Spicer v. Spicer, ED 106563

• Decision Date: 29 January 2019
• Docket Number: No. ED 106563,ED 106563
• Parties: Gwen M. SPICER, Respondent, v. Steven G. SPICER, and Debra S. Pauli, Appellants, and John Doe, and Jane Doe, Defendants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

568 S.W.3d 480

Gwen M. SPICER, Respondent,

v.Steven G. SPICER, and Debra S. Pauli, Appellants,andJohn Doe, and Jane Doe, Defendants.

No. ED 106563

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION FOUR.

FILED: January 29, 2019

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied March 4, 2019

Gregory G. Fenlon, 601 S. Lindbergh, St. Louis, MO 63131, for appellant.

Ron Ribaudo, 361 Quail View Drive, Ballwin, MO 63021, for respondent.

KURT S. ODENWALD, Presiding Judge

Introduction

Steven G. Spicer ("Spicer") and Debra S. Pauli ("Pauli") appeal from the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Gwen M. Spicer ("Wife") on Wife’s quiet-title action. Spicer and Pauli (collectively, "Appellants") raise four points on appeal.¹ In Point One, Appellants contend that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Wife because the compulsory counterclaim rule bars Wife’s petition. Because Wife’s claim against Appellants was not ascertainable until the judgment granting Wife quiet title was voided, we deny Point One. In Points Two through Four, Appellants argue that the circuit court erred in entering summary judgment because the circuit court failed to consider the defenses of equitable contribution (Point Two), unjust enrichment (Point Three), and promissory estoppel (Point Four). Because Appellants lack standing to assert equitable-contribution and unjust-enrichment claims on behalf of the decedent, Donald N. Spicer ("Husband"), we deny Points Two and Three. Because the summary-judgment record lacks evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact that Appellants detrimentally relied on Wife’s promise to Husband, we deny Point Four. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

Factual History

No party disputes the following facts:

Wife married Husband and became Husband’s second wife. Husband had three children from his first marriage, two of whom were Spicer and Pauli. During their marriage, Wife and Husband purchased a property at 5367 Southview Hills (the "Property") by General Warranty Deed. The General Warranty Deed identified the grantees as "Donald N. Spicer and Gwen M. Spicer, his wife."

Wife and Husband began having marital difficulties. Wife moved out of the Property. After moving out, Wife did not pay the mortgage, taxes, insurance, or any upkeep for the Property. As a result of the strife between Wife and Husband, Husband created a living trust (the "Trust") naming Appellants as beneficiaries.

In 2007, Husband executed a deed (the "2007 Warranty Deed") to convey his interest in the Property to the Trust, naming himself as the grantor and the Trust as the grantee. Husband named Spicer as successor Trustee to the Trust. Husband did not name Wife in the 2007 Warranty Deed, nor did Wife sign the 2007 Warranty Deed. Husband recorded the 2007 Warranty Deed, and died shortly thereafter. At the time of Husband’s death, Husband and Wife were still married. Wife received $1700 in monthly pension benefits upon Husband’s death.

Procedural History

The parties involved have compiled over a decade of contentious litigation history. Because the full procedural history of this case has been detailed in previous litigation, we summarize only the relevant portions of that background here.

I. Spicer I

Wife filed a quiet-title action ("Spicer I") to claim ownership of the Property following Husband’s death. Wife asserted that the Property was a tenancy by the entirety and when Husband died, by operation of law, she remained the sole owner of the Property. Further, Wife argued that the 2007 Warranty Deed was a nullity because she did not join or sign the deed. Wife named only the Trust as the defendant in Spicer I. Wife obtained summary judgment on her quiet-title action: the circuit court declared Wife the fee simple owner of the Property and declared the 2007 Warranty Deed a nullity (the "2008 Judgment").

Appellants subsequently moved to intervene asking the circuit court to set aside the 2008 Judgment. Appellants averred that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to provide the relief sought by Wife in her petition because Trustee and the Trust beneficiaries were indispensable parties to Wife’s claim. The Spicer I circuit court granted the intervention and withdrew its order granting Wife summary judgment on her claim.

