Sperry Corp. v. Patterson, 8410SC461
Decision Date | 19 February 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 8410SC461,8410SC461 |
Citation | 73 N.C.App. 123,325 S.E.2d 642 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 1985-1 Trade Cases P 66,577 SPERRY CORPORATION v. Jane PATTERSON and Glenn Jernigan. |
Morgan, Bryan, Jones & Johnson by Robert B. Morgan, James M. Johnson and John M. Phelps, II, Lillington, for plaintiff-appellant and appellee.
Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Sp. Deputy Attys. Gen. H. Al Cole, Jr., and T. Buie Costen, Asst. Attys. Gen. Fred R. Gamin and R. Andy Giles, Jr., and Associate Atty. Gen. Victor H.E. Morgan, Jr., Raleigh, for defendant-appellant and appellee Jane Patterson.
Chief Counsel T.S. Whitaker and Staff Atty. Donald R. Teeter, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant and appellee Glenn Jernigan.
At the outset we note that the judgment of the Superior Court did not dispose of all claims and is interlocutory. In our discretion we shall dispose of the appeal.
The complaint alleges violations of G.S. 143-52 by defendant Patterson; it fails to allege any actions by defendant Jernigan that could possibly be a violation of that statute or otherwise give rise to a cause of action against him. Thus the case must be remanded for dismissal of all claims against defendant Jernigan pursuant to his G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in dismissing its claim under G.S. 75-1.1 for lack of jurisdiction. Although plaintiff argues that sovereign immunity should not bar its G.S. 75-1.1 claim, we perceive another basis for affirming the trial court's dismissal of this claim. The consumer protection and antitrust laws of Chapter 75 of the General Statutes do not create a cause of action against the State, regardless of whether sovereign immunity may exist. G.S. 75-16 authorizes a civil action by a person or business who has been injured in violation of Chapter 75 against the "person, firm, or corporation" causing the injury. The State of North Carolina is not a "person, firm, or corporation" within the meaning of G.S. 75-16, so plaintiff has not stated a claim against the State for which relief can be granted. "When the defendants act in their official capacity, it is the State acting." Microfilm Corp. v. Turner, 7 N.C.App. 258, 263, 172 S.E.2d 259, 263, cert. denied, 276 N.C. 497 (1970). Thus, the G.S. 75-1.1 claim against defendants in their official capacity must be dismissed pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6).
Nor does a G.S. 75-1.1 claim lie against defendant Patterson in her individual capacity. Whether or not defendant Patterson exceeded her statutory authority, she acted as a representative of the State when dealing with plaintiff. The subject of this action relates to her acts in awarding State contracts. Plaintiff has alleged the violation of statutory duties by defendant Patterson, but it has not alleged any fraudulent, corrupt, or otherwise tortious conduct on her part. In this context plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6). The whole thrust of G.S. 75-1.1 as applied by North Carolina courts has been to afford protection from unethical acts by businesses or business persons, not to allow claims against state employees purchasing or leasing equipment for the State.
In an area of law such as this, we would be remiss if we failed to consider also the overall purpose for which this statute was enacted. The commentators agree that state statutes such as ours were enacted to supplement federal legislation, so that local business interests could not proceed with impunity, secure in the knowledge that the dimensions of their transgression would not merit federal action.
Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 549, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981) (emphasis added).
Defendants argue that the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers is the source of a...
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