Spiers v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 January 1935
• Docket Number: 13975.
• Citation: 178 S.E. 136,174 S.C. 508
• Parties: SPIERS v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

178 S.E. 136

174 S.C. 508

SPIERS v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

No. 13975.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 14, 1935

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Berkeley County; T. S Sease, Judge.

Action by Sara Spiers against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. From judgment in favor of the plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Hagood Rivers & Young, of Charleston, for appellant.

L. E Purdy, of Sumter, for respondent.

STABLER Justice.

This action was brought by the plaintiff for the recovery of damages, both actual and punitive, for personal injuries suffered by her when an automobile in which she was riding collided with defendant's train of cars. The complaint alleges, inter alia:

"That on or about the 29th day of April, 1932, in the night time, the plaintiff was riding in an automobile driven by another on South Carolina highway number seventeen, in approximately a southerly direction; that the tracks of the said defendant cross the said highway at or about a point known as Heinemann Station, in Williamsburg County in said State. That without any warning of any kind as to the presence of defendant's train, the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding collided with a freight car constituting a part of a train operated by the defendant which at the time in question was standing on the defendant's tracks at the point above described and across the whole width of the said highway, and for some distance on both sides thereof. That it was dark at the time and place aforesaid, and the presence of the defendant's train of cars not being known to the plaintiff or to the driver of the said automobile.

* * * That the train of cars of the defendant was allowed to remain upon and obstruct the said highway for an unreasonable and unnecessary length of time; that the defendant so obstructed the highway without having any lights showing on the train or elsewhere on the crossing and without having any person or persons placed to warn travelers of such obstruction and without taking means to protect travelers along the highway against running into or colliding with said train, although the defendant knew that such obstruction was dangerous to the traveling public , and although the persons in charge of the train knew that the plaintiff was injured and knew that it was necessary to have the highway open in order that she might go to a hospital to be treated, the train of cars was permitted to remain on the highway for at least thirty minutes before an opening was made through which an automobile could pass to take her to a hospital, and during all of which time the plaintiff suffered great pain from the cuts and bruises and from the loss of blood.

That all of said acts and omissions on the part of the defendant were negligently, recklessly and wilfully done and omitted to be done as aforesaid. * * *"

The defendant, while admitting the collision, denied the material allegations of the complaint, and set up, as an affirmative defense, contributory negligence and recklessness on the part of the plaintiff and on the part of the driver of the automobile.

The case was tried at the fall, 1933, term of court of common pleas for Berkeley county. At the close of the testimony, the defendant asked for a directed verdict on the following grounds: (1) That there was no evidence of actionable negligence; (2) that the testimony of "the plaintiff shows that the accident was caused by the negligence and recklessness of the driver of the car"; and (3) that it is undisputed that the train crew did all it could do in the circumstances. Judge Sease held that there was "no testimony to bring this case under the blocking statute * * * and * * * under the crossing statute" (sections 5829 and 8355 of the Code), but that the evidence required its submission to the jury on the question of common-law negligence-a failure to exercise due care in the circumstances. He therefore overruled the motion, but instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover only actual damages, if anything. A verdict was found for $1,500, and the defendant appeals.

The appellant argues, in the first place, that it was error not to grant its motion, for the reason that a "railroad company is under no duty in case a train be stopped across a highway, to give signals to travelers on the highway that there is a car across the road * * * that there can be no greater warning of the presence of the train than the train itself."

This contention does not seem to have support in the decisions of this court. In Myers v. Railway Co., 172 S.C. 236 173...