Spielberg v. Board of Regents, Univ. of Mich.
Decision Date | 05 February 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 84-CV-7190-AA.,84-CV-7190-AA. |
Citation | 601 F. Supp. 994 |
Parties | Anne SPIELBERG, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF REGENTS, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Anne Spielberg, in pro per.
Peter A. Davis, Davis & Fajen, P.C., Ann Arbor, Mich., for defendants.
Plaintiff, Anne Spielberg, brings her suit citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan and alleges that her constitutional rights were violated when the University failed to reclassify her as an in-state student for purposes of tuition assessment. Defendant moved to dismiss, or alternatively, for summary judgment. Several hearings, including an evidentiary hearing, were held on this matter. For reasons discussed herein, defendant's motion for summary judgment, is granted.
Plaintiff moved to Ann Arbor, Michigan, on August 25, 1982, in order to attend the University of Michigan Law School. Plaintiff had never before lived in Michigan, and was admitted as an out-of-state student. On September 16, 1983, plaintiff filed an Application for Resident Classification for University Purposes in order to pay tuition at the reduced resident rate. Plaintiff's application for reclassification reveals the following facts: Plaintiff had continuously resided in Michigan for slightly more than one year when she applied for reclassification. Prior to her move to Ann Arbor, plaintiff lived in Washington, D.C. for nearly one year, and spent the three years before that, exclusive of summers, attending college in Oberlin, Ohio. Plaintiff's summers during college, her first year of college, and her high school years were spent in Atlanta, Georgia. Plaintiff was supported entirely by her father, a Georgia resident, during the years 1979-1981. During 1981-1982, plaintiff was self-supporting. In 1982-1983, plaintiff provided approximately 70% of her financial support, the balance coming from her father. Plaintiff's application for reclassification included a one-half page, hand-written statement indicating that she "came to Michigan with the intent of establishing her home and believes that she will continue to live, go to school and work in Michigan for the foreseeable future."
By letter dated November 9, 1983, Larry Katz, Assistant Registrar for the University of Michigan, denied plaintiff's application for reclassification. The substantive portion of this letter states:
The letter also described the appeals procedure available to plaintiff, which she pursued. Again, by letter dated December 21, 1983, the Residency Appeals Committee denied plaintiff's appeal stating that "it is the judgment of the Residency Appeal Committee that you have not demonstrated by sufficient evidence that you are entitled to resident reclassification under the University's residency regulations; therefore, it denies your appeal." Both letters indicated that plaintiff was eligible to apply for reclassification for any subsequent term, although plaintiff apparently declined to do so.
Plaintiff argues that defendant, while acting under color of state law,1 violated her rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Her argument has three parts: First, plaintiff contends that she has a constitutional right to a statement of the reasons why the University denied her application for reclassification, and that the conclusory form letters she received from the Assistant Registrar and the Appeals Committee do not satisfy this requirement. Second, plaintiff argues that she was denied substantive due process because the decision to deny her application was arbitrary and capricious. Finally, plaintiff argues her application was treated differently than other students' applications in violation of the equal protection clause. I will address each argument in turn.
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Plaintiff clearly alleges a property interest in her tuition rates, thus triggering the procedural protection of the due process clause. However, "once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). While due process is a flexible concept and the process which is due will vary with the facts of each case, the Supreme Court has articulated guidelines for analyzing due process questions:
Our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). See also Frumkin v. Board of Trustees, 626 F.2d 19, 21 (6th Cir.1980); Jaksa v. The Regents of the University of Michigan, 597 F.Supp. 1245, 1248 (E.D.Mich.1984). At least three courts have undertaken this analysis and concluded that a university has no constitutional obligation to provide a detailed statement of reasons for denial of residency status. Lister v. Hoover, 706 F.2d 796 (7th Cir.1983); Black v. Sullivan, 561 F.Supp. 1050 (D. Maine 1983); Michelson v. Cox, 476 F.Supp. 1315 (S.D.Iowa 1979). I similarly conclude that the University did not violate the due process clause when it failed to provide plaintiff with a detailed statement of reasons.
First, I must consider the nature of plaintiff's interest in the University's refusal to reclassify her as a Michigan resident. It is important to note at the outset what is not at stake in this litigation. Plaintiff's interest in practicing law is not implicated, cf. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963), nor does plaintiff have a fundamental right to attend law school, see San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). All that is at stake here is the difference between instate and out-of-state tuition for a maximum of two years. This interest, though entitled to protection under the Constitution, is not the sort of interest requiring the maximum protection available under the due process clause.2See Lister v. Hoover, 706 F.2d at 804 (appended District Court opinion); Michelson v. Cox, 476 F.Supp. at 1321.
Second, I must consider whether the procedures currently used for deciding applications for reclassification adequately protect against erroneous results, and whether a detailed statement of reasons would reduce that risk. Initially, plaintiff's application is considered by Larry Katz, Assistant Registrar, and his two assistants, and a consensus opinion is reached. On appeal, a five-member Residency Appeal Committee considers the application de novo. In sum, eight people at two stages of review evaluate applications for reclassification, thus minimizing the risk of erroneous disposition of an application for reclassification. Further, it is difficult to see how a statement of reasons would reduce this risk, given the "`nebulous' nature of the required administrative determination; that is, the bona fides of the expressed domiciliary intent of a full-time University student seeking a preferential tuition rate." Black v. Sullivan, 561 F.Supp. at 1062. The University's letter rejecting plaintiff's application makes clear that plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption that she remains an out-of-state resident.3 The University's residency regulations similarly make clear what sort of evidence could rebut that presumption. In light of this information available to plaintiff, "exhaustive detailing of the reasons for denying reclassification would be of dubious value in view of the highly subjective nature of the subject matter under inquiry." Black v. Sullivan, 561 F.Supp. at 1063. Accordingly, I hold that under the procedures currently employed by the University, the risk of error is relatively slight, and that risk would not be reduced noticeably by requiring such a statement.
Finally, I must consider the state's interest and the added fiscal and administrative burden if the University were required to issue statements of reasons for denial of applications for reclassification. Clearly, Michigan has a "legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition...
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...students had property interest in "difference between resident and nonresident student tuition"); Spielberg v. Board of Regents, Univ. of Michigan, 601 F.Supp. 994, 997-98 (E.D.Mich.1985) (observing enrolled student had property interest in "difference between in-state and out-of-state tuit......
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Tobin v. University of Maine System, Civil No. 98-237-B (D. Me. 6/30/1999)
...students had property interest in "difference between resident and nonresident student tuition"); Spielberg v. Board of Regents, Univ. of Michigan, 601 F. Supp. 994, 997-98 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (observing enrolled student had property interest in "difference between in-state and out-of-state t......