Speten v. State

Decision Date09 June 2008
Docket NumberNo. S-07-0253.,S-07-0253.
Citation2008 WY 63,185 P.3d 25
PartiesSherri R. SPETEN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Representing Appellant: John Craig Abraham of Plains Law Offices, LLP, Gillette, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Teresa R. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Nelson.

Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] This is an appeal from the district court's denial of a motion to suppress as evidence methamphetamine discovered during a warrantless search of the appellant's purse. The appellant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007), reserving her right to appeal that denial. See W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2). We conclude that the search of the appellant's purse violated neither the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. Therefore, we affirm.

ISSUE

[¶ 2] Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to suppress?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 3] A succinct statement of our standard for reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is found in Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 10, 169 P.3d 538, 542 (Wyo.2007) (quoting O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo.2005)):

Factual findings made by a trial court considering a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2002). Because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence, assess witness credibility, and draw the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination. Id. Whether an unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480 (Wyo.1999).

[¶ 4] The issue of the constitutionality of a search often focuses upon the question of whether or not the officer had probable cause to search, or the question of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative detention. These questions are resolved by resort to an objective test, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, rather than by analyzing the subjective thought process of the officer. Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 25, 146 P.3d 492, 500 (Wyo.2006) (probable cause); Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 17, 65 P.3d 33, 37 (Wyo.2003) (investigative detention).1 Probable cause to search exists "where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found[.]" Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 17, 64 P.3d 700, 707 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). By contrast, reasonable suspicion is simply "`a particularized and objective basis' for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). Finally, while the test is objective, the officer's training, experience, and expertise are to be considered as part of the "totality of the circumstances." McKenney v. State, 2007 WY 129, ¶ 11, 165 P.3d 96, 98-99 (Wyo.2007); Rohda v. State, 2006 WY 120, ¶ 24, 142 P.3d 1155, 1167 (Wyo.2006); Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 18 n. 7, 99 P.3d 987, 994 n. 7 (Wyo.2004).

FACTS

[¶ 5] The motion to suppress was heard on May 4, 2007. The only person to testify was Sheriff's Deputy Tony Seeman, a fourteen-year veteran of the Campbell County Sheriff's Office, with over four years served as a plain-clothed narcotics officer. Before we discuss the district court's findings of fact, we will summarize the key facts of this case, drawn from Deputy Seeman's testimony.

[¶ 6] During the evening of September 23, 2006, Deputy Seeman received a telephone call from his partner, asking him to go to the sheriff's department to assist with the execution of an arrest warrant and a search warrant. Upon arrival at the department, Deputy Seeman learned that the warrants were being requested because a woman who we will identify as J.K. had been hospitalized after receiving an injection of methamphetamine from Dickie Fay Sandy. Deputy Seeman was familiar with both J.K. and Sandy, having previously learned from J.K. that Sandy distributed methamphetamine from his automotive shop, where he sometimes hid drugs in engine blocks. Deputy Seeman further learned from other deputies that the current situation had arisen when J.K. became seriously ill after receiving the methamphetamine injection from Sandy, was later found unconscious at her residence, and had been taken by city police officers to the hospital.

[¶ 7] Deputy Seeman was ordered to go to the location of Sandy's shop for surveillance purposes until the warrants could be obtained. Upon arrival at the shop, Deputy Seeman observed a vehicle he knew to be driven by Sandy, and he saw that the shop lights were lit. When Deputy Seeman notified the other officers that he believed Sandy was present, he was told to maintain surveillance pending completion of the warrants, but to effectuate a "probable cause arrest" if Sandy began to leave.

[¶ 8] Deputy Seeman began surveillance at about 8:50 p.m. Nothing occurred until about 9:22 p.m., when a man and a woman left the shop and walked toward Sandy's vehicle. Deputy Seeman watched the man appear to wipe off the vehicle's tires, while the woman paced back and forth.2 Deputy Seeman recognized the man as Sandy, but did not recognize the woman. As Sandy walked around his vehicle, he came to a spot where he had a direct view of where Deputy Seeman was sitting. Fearful that Sandy would see him and would attempt to leave or go back into the building, Deputy Seeman called a nearby backup officer, and the two of them proceeded to arrest Sandy.

[¶ 9] The two deputies rapidly approached Sandy and the woman and, at gunpoint, ordered Sandy to the ground, at the same time ordering the woman to put her hands in the air and not to move. Deputy Seeman testified that it is standard operating procedure to make felony drug arrests at gunpoint because it is common for drug dealers to carry weapons. After Sandy was handcuffed and placed in the backup officer's patrol car for transport to the detention center, Deputy Seeman returned to where the woman was standing and began to question her as to her reason for being there. The woman, later to become the appellant herein, identified herself by name, but indicated that she did not know where her "I.D." was.3 This caused Deputy Seeman some concern because he did not know exactly with whom he was dealing. In response to the deputy's question as to her purpose there, the appellant said that she had just arrived and that she was looking for a vehicle to buy. Deputy Seeman then noted that the appellant's vehicle, which he had not noticed earlier, was not parked in front of the shop, but was parked in a line of cars that "appeared to either be abandoned or for sale or just kind of parked off to the side."

[¶ 10] Deputy Seeman told the appellant that he had been there for some time, that he knew she had not just arrived, and that he had not seen her look at any of the vehicles. He then suggested to her that most women carry their I.D. in their purse, and asked her if she would like to look in her purse for her I.D.4 The appellant declined to look in her purse, but suggested that the backup officer could search her vehicle to see if her I.D. was there.

[¶ 11] Deputy Seeman continued to question the appellant, during which time she appeared nervous and fidgety, was pacing, and was "quite animated and upset that the police had come to make this arrest on Mr. Sandy ..." Deputy Seeman concluded that her actions resembled those of someone "who could possibly be under the influence of methamphetamine." When asked about methamphetamine use, the appellant admitted that she used it occasionally, and that she had smoked methamphetamine the previous day.

[¶ 12] During this interview, Deputy Seeman received a telephone call from Chris McDonald, an agent with the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation. McDonald told Seeman that the appellant was a known methamphetamine dealer, according to several "street level targets" who had named her as their source. By that juncture, Deputy Seeman's "overall sense of what's going on" was that the appellant was at the shop to get methamphetamine from Sandy and that she probably had already done so.

[¶ 13] What happened next is the focus of this appeal, and it is best described by Deputy Seeman's testimony:

Q What happened then?

A Detective Brent Wasson arrived on the scene. The search warrants and arrest warrants had just been in transit to the County Attorney's Office, to the — to the Judge's house, I believe. They were just being finalized, at least they were almost completed. Miss Speten stated that she wanted to leave, and before she left I took her purse, placed it on the back of my car and opened it to give it back to her, or to make sure that it was safe; that it was still in the immediate area. When I opened the purse, I immediately saw a glass methamphetamine pipe on top.

....

Q What were your concerns and reasons for opening the purse?

A My concern was that I still had not properly identified Miss Speten, that she could have some type of weapon in the purse and still in the immediate area; that there was possibly narcotics that I believed could be dangerous narcotics that...

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