Spin Ghar Properties, LLC v. Stewart
| Decision Date | 25 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | HFHCV166001697S |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Spin Ghar Properties, LLC v. Lorenza Stewart, Anthony Kinsey aka John Doe and Jane Doe |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
This memorandum of decision addresses the issues raised through the summary process complaint brought by Spin Ghar Properties, LLC (Spin Ghar) seeking possession of the dwelling unit known as 30 Auburn Street, Apt. 9, in Hartford CT (the dwelling unit) from the named defendants Lorenza Stewart, John Doe and Jane Doe.
The plaintiff was represented by counsel throughout. Stewart filed an appearance on her own behalf with special defenses on May 18, 2016. On June 14, 2016, identifying himself as the defendant John Doe, Anthony E. Kinsey filed an appearance to represent himself. Jane Doe has not appeared in this matter and is subject to a default judgment, as discussed below.
The matter was tried to the court on July 19, 20 and 21, 2016. On the first day of trial, Spin Ghar withdrew Count Five of its complaint but reserved the privilege of presenting evidence on the subject raised therein. Before hearing evidence, the court considered the allegation in Stewart's Special Defenses that claimed the summary process litigation should be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. The court orally denying Stewart's cognizable motion to dismiss for the reasons discussed in Part I, testimonial and documentary evidence was received in support and in opposition to the complaint, the complaint, and in support of the Stewart's remaining special defenses; all evidence was subject to vigorous cross examination. After hearing, and without objection, the court took judicial notice of the file. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the operative allegations of its complaint by a fair preponderance of the evidence.[1] Stewart bears like burden of proof insofar as her special defenses are concerned.[2]
The court has reviewed the pleadings and considered the evidence in its entirety using the applicable principles of law and equity. Basing its decision upon those facts proved at trial by a fair preponderance of the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the court finds all issues in favor of Spin Ghar and enters judgment of possession for the plaintiff and against each defendant.[3]
As Stewart implicated the court's jurisdiction by alleging that the " case should be dismissed because the quit date on lapse of time should be 5/1/2016 and not 4/30/16 " the court has considered the self-represented litigant's claim in the context of a motion to dismiss. (Stewart Special Defenses, 5/18/16.) (Emphasis added.) Housing Authority v. DeRoche, 112 Conn.App. 355, 362, 962 A.2d 904 (2009). See also St. Paul's Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, 124 Conn.App. 728, 734, 6 A.3d 1168 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906, 12 A.3d 1002 (2011).
The record in this case establishes, without factual contest, that the Notice to Quit was served upon Stewart on March 22, 2016.[4] Among other things, this notice to quit asserted that because of " Lapse of Time" this defendant, those holding under her, John Doe and Jane Doe were required to quit possession or occupancy of the dwelling unit on or before April 30, 2016. Stewart has provided no authority to support her claim that the notice to quit must fail because it named the last day of the month of April 2016 as the date by which she was to leave the premises; she has provided no authority establishing that a notice to quit based on lapse of time must name the first date of the following month, May 1 in this case, as the date for departure.
Wilkes v. Thomson, 155 Conn.App. 278, 282, 109 A.3d 543 (2015). " Service of a valid notice to quit, which terminates the lease and creates a tenancy at sufferance . . . is a condition precedent to a summary process action . . ." Cheshire Land Trust, LLC v. Casey, 156 Conn.App. 833, 839, 115 A.3d 497 (2015), quoting Cornfield Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Cummings, 148 Conn.App. 70, 76, 84 A.3d 929 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 929, 110 A.3d 433 (2015). (Citations and footnote omitted.) Sproviero v. J.M. Scott Associates, Inc., 108 Conn.App. 454, 462-63, 948 A.2d 379 (2008).
Here, on the face of the record, the court has found the notice to quit fully sufficient to support the court's jurisdiction over the plaintiff's lapse of time allegations, within the application of General Statutes § 47a-23(a)(1)(A).
Accordingly, Stewart's motion to dismiss has been DENIED.
In July 2015, Spin Ghar Properties, LLC purchased the property at 30 Auburn Street in Hartford, which houses fourteen dwelling units including Apt. 9. Stewart has resided at the dwelling unit for approximately twenty-five years. Approximately ten years ago, Stewart was a party to a written lease through which Spin Ghar's predecessor in interest allowed Stewart to reside at the premises for one year; when that written lease expired, Stewart remained in place pursuant to an unwritten month-to-month lease.[5] In the past few years, in the absence of a written rental agreement, Stewart's monthly rent had been $500, the same rent charged for occupancy of some of the other dwelling units at 30 Auburn Street. Kinsey has never been a party to a lease permitting him to reside at the dwelling unit and has never been responsible for paying rent; he has lived at the dwelling unit with Stewart since before Spin Ghar obtained ownership of the property. The court credits Stewart's testimony establishing that there is always someone present at the dwelling unit, so access can always be obtained; the court also reasonably infers therefrom, however, that anyone present within the dwelling unit could deny access to one who sought consent to enter.[6] (Tes. Stewart.)
On approximately August 12, 2015, Spin Ghar sent and Stewart received a letter through which the plaintiff informed her that a one-year lease was available for the dwelling unit, with a rental increase to $725 per month plus " a onetime deposit of $725, " and that if she did not sign the proffered lease, she could " continue on month to month [but] the rent will be $775 with a onetime deposit of $775." [7] The plaintiff sent similar letters to the other tenants of the dwelling units at 30 Auburn Street proffering terms for written or month-to-month leases. Stewart did not respond to the plaintiff concerning the content of the letter. She did not accept the lease terms, but knowingly remained in possession as a month-to-month tenant causing, allowing and/or permitting Kinsey and Jane Doe to live with her. (Tes. Stewart, Kinsey, Akbarzai.)
Soon after receiving this letter, Stewart and a number of other 30 Auburn Street occupants complained to the City of Hartford's Fair Rent Commission (FRC) concerning the plaintiffs proposed rent increases and/or the condition of the dwelling units.[8] In connection with these complaints, the apartments at 30 Auburn Street were inspected by Alexander Samboy, a Housing Code Enforcement Officer for the City of Hartford (city inspector). The city inspector identified some code violations, unspecified at trial, in some of the apartments at 30 Auburn Street. Samboy rendered his written report on October 13, 2015, and made it available to the FRC.
By October 20, 2015, in compliance and cooperation with the FRC the plaintiff had commenced reasonable efforts to communicate orally with Stewart to provide notice of its intention to enter 30 Auburn Street, Apt. 9 at a reasonable time to inspect its condition and address any code violations or conditions requiring repair, as contemplated by General Statutes § 47a-16(c).[9] Neither Stewart nor any of the dwelling unit's occupants then gave consent to permit the plaintiff to enter the dwelling unit; under the circumstances, the landlord could not enter the apartment, even to inspect the premises, make repairs...
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