeal to the prurient interest. Although the test for obscenity set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), omits the phrase "dominant theme," the "as a whole" concept is retained and it is clear that the meaning remains the same.

Lower courts have consistently upheld the principle of Roth that isolated excerpts cannot in any way be a basis for a finding of obscenity. Thus, a pattern of seizures by police, admittedly based on "indicators" such as bare breasts or buttocks, has been held to be impermissible, since one objectionable picture cannot render an entire publication obscene. ⁵ Similarly, it has been held that since isolated episodes are insufficient, an arrest made on the basis of an offense committed in the presence of an officer requires the officer to have seen the entire motion picture. ⁶ Each motion picture or single book is considered a "unit of perception." This principle applies to trials as well as preliminary proceedings, and thus since a finding of obscenity must be based on the worth as a whole, the judge, or jury must see the entire motion picture or consider the entire book. ⁷

Likewise, in the instant case, the State was only required to present evidence to sustain those allegations contained in the information. The record indicates that the jury viewed "Cherry Truckers" and "Fulfillment" in their entirety, but did not view the untitled film. The State, exercising its right, chose not to charge appellant with commercially exhibiting the third untitled film. As such, the third film was neither relevant nor material to any issue in appellant's trial. ⁸

Appellant's first ground of error is overruled.

In appellant's second ground of error she contends that the trial court erred by denying her a speedy trial under Article 32A.02, V.A.C.C.P. In the instant case, the complaint and information against appellant were executed December 6, 1977. The docket sheet reveals that on June 20, 1978, an announcement of ready for trial was made. On July 12, 1978, a pretrial conference was held at which appellant moved for dismissal for failure of the State to grant them a speedy trial. Appellant's motion was overruled by the trial court.

Article 32A.02, V.A.C.C.P., provides that the court should grant a motion to set aside an information if the State is not ready for trial within 60 days of the commencement of a criminal action and if the defendant is accused of a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment for 180 days or less.

Appellant contends that since she was charged with the offense of exhibiting commercial obscenity, a Class B misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for 180 days or less, she was entitled to be brought to trial by the State within 60 days. She argues that the State waited 178 days before it announced ready for trial, and 212 days elapsed before the case was actually called to trial. Since appellant claims to have neither waived her rights to a speedy trial nor moved for a continuance, she claims the State's delay entitles her to a dismissal. We disagree.

The effective date of the Speedy Trial Act was July 1, 1978. In Wade v. State, 572 S.W.2d 533 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), the Court held that the time limits prescribed by Article 32A.02, V.A.C.C.P., began to run on July 1, 1978 for all criminal cases then pending on the trial court's docket. Judge Dally, writing for the Court, stated: "In determining whether a motion to set aside an indictment should be granted in cases pending on July 1, the time which elapsed prior to that date is not to be considered." It is clear from the record before us that appellant filed her motion to set aside the information only twelve days after the Speedy Trial Act went into effect. Since the State brought appellant to trial within 24 days, she was not denied her statutory right to a speedy trial.

Ground of error number two is overruled.

Appellant next asserts that the prosecutor made an improper jury argument. She says the prosecutor attempted to inject a fact not in evidence. During the State's closing argument at the guilt stage of the trial, the prosecutor made the following comment:

"Where are the owners? The owner is in New York, Ladies and Gentlemen."

Appellant objected. The trial court sustained the objection and an instruction to disregard was given. Appellant's motion for mistrial was overruled.

An argument will not constitute reversible error unless, in light of the record as a whole, the argument is extreme or manifestly improper, violative of a mandatory statute or injects new facts, harmful to the accused into the trial proceedings. Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Simpkins v. State, 590 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Kerns v. State, 550 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Certainly the State's informing the jury that the owner of the Trail Drive-In was in New York injected new facts into the trial. While such a statement may constitute error, we cannot say, however, that such error was harmful to appellant. Our reading of the record as a whole reveals that appellant sold admission tickets to Deputy Sheriff D. J. Moulder on both the evening of December 5 and December 6, 1977. In light of appellant having been charged with aiding the commercial exhibition of obscenity under Article 43.23, supra, we do not perceive the prosecutor's argument to have been extreme or manifestly improper. See Little v. State, 567 S.W.2d 502 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Taylor v. State, 550 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). See also Todd v. State, supra; Hardeman v. State, 552 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Mims v. State, 466 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Hoover v. State, 449 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). Cf. Stearn v. State, 487 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). The sustaining of appellant's objection followed by an instruction to the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comment sufficiently cured the latter error.

Ground of error number three is overruled.

In ground of error number four appellant contends that the prosecutor made an improper jury argument during the punishment phase of the trial. During the State's argument to the jury in the punishment phase of the trial the prosecutor stated:

"I am asking you to enforce it. I'm asking you to...