Cooper v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 92-CA-01334-SCT,92-CA-01334-SCT
• Citation: 702 So.2d 428
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,140 Wallace B. COOPER, Vivion A. Cooper and Buddy Ray Cooper v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Louisa Dixon, as Commissioner Of Public Safety, and Estate of William H. White (Deceased).
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 428

702 So.2d 428

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,140

Wallace B. COOPER, Vivion A. Cooper and Buddy Ray Cooper v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Louisa Dixon, as Commissioner Of Public Safety, and Estate of William H. White (Deceased).

No. 92-CA-01334-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Dec. 8, 1997.

William P. Featherston, Jr., Ridgeland, Richard D. Stratton, James R. Pratt, III, Hogan Smith & Alspaugh, Birmingham, AL, for Appellants.

Charles Gregory Copeland, Copeland Cook Taylor & Bush, Jackson, Keith D. Obert, Akers & Overt, Brandon, Eugene D. Martenson, Christopher S. Rodgers, Huie Fernambacq & Stewart, Birmingham, David M. Heilbron, San Francisco, CA, for Appellees.

John L. Walker, Jr., Walker Walker & Green, Jackson, C. Victor Welsh, III, Crymes G. Pittman, Pittman Germany Roberts & Welsh, Jackson, Jay Boling, Merdian, William Liston, Winona, Roland C. Lewis, Jackson, Michael T. Jaques, Langston Frazer Sweet & Freese, Jackson, Paul S. Minor, Mark D. Lampkin, Minor & Guice, Biloxi, for amicus curiae.

En Banc.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

SMITH, Justice, for the Court:

¶1 Motion for rehearing denied. The original opinions are withdrawn and these opinions are substituted therefor.

PREAMBLE

¶2 We recognize a person's right to maintain a common law tort action against automobile manufacturers. The manufacturer's compliance with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards Act does not immunize the manufacturer from State tort liability. We accept the disclaimer within the statute that "[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this title does not exempt any person from any liability under common law." 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k)(1988). ¹ It is not necessary today to find common law liability. However, in so far as state common law torts are reserved by the Federal statute or preserved thereby, we claim them for State jurisdiction.

INTRODUCTION

¶3 This case comes to this Court from the Circuit Court of Madison County which granted General Motors Corporation's (hereinafter General Motors) motion for partial summary judgment. The Cooper family brought a wrongful death action against General Motors for failure to install an air bag in the 1984 Buick driven by their now deceased son. General Motors filed a motion for summary judgment on the air bag claim (1) as being preempted by federal law, and (2) for failing to state a cognizable claim under Mississippi common law. General Motors contended that the federal motor vehicle

standards gave automobile manufacturers the option of installing air bags or manual seat belts. The lower court granted the summary judgment motion on both counts. After a careful and exhausting review of the voluminous case law on air bag claims, we find that the air bag claim is preempted by federal law, and that it also fails to state a cognizable claim under Mississippi law. As such, the award of partial summary judgment to General Motors was proper.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶4 The facts are undisputed. Joseph T. Cooper was killed on November 23, 1990, on Interstate Highway 55 South, near Canton, Mississippi. Cooper's 1984 Buick Regal was struck "head-on" by a 1977 model Pontiac operated by William H. White, who was driving his vehicle the wrong way on the interstate. The Buick was equipped with a standard three-point lap/shoulder belt manual seat belt. The seat belt was not deficient and fully met its performance requirements. Cooper was not wearing the available manual seat belt in the vehicle at the time of the accident. Cooper died from massive trauma to the head and chest suffered during the collision.

¶5 On November 13, 1991, the Cooper family brought a strict liability and negligence action against defendant General Motors in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Mississippi, to recover damages for the death of Cooper. In their complaint, they allege that General Motors did not make the occupant restraint system utilized in the 1984 Buick Regal to meet the common law standards for crashworthiness. They allege that General Motors should have utilized a driver-side air bag so as to be more adequate in frontal collisions.

¶6 General Motors filed an answer on December 13, 1991, and later, filed a motion for partial summary judgment directed only to the claim that the Regal was defective because it lacked an air bag. General Motors claimed that the plaintiffs' inadequate restraint system claim was expressly and impliedly preempted by federal law, and that even if the claims were not preempted, the plaintiffs' allegation that the vehicle was defective because it contained a defective restraint system failed to state claims under Mississippi law for negligence and strict liability.

¶7 On September 18, 1992, the lower court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. The lower court applied the consumer expectation test and found that plaintiffs had failed to state claims against General Motors for negligence and strict liability with regard to General Motors' installation of a defective restraint system in the vehicle. The trier found that the failure to install an air bag in a 1984 car was not, as a matter of law, the basis of a claim under the theories of negligence and strict liability. The lower court found that the lap belt/shoulder harness, if utilized properly, provided protection in frontal collisions, and met the expectations of an ordinary consumer, especially in light of the fact that air bags were virtually nonexistent in 1984. The lower court further found that, even assuming the plaintiffs had stated a claim under Mississippi law, federal law preempted that claim. A Motion to Reconsider was filed by the plaintiffs, and denied by the lower court on November 30, 1992. Aggrieved, the Coopers appeal, citing the following two issues:

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THEAIR BAG CLAIM IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW?

II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STRICT LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS ARE NOTCOGNIZABLE UNDER MISSISSIPPI COMMON LAW?

DISCUSSION OF LAW

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE AIR BAG CLAIM IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW?

A. The Pertinent Statutes

¶8 Four provisions of the Safety Act are pertinent to our inquiry. We set them out in detail before proceeding to a more in-depth discussion of the issues.

¶9 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 expressly grants manufacturers the option to install manual seat belts in lieu of air bags. Three options are provided for manufacturers:

1. Passive protection from frontal and angular collisions (air bags only);

2. Passive protection from head-on collisions, supplemented by seat belts and a belt warning system (air bags and seat belts); or

3. Lap and shoulder belts, plus a belt warning system.

49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S4.2.2 (1983). Here, General Motors exercised the third choice. The Safety Act contains a preemption clause, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d)(1988) ², which provides:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this title is in effect,no State orpolitical subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing any State from enforcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of performance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal standard.

(emphasis added).

The Safety Act also contains a savings clause, which states that:

[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this title does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.

15 U.S.C. § 1397(k)(1988).

Also, part of the federal regulatory framework is § 1410b which provides:

(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3), no Federal motor vehicle safety standard respecting occupant restraint systems may -

(A) have the effect of requiring, or

(B) provide that a manufacturer is permitted to comply with such standard by means of, an occupant restraint system other than a belt system.

(3)(A) Paragraph (2) shall not apply to a Federal motor vehicle safety standard which provides that a manufacturer is permitted to comply with such standard by equipping motor vehicles manufactured by him with either--

(i) a belt system, or

(ii) any other occupant restraint system specified in such standard.

15 U.S.C. § 1410b(b)(2)-(3)(A)(1988). ³

B. History of the Safety Act

¶10 The purpose of the Safety Act is:

"to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents." 15 U.S.C. § 1381. The Act requires the Secretary of Transportation to establish "appropriate Federal motor vehicle safety standards." § 1392(a). The Act defines a safety standard as "a minimum standard for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment performance, which is practicable, which meets the need for motor vehicle safety and which provides objective criteria." § 1391(2).

Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 283-84, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 1485-86, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995). Other courts agree. See Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1122 (3rd Cir, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853, 111 S.Ct. 147, 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990). "Through the Safety Act, Congress sought to increase automotive safety by authorizing the promulgation of safety standards.... The responsibility for promulgating these standards was given first to the Department of Transportation and later...