Wife appealed from the circuit court’s judgment setting aside the 2008 Judgment. For a full procedural history up to the Spicer I appeal, see Spicer v. Donald N. Spicer Revocable Living Tr., Nos. ED93371, ED93529, 2010 WL 2378000, at *1-2 (Mo. App. E.D. June 15, 2010). On appeal, the Trust argued that Husband unilaterally terminated the parties' joint tenancy in the Property by obtaining a mortgage without Wife’s consent and by conveying Husband's interest by the 2007 Warranty Deed to the Trust. Id. at * 1. The Trust further argued, through Spicer as Trustee, that the Trust was not a legal entity and that Trustee was the legal owner of the Property. Id. at *4. Spicer contended that Trustee and the Trust beneficiaries were necessary parties to any lawsuit involving trust property, and thus the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the case, and was without authority to enter the 2008 Judgment. Id.

This Court held that the only valid final judgment in Spicer I was the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment in Wife’s favor. Id. at *3. We further held that the 2008 Judgment bound the Trust beneficiaries. Id. at *4. Specifically, we concluded that the circuit court lost jurisdiction thirty days after entering the 2008 Judgment, thus the subsequent order of the circuit court to set aside its summary judgment was invalid. Id. at *3. We recognized that although Trustee was the proper party to the suit, the Trust failed to argue before the circuit court that it lacked the legal capacity to be sued, and therefore waived any objection to proceeding with the litigation. Id. at *4. Equally as important to the current appeal, we held that all interests related to the Trust were represented in the litigation because Trustee and the Trust beneficiaries were represented by the Trust through the doctrine of virtual representation. Id. We transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri. Spicer v. Donald N. Spicer Revocable Living Tr., 336 S.W.3d 466 (Mo. banc 2011).

The Supreme Court held that the initial grant of summary judgment to Wife was final and the circuit court lost jurisdiction over the matter prior to Trustee’s attempted post-judgment intervention. Id. at 469-70. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that all actions occurring after the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 470. The Supreme Court did not address the issue of virtual representation and whether the Trust beneficiaries were bound by the summary judgment. Id. at 472 n.8. Instead, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as untimely because Wife filed the notice of appeal more than one year after the 2008 Judgment became final. Id. at 472.² At this point, the 2008 Judgment was valid and final and Wife held fee simple title to the Property.

II. Spicer II

Appellants, as Trustee and beneficiaries of the Trust, sued Wife seeking to void the 2008 Judgment ("Spicer II"). Wife did not file any counterclaims in Spencer II. Instead, Wife defended against Appellants' claim and pled multiple affirmative defenses to Appellants' petition. Among the affirmative defenses, Wife contended that "[a]s the Eastern District previously held, both [ ] [T]rustee and the Trust beneficiaries were virtually represented by the Trust, and hence are barred by the 2008 [J]udgment" from raising their claim. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Wife. Wife held fee simple ownership of the Property.

Spicer and Pauli appealed, arguing that they were necessary and indispensable parties to Wife’s quiet-title action, and thus the 2008 Judgment was void because Appellants were neither served nor identified in Wife’s Spicer I petition. On appeal, we reversed our prior holding in Spicer I and voided the 2008 Judgment, finding that Appellants were necessary and indispensable parties to the prior litigation. Pauli v. Spicer, 445 S.W.3d 667, 677, 678 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). However, we noted that Wife "has an adequate remedy at law, which is to initiate another quiet[-]title suit naming the correct parties as defendants." Id. at 676. At this time, we voided Wife’s ownership of the Property and the case was treated as if Wife never filed her quiet-title action in Spicer I.

III. Spicer III

Following the conclusion of Spicer II Wife filed the current action to quiet title ("Spicer III"). Wife, in her sole contention, sought the same quiet-title relief as in Spicer I, but in this action Wife named Spicer and Pauli as defendants. Appellants filed a series of motions to dismiss, raising multiple defenses. Specifically, Appellants maintained that the compulsory counterclaim rule barred Wife from bringing Spicer III because Wife was required to assert her claim to quiet title against Appellants in Spicer II. Appellants also raised affirmative defenses of equitable contribution, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel.

The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Wife, holding that "[b]ecause this is a straightforward case of a surviving spouse's right of title to property acquired in a tenancy by the entirety, the [circuit c]ourt enters judgment in favor of Plaintiff, [Wife] Spicer." The circuit court further denied Appellants' equitable-contribution and unjust-enrichment counterclaims because, as individuals who never had an interest in the Property, Appellants were not entitled to a money judgment based on a claim that Wife failed to contribute to the Property. The circuit court also rejected Appellants' promissory-estoppel claim because the summary-judgment record lacked a written promise involving real estate, Appellants did not allege detrimental reliance on the oral promise, and Wife made no...