Sperry-New Holland, a Div. of Sperry Corp. v. Prestage

• Decision Date: 25 March 1993
• Docket Number: SPERRY-NEW,No. 90-CA-0657,90-CA-0657
• Citation: 617 So.2d 248
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,437 HOLLAND, A DIVISION OF SPERRY CORPORATION v. John Paul PRESTAGE and Pam Prestage.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 248

617 So.2d 248

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,437

SPERRY-NEW HOLLAND, A DIVISION OF SPERRY CORPORATION v. John Paul PRESTAGE and Pam Prestage.

No. 90-CA-0657.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 25, 1993.

Michael W. Ulmer, Watkins & Eager, Jackson, for defendant-appellant.

William B. Raiford, III, John H. Cocke, Charles M. Merkel, Jr., Merkel & Cocke, Clarksdale, Wayne E. Ferrell, Jr., Dale Hubbard, Ferrell & Hubbard, Jackson, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and PITTMAN, J.

PRATHER, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

I. INTRODUCTION

In this case, plaintiffs-appellees, John Paul Prestage and his wife, Pam Prestage [hereinafter Prestage], sought damages arising out of the loss of John Prestage's foot and lower leg when it was caught in a combine manufactured by the defendant-appellant, Sperry-New Holland [hereinafter Sperry].

In this products liability and negligence suit, Prestage proceeded on two theories of liability, (1) strict liability in tort and (2) negligent design. Pam Prestage also sued for loss of consortium. The jury found for Prestage under both theories of recovery and awarded John $1,425,000 and Pam $218,750. The jury also found John 35 percent comparatively negligent. From this award and finding Sperry asserts the following errors:

(1) The court erred in applying a "risk-utility" analysis instead of a "consumer expectations" analysis.

(2) The court erred in refusing Sperry's "Failure to Warn" instruction, D-20.

(3) The court erred in not granting a mistrial after Prestage attempted to admit certain John Deere safety committee minutes even though the court held them inadmissible.

(4) The court erred in refusing to let Sperry impeach Edgar "Red" Prestage, Sr. with a prior inconsistent statement.

(5) The court erred in precluding evidence that Prestage had settled with his father, Edgar "Red" Prestage, Sr.

(6) The court erred in precluding opinion evidence of experts Nooyen and Poindexter that Prestage was down in the grain tank prior to the accident.

(7) The court erred in not granting Sperry's motion for directed verdict because the combine was not in substantially the same condition on the date of the accident as it was when it left Sperry's possession.

(8) The court erred in excluding evidence as to the overall condition of the combine.

(9) The court erred in giving plaintiffs' special interrogatories.

(10) The jury verdict was excessive and this Court should enter a remittitur or remand for a new trial on damages.

II. FACTS

On June 28, 1985, John Paul "Butch" Prestage lost his lower leg in a combine manufactured by Sperry-New Holland. At the time of the accident, Prestage worked for his father, Edgar "Red" Prestage, Sr. [hereinafter Red]. Red farmed land owned by his sister and employed Prestage to, among other things, operate a used Model 985 combine manufactured by Sperry-New Holland in 1969. Red purchased the combine from Greenwood Ford Tractor Sales, Inc. in 1978.

Prestage testified that he operated the combine more than anyone else in his family and used the combine on the day of the accident to harvest wheat. Under normal operation of the combine, after wheat is collected, a threshing mechanism is engaged to separate the wheat heads from the straw. After the threshing of the wheat takes place, the wheat heads are dumped into a grain tank which empties into a truck. At the bottom of the grain tank, a discharge auger churns to facilitate the wheat's movement. This discharge auger looks similar to a horizontal screw which, when turning, moves the wheat from one end of the tank to the other. There is a V-shaped guard covering this spinning auger which can be adjusted to compensate for different types of grains. Wheat is not a very fluid grain, especially when damp, and requires as much space as possible to flow properly. As designed, the maximum distance the auger guard could separate from the tank bottom is 4 inches and the minimum space is 2 inches.

In addition to the discharge auger in the tank bottom, a leveling auger spins at the top and dispenses the grain throughout the tank. This auger has a guard over the top of it and needs to be operated only while the combine is harvesting wheat. It does not need to be operated when the wheat is simply being threshed.

Prestage testified that on the day of the accident he had finished harvesting wheat and had begun threshing it. He left the leveling auger on, however, as was the custom on the farm, to check for loose belts, ball bearings, etc. which might need to be replaced. As Prestage walked to the back of the combine, he noticed that the grain tank had clogged. To unclog the tank, Prestage climbed a ladder on the back of the combine to a flat section of the machine which overlooked the grain tank. The wheat heads and straw had clogged in the discharge auger, and Prestage, as was the custom on the farm, looked for a long stick he kept to free the debris. Usually, Prestage would be in the cab when the discharge auger jammed and he would only need to step out of the cab, grab the stick in front of him and jab the debris until it came free. Because Prestage had been checking the rear of the machine for repairs and climbed up the back of the combine, however, he had to lean across the tank and rest on the leveling auger guard to reach his stick. Prestage testified that he was wearing an untucked pullover jersey which became tangled on a bolt on the leveling auger. The auger wound his shirt up and pulled him into the tank. He hypothesized that the shirt tightened around his neck because he passed out upon entering the tank and awoke to find his foot and leg under the guard and mangled by the discharge auger. After a few minutes, Prestage freed himself and got to the combine cab. From there, he drove to his truck, changed vehicles, drove to his parents' home nearby and was immediately taken to the hospital by his mother. Prestage's left leg needed amputation below the knee.

Prestage sued his father and his father's liability insurer, Greenwood Ford Tractor Sales, Inc. and Sperry. Greenwood never answered the complaint and a default judgment was entered against it. Before the jury was impaneled for the trial involving the two other defendants, Prestage settled with his father and his father's liability insurer. The case proceeded to trial against Sperry, and the jury found for Prestage.

III. ISSUES

Sperry raises several issues involving the denial of a directed verdict, refusal and acceptance of certain jury instructions, the use of prior inconsistent statements, the denial of certain expert testimony and the use by Prestage of an improper theory of recovery.

Issue A: The court erred in applying a "risk-utility" analysis instead of a "consumer expectations" analysis.

1.

The trial court denied Sperry's motion for summary judgment; denied its motion for directed verdict; denied its request for peremptory instruction; and denied its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict [J.N.O.V.]. Sperry argues that the court operated under an erroneous understanding of Mississippi products liability law in denying its requests.

2.

Miss.R.Civ.P. 56 provides that summary judgment may be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. McDonald v. Holmes, 595 So.2d 434, 437 (Miss.1992). In Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358 (Miss.1983), which first interpreted Rule 56, this Court stated:

The trial court must review carefully all of the evidentiary matters before it--admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. If in this view the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor. Otherwise the motion should be denied.

Id. at 362. See also Pace v. Financial Security Life of Miss., 608 So.2d 1135, 1138 (Miss.1992); Lovett v. Anderson, 573 So.2d 758, 760 (Miss.1990); Pearl River Cty. Bd. v. South East Collections, 459 So.2d 783, 784-785 (Miss.1984); Pittman v. Home Indem. Co., 411 So.2d 87, 89 (Miss.1982) (citing Paymaster Oil Miss Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So.2d 652 (Miss.1975)).

This Court's standards of review regarding a denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a peremptory instruction are the same. Munford, Inc. v. Fleming, 597 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Miss.1992); Motorola Com. & Electronics v. Wilkerson, 555 So.2d 713, 723 (Miss.1989); Mississippi Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Todd, 492 So.2d 919, 927 (Miss.1986) (citing Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So.2d 652, 656 (Miss.1975)). Our standards of review for a denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a directed verdict are also identical. Munford, 597 So.2d at 1284 (citing Litton Systems, Inc. v. Enochs, 449 So.2d 1213 (Miss.1984)). Under this standard, this Court will:

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inference that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. If the facts so considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant that reasonable men could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, [we are] required to reverse and render. On the other hand if there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, affirmance is required.

Munford, 597 So.2d at 1284 (citing Litton Systems, Inc., 449 So.2d at 1214.)

The above standards of review, however, are predicated on the fact that the trial judge applied the correct law. Under the standard of review applicable to discretionary matters, this Court first asks if the court below applied the correct legal standard. See Detroit Marine Engineering v